PERI OIKONOMIA THEOU: THE MEANING OF HISTORY ACCORDING TO THE GREEK FATHERS

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ABSTRACT

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The "philosophy of history" according to the Greek Fathers has suffered in two ways: it has fallen into the shadow of Saint Augustine and whenever investigated by modern scholarship it has been viewed as both a Christian version of Greek philosophy and a preamble to Scholasticism. In both instances, the teachings, didascalia, of the Fathers has been approached with modern Western presuppositions which themselves are biased and without antecedent demonstration. It is ludicrous, therefore, that modern historians should make such categoric declarations about the Greek patres when the foundations of modern thought are so profoundly uncertain. Modernity has not only arbitrarily driven theology from history, but insists that all thought evolves quite naturally as a continuous whole while admitting no "supernatural interruptions". Modern intellectualism will recognize nothing unique in history, nothing beyond reason and the instruments of reason.

On the other hand, the Fathers nowhere claim to have produced a "philosophy of history". They refer to themselves only as believers, witnesses to Christ or, more broadly, the Christian economy, the acts of God in history which have culminated in the Incarnation and the redemptive deeds of Christ. Their witness, moreover, declares that

all history in the warfare between God and Satan, between the forces of good and evil, eternal life and eternal death. Thus, the story of man is a cosmic drama: the destiny of the children of God and the children of Adam. The end of the former is deification, theosis, and the end of the latter is everlasting death with Satan and his angels. These have already been routed by Christ at Calvary and His Resurrection. This "victory of Christ" has inaugurated "the age to come", "the Eighth Day", the "Day" or "Age" after "the seven ages" of the world as it is, history as we know it. The "age to come" is the time when God will have banished sin, corruption and death. This is "the new creation" of which Christ is the earnest.

History is being moved to its end by a theandric process. History possesses a divine and human aspect both of which are united to each other even as the two natures of Christ are united in one Person. But Christ has taken human sin unto Himself in order to destroy it; thus, history is a dialectical process of purification, a process of preparation for eternity. In other terms, modern scholarship is wrong to look for "dualism" in the Fathers akin to Platonism. Time and eternity are merged christologically and the only "dualism" they recognize is that which exists between the Church and the world. Nowhere in the Greek Fathers do we find anything not consistent with the traditional christologico-ecclesiologico-eschatologico-soteriology of the Christian Faith.

The soteriological attitude of the Greek Fathers is also found in their teachings concerning the two primary human enterprises, culture and the state. These are interpreted christologically: secular culture as education has no value as such, but is positively inimical to Christians; yet, it contains some truth and can prove useful in the salvation of the believer. Christian culture, on the other hand, is the handmaid of theology and is connected to it as the humanity of Christ is related to His divinity. The secular state is antithetical to Christianity, but the Christian state has an evangelical purpose. Its relationship to the Church is like that which exists between the human and the divine in Christ. No particular form of the state or culture appears to be necessary; nevertheless, they must illustrate the principles of the Christian understanding of history.

History is salvation. Salvation is eschatological. Eschatology means that the future is present. It was present in Old Israel in the forms of "types" and in paganism as "anti-types". The future is present in the Church as the Eucharist; indeed, the Church is created by the Eucharist. The Church, then, is the beginning of "the Eighth Age", the inauguration of the Kingdom of God, the initiation of deification. What the Church does not sanctify must fall into perdition. This history of the world outside the Church is the history of decay and death, the end of that history is utter alienation from God. The

dichotomy between the Church and the world is the history of redemption and the history of decadence. This does not mean, however, that God has simply abandoned the world, for He has instituted government and has sought to enlighten every man that comes into the world. He has made every effort to convert the unbeliever to Christ even by means of catastrophe. Everything in history has been calculated, kairos, to bring the whole cosmos to the Trinity. Man, nonetheless, is free and may oppose the Will of the Creator.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

For too long the Christian vision of history has been identified with Saint Augustine's conception of it. There is something ironical in this fact, because, in his own day, he was a relatively unknown African bishop who exerted little influence[1] on other thinkers, while the Greek Fathers, whose

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[1]For example, Augustine's teaching on predestination gained very few adherents. Father Garrigou-Lagrange can count only Sts. Prosper of Aquitaine (39-463), Caesrius of Arles (470-453), Fulgentius of Ruspe (468-533), the author of De Vocatione omnium gentium in the sixth century, a few bishops of Rome and probably, St. Isidore of Seville (seventh century). See Sent. II, 6 PL 83 606BC. Although the council of Orange (529) condemned semi-Pelegianism, it failed to define predestination. In addition, St. Faustus of Riez (d. 485), Vicent of Lerins (c. 450) and John Cassian (390-463) would not receive Augustine's doctrine. St. Pope Gregory the Great (540-604) spoke of predestination merely as divine foreknowledge (e.g., Moralia XXXIII, 21 PL 75 1135B). Lagrange can find no Greek Fathers with the exception of Sts. John Chrysostom and John of Damascus (whom he, like Thomas Aquinas, misinterprets. See Summ. Theol. (vol. I of The Writings of Thomas Aquinas, edited by A.C. Pegis). New York, 1945, q. xxiii, a. 1-8) who advocated predestination. Not until Anselm (1033-1109) does the idea become common in the West (Predestination, trans. by Dom Rose Bede. St. Louis, 1935, pp. 39-45). Of the theological controversies in which Augustine became involved--Donatist, Manichaean and Pelegian--none gained him universal recognition. He did win some reputation, however, because he was invited to deliver the official panegyric in praise of Bauto and the Emperor Valentinian. In his Bibliotheca, St. Photius confused Augustine with the bishop of Carthage and appears only to have been interested in the council of Diosopolis (415) which tried Pelagius (Cod. 54 PG 103 96C). That Pelagianism was eventually condemned by the ecumenical council of Ephesus (431) was totally unrelated to the opinions of Augustine; it was a

witness was felt throughout the Empire and who were chiefly responsible for the definitions of faith, are not well understood even today in the West,[2] seeming always to fall beneath the shadow of "the greatest genius the Church has ever possessed."[3] This usual estimate of Augustine is even more curious (if not dubious) when one considers that Origen (who certainly was as voluminous) was more influential during the early Church[4] and that Augustine, like Origen, often, as the

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heresy associated with Nestorianism. Again, the reputations of Sts. Hillary of Poitier, Ambrose and Jerome were far greater and universally acclaimed. Augustine's influence only gradually began to spread and earned cultural importance with Cassiodorus' (477-570) adoption of his scheme for Christian education found in De Doctrina Christianum. By the ninth century, Augustine's teachings almost dominated theology in the West, especially his political theory. See J. N. Figgis, The Political Aspects of St. Augustine's 'City of God'. Glouster (Mass.), 1963, p. 93f.

[2]Thus, Cyril Richardson can write that the "weakness" of "Eastern theology" is "its failure to grasp the meaning of history, and its difficulty in freeing itself from Hellenistic elements in its approach to creation, sexuality and death" (Christology of the Later Fathers [vol. VIII of The Library of Christian Classics]. Philadelphia, 1954, p. 250); and Sister Hilda Graef considers the absence of a doctrine of grace a major defect in the "theology" of the Greek Fathers. The "question of grace" never arose in the East, she writes, "because no particular heresy on this matter had been propounded there. Moreover, it is undeniable that Greek ascetical teaching was greatly indebted to Stoic philosophy, and that the emphasis on human effort learned in this school was not always balanced by the corresponding stress on Divine grace that should have been learned from St. Paul" (in Graef's introduction to her translation of the writings of St. Gregory of Nyssa, in Ancient Christian Writers, vol. XVIII, Westminister (Md.), 1954, p. 19). The absurdity of these remarks will be shown later.

[3]J. Tixeront, A Handbook of Patrology, trans. by S. A. Raemers. St. Louis, 1951, p. 260.

[4]See J. Daniélou, Origen, trans. by Walter Mitchell. New York, 1955, vii.

result of unusual tolerance towards Hellenism, did not always express himself in terms of unquestionable orthodoxy. It was, perhaps, Augustine's isolation--although it is said that he contemplated attending the council of Ephesus (431)--that he elaborated those theological ideas which, in the light of future historical developments, alienated him from the Eastern Church and to this day has left him uncanonized by it.[5]

It is not our intention here to undertake a critique of "the philosophy of Saint Augustine", nor even to offer an alternate Christian "philosophy of history", but to present the broader vision of the Greek Fathers, a vision not limited, as his was, by personal experiences. The Confessions show clearly how Augustine's philosophical speculations and religious beliefs, his thoughts, his feelings, mysticism, rationalism, joy and suffering--his exaggerated sense of guilt and his dark and atrabilious moods-contributed to his peculiar and sometimes heterodox doctrines. Yet, the attitude of Saint Augustine towards history--and one might be surprised how unlike the subsequent interpretations his teachings really are--is basically correct from the anthropic point of view even if he does not, as the Greek Fathers, give history cosmological magnitude. The difference between them

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[5]It is noteworthy, nevertheless, how much in common Augustine had with the Greek Fathers. Werner Jaeger concedes that Augustine, who lived only a generation after the Cappadocian fathers, "had so many characteristic features in common with them in a way that is still unexplained" (Early Christianity and the Greek Paideia. Cambridge (Mass.), 1961, p. 101).

can be explained by historical circumstance and the unity of their thought by the Christian tradition.

Unfortunately, the categories of the patristic mind have been obfuscated by modern researchers, the very enterprise of which is vitiated ab initio by undemonstrated presuppositions and crippled further by arbitrary aims and methods. The erroneous attitudes, especially concerning the Greek Fathers, were probably established during the Latin Middle Ages when the paucity of manuscripts and poor translations of their writings,[6] along with the Scholastic compromise with Aristotle and neo-Platonism, more than obscured their didascalia; and, too, later in the sixteenth century, during the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, the Greek Fathers, used to corroborate conflicting Augustinianisms, were lost in the polemical warfare of misused texts and verse. It was not until after the hostilities between Roman Catholic and Protestant had abated that the work of reclamation, the search for Christian origins began--usually by

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[6]For example, there was little knowledge of St. Athanasius until the Renaissance and his Oratio de Incarnatione Verbi Dei was not translated from the Greek until the fifteenth century. Although St. Gregory Nazianzus was much read during the Greek Middle Ages, it was not until the Renaissance that a full edition of the Orationes, with some letters and poems, appeared. Of St. Gregory of Nyssa, there was no trustworthy edition of his works until 1615. See E. R. Hardy and C. C. Richardson, The Christology of the Later Fathers, pp. 49-51, 120-121, 251-253. Sts. Basil, Chrysostom, Dionysius, Maximus the Confessor and John of Damascus seem to have been the most popular Greek Fathers during the Latin Middle Ages, but the manuscripts were few, the knowledge of the Greek language poor and the translations not always good. See C. H. Haskins, The Renaissance of the 12th Century. New York, 1955, pp. 278-302.

members of religious orders[7]--that the West became aware that an understanding of Christian history and doctrine was not possible without seriously taking into account the witness of the Fathers and that certain questions needed to be answered about them before the nature of that history and doctrine could be ascertained.

It was asked (as some are still asking), what or who is a "father of the Church"? The title "father" is to be found already in the Old Testament, where it was applied to

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[7]In the sixteenth century, the task of bibliography was begun by Marguerin de la Bigne, canon of Bayeux, in his 9 volume Bibliotheca Sanctorum Patrum (Paris, 1575-1579) containing more than 200 writers of the early and Middle Ages. He perfected the work initiated by Estienne, Froben, Erasmus, etc.; nevertheless, La Bigne's collection was the first of its kind. His collection developed into the Maxima Bibliotheca Veterum Patrum in 27 volumes (Lyons, 1677). This was improved by the Benedictine fathers, Combefis (1648-1672), J. B. Cotelier (1677-1686), Bernard de Montfaucon (1706) and the Oratorian, Andres Gallandi (1765-1681). The collection which appears to have superseded them all is J. P. Migne's 379 volume Patrologiae Cursus Completus (Paris, 1857-1866) in two series: the Latin Fathers from the beginning to the pontificate of Innocent III; and the Greek Fathers from sub-Apostolic times to the council of Florence (1439). These two series, used in our study, will be referred to as PL (=patrologia latina) and PG (=patrologia graeca) as is customary. Migne's patrology reproduces many excellent texts "avec negligence et avec de nombreuses fautes", observes E. Amann, and has no sharply defined plan of order and sometimes wrongly attributes works (e.g., Hippolytus' Philosophoumena to Origen) and sometimes there are omissions and doublets. Nevertheless, Migne's collection is an enormous contribution to religious science (Dictionaire de Theologie Catholique, vol. X, Paris, 1929, 1739-1740). There are other translations and collections which have been or are being published, intended to correct and complete Migne's work. See Bibliographia Patristica (Berlin, 1956-1963); and e.g., in the bibliographies in B. Altaner's Patrology, trans. by H. C. Graef, Freiburg, 1960; and J. Tixeront, A Handbook of Patrology: references are found in their introductions and throughout the text.

patriarchs (Gen. i, 24; Exod. iii, 13-15; Deut. i, 8), priests (Judg. xvii, 10; xviii, 19), prophets (II Kings ii, 12; vi, 21; xiii, 4) and distinguished ancestors (Ecclus., xliv, 1). In Rabbinic literature "the fathers" were the more learned of the earlier rabbis whose sayings were handed down for the "guidance of posterity". In the time of Our Lord, the scribes arrogantly claimed the title and gained His vehement disapproval (Matt. xxiii, 9). Saints Peter and Paul and John refer to their converts as spiritual children (I Cor. iv, 14f; Gal. iv, 19; I Pet. v, 13; I John ii, 12). When Saint Polycarp of Smyrna was martyred (155 A. D.), the pagan crowd shouted, "This is the teacher of Asia, the father of the Christians (ho patēr tōn Christianōn), the destroyer of our gods, who teaches neither to offer sacrifices nor to worship."[8] In the third century, members of the magisterium were sometimes addressed as "father"; for instance, Saint Cyprian of Carthage was styled, Cypriano papae.[9] The bishops who sat in the ecumenical councils of the fourth century were known as "the 318 fathers" of Nicea (325) and "the 150 fathers" of Constantinople (381). Again, Saint Athanasius wrote, "We have the witness of the fathers (for the use of the word homoousios) . . . ."[10]

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[8] Martyr. Polyc. (vol. II of The Apostolic Fathers, trans. by K. Lake). London, 1930, xii, 2.

[9] Ep. XXX, 1 PL 4 311A. Cf. St. Hippolytus, Philosophoumena V, 8 PG 16 3146B.

[10] ek Paterōn echontes tēn martyrian (Ep. ad Afros, 6 PG 26 1040B). Cf. St. Basil, de Spirit. Sanct., 79 PG 32 209A.

Thus, Henry Barclay Swete defined "the fathers of the Church" as "those great bishops and eminent teachers of antiquity" who were conspicuous for "soundness of judgment and sanctity of life and whose writings remained as a court of appeal for their successors."[11] Following this principle, the list of "fathers" meant an enumeration commencing with the writers of the first century (excluding the New Testament) and ending sometimes before, often within, occasionally later than the eighth century, but always, it appears, the periodization is set arbitrarily.[12] For example, Campenhausen insists that "the [Greek] patristic age" closed with Saint Cyril of Alexandria, because "the freedom of Biblical and systematic research" ends and "theology" becomes "scholastic" in the sense that "the authority of the old Church Fathers overshadowed more and more the influence and responsibility of the contemporary teacher."[13]

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[11] "The Fathers of the Church," The Encyclopedia Britannica, (vol. X) New York, 1911, 200.

[12] In the West, says Fr. Florovsky, "the Patristic Age" has been fixed, because it is believed that this age has been "succeeded and, indeed, superseded by the 'Age of the Schoolmen', which is essentially a step forward. Since the rise of Scholasticism "Patristic theology' has been antiquated . . . ." Accordingly, we are now faced with the choices, he continues, either to "regret the 'backwardness' of the East which never developed any "Scholasticism of its own" or to become theological archeologists, living in the past. This choice poses false alternatives, because that to which the Fathers testified has not ceased, neither must we declare the "age of the Fathers" terminated. To it "there should be no restriction" ("Gregory Palamas and the Tradition of the Fathers" Greek Orthodox Theological Review. V, 2 (1959-1960), 123-124.)

[13] The Fathers of the Greek Church, trans. by S. Goodwin. New York, 1959, p. 6.

Apparently not everyone agrees with Campenhausen, because Tixeront says that most patrologies close the age of the Greek Fathers with "the death of Saint John of Damascus (c. 749)" and the Latin Fathers with the death of Saint Gregory the Great (604) or even Saint Isidore of Seville (636). He offers no reason for the periodization of the former, but for the latter he suggests that the seventh century "was the time when new elements, borrowed from the barbarians, began considerably to modify the purity of the Latin genius."[14] It is difficult to see what the witness of the Fathers to the truth of the Christian religion has to do with "the purity of the Latin genius".

Another problem, not unrelated to our previous discussion, is the matter of whether all Christian writers of any given period are to be included among the "fathers". Migne, following the example of anterior bibliothecae patrorum, indiscriminately collected the writings of all the theologians within the scope of his work, but, nevertheless, inscribed on its title page "ecclesiastical writers," "doctors," and "fathers"--Patrologiae cursus completus seu Bibliotheca Universalis, Integra, Uniformis Comoda, Oeconomica Omnium SS Patrum, Doctorum Scriptorunque Ecclesiasticorum. For the comprehensive use of the expression "ecclesiastical writers", he had the authority of Saint Jerome's De viris illustribus which listed such heresiarchs or schizmatics as Tatian, Novatus, Donatus, Photinus and Eunomius. Clearly,

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[14] Handbook of Patrology, p. 1.

Jerome was not an uncritical patrologist and his testimony cannot be accepted as final or definitive.

Aside from the volume of Jerome, a list of Christian authors is to be found in the so-called Gelasian Decretum de libris recipiendis et non recipiendis which enumerates the marks of a "father" as doctrina orthodoxa, sanctitas vitae, antiquitas and approbatio ecclesiae.[15] These "marks", however, are somewhat misleading: by the first, we could not explain the apocatastasis of Saint Gregory of Nyssa or the millenianism of Saint Irenaeus; by the second, the obstinate and irascible Jerome could not be a "father"; "antiquity" as a "mark" has already been dismissed; and by the fourth, innumerable "fathers" who have never received "ecclesiastical approbation" would be removed from the list, such as Saint Theodore of Tarsus or Saint Mark of Ephesus.

We must admit that no source has given us an adequate definition of the title "father". Nevertheless, we must presume to offer our own: a "father" is any Christian author whose life and literature, in their spirit and general content, express the faith and piety of the Church. His thought must display no fundamental disparity with the continuity of the Christian tradition[16] and his life any opposition to

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[15]See Altaner, p. 14; and Tixeront, p. 2.

[16]We are aware that this definition raises various important questions which we are unable to discuss here. It is important, however, that we have some understanding of the word, "tradition". It is not "old customs" transmitted from one generation of Christians to another, for these may have been initially false, inveterate prejudice. Neither is it merely a "continuity of human memory, or a permanence of

the corporate piety of the Church. In our study, then, the title "father" and "ecclesiastical writer" will be sharply distinguished. There will be, consequently, excluded such important names from the list of the Fathers as Tatian, Clement of Alexandria, Eusebius of Caesarea, Origen, Tertullian, Faustus of Riez. To be sure, the errors laid to their charge do not simply erase that in which they were eminently orthodox and we shall not fail to allude to their writings, to their corroborative authority. We have no right, however, to call them "fathers," because some of them were condemned as heretics by ecumenical councils (e.g., Origen), some informally (e.g., Clement of Alexandria by Saint Photius in his Bibliotheca, Cod. 109-111 PG 103 384D-385A), and some even left the Church (e.g., Tatian and Tertullian). None of them is found on the liturgical calendar of the Eastern Church. Moreover, the title "doctor" has no meaning for us, because it was only given much later in the West to such theological writers as Aquinas and Bonaventura on the assumption that "the Patristic age" had ended

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rites and habits," but something living: "the living unity with the fullness of Christian experience . . . the reverence for the supratemporal unity of history as the God-man process and the devoted esteem for the entire past" (Metropolitan Seraphim, Die Ostkirche. Stuttgart, 1950, pp. 32-33). Tradition is the depositum juvenescens, the faith once delivered to the Apostles by Christ, placed in the custody of the Church and delivered to every generation of Christians by her ministry under the guidance of the Holy Spirit (See St. Irenaeus, Contra Haer. III, 2 PG 7 847A). Tradition is "only tradition of truth, traditio veritatis", exclaims Father Florovsky, "a continuity of Divine guidance and illumination ("Gregory Palamas and the Tradition of the Fathers," Greek Orthodox Theological Review, V, 2 (1959-1960), p. 120).

and a new distinction was needed to identify a new situation.

The Fathers, however, are witnesses to the Christian faith. It would be unfair to believe that they were, like some of the theological writers of Christian history, metaphysicians speculating on doctrine and weaving intricate philosophical systems which demand that the historian place them "in the mainstream of the development of ideas".[17] It is equally wrong to view their labors, as does Adolph von Harnack, as something Greek in spirit, that is, to transform the Christian faith into dogma, into something rational. The process of Hellenization, he insists, was begun by the Apologists and, naturally, continued by their successors.[18] It is apparent to Harnack cum sui that not only the historic form of the patristic witness is "hellenistic" but the content

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[17]H. A. Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Church Fathers, vol. I. Cambridge, (Mass.), 1956, vi.

[18]" . . . die Thesen der Apologeten haben in den kirchlichen Kreisen schliesslich alle Bedenken Ueberwunden und die roemisch-griechische Welt gewonnen," Harnack states, "weil sie das Christenthum rational gemacht haben, ohne seinen ueberlieferten historischen Stoff anzutasten oder ihm etwas Realistisches hinzusufuegen. Das Geheimniss des epochemachenden Erfolges der apologetischen Theologie liegt in der Tatsache, dass diese christlichen Philosophen das Evangelium inhaltlichen auf eine Formel gebracht haben, die dem common sense aller ernst Denkenden und Vernuenftigen des Zeitalters entgegenkam, waehrend sie den ueberlieferten positiven Stoff, die Geschichte und die Verehrung Christi miteingeschlossen, hauptsaechlich fuer die noch fehlende und bisher mit heissem Bemuehen gesuchte Beglaubigung und Versicherung dieser verununftigen Religion zu benutzen verstanden" (Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte, bd. I, viert. aufl. Tuebingen, 1909, p. 498. Part one of the second book of volume I is dedicated to the demonstration of this idea--"Fixirung und allmaehliche Hellenisirung des Christentums als Glaubenslehre" (pp. 496-796).

of it. He would simply reject Saint Maximus' remark that "the Fathers did not draw from their own resources, but learned these things about Christ from the Scriptures and with love taught us. For it is not they who speak, but the grace of the Holy Spirit which entirely permeated them."[19] In this study, however, the claim of the Fathers that the Christian faith is divinely revealed and their witness is divinely guided will not be questioned. It is the task of the historian to understand the Fathers as they understood themselves and not to recast them in some system of his own liking.

The Fathers believed that Christianity was a unique reality, something essentially undetermined by historical causality even though, in some respects, part of it. They never considered themselves as lonely thinkers in quest of some possible way to truth. Indeed, their ideas were nothing more than a witness, martyria, to the truth; and their witness was as objective as the Christian faith was unique. Yet, most modern historians generally refuse to take "the philosophy of the Church Fathers" as anything more than a synthesis of human ideas with purely human sources, that is, Hellenism and Judaism. Undoubtedly, the Fathers agreed that Judaism and Hellenism prepared for the advent of Christianity, but with equal conviction they did not allow that any human source accounted for the origin of Christianity. Their religion was older than the world and, therefore, preceded the

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[19] Discip. c. Pyrrho, PG 91 320D.

truths of all religions and philosophies. The Jews and the Greeks gave Christianity historical form and language, but its origin was beyond history. The Church was not in Itself a human institution although not without human and historical character. Ignoring this claim, modern historians have habitually examined the patristic didascalia (and Christianity) with the undisputed assumption that it (and the Church) could be understood by purely natural means--philosophy, philology, anthropology, comparative religion, etc.

Almost as if the Fathers had anticipated this allegation, they drew a line sharply between Christianity and the world. Against Judaism and Hellenism, they set the inexplicable mystery of the Incarnation. Thus, Saint Athanasius confuted the Jews with an appeal to Biblical prophecy. "Who is there so great that even the Prophets foretell of Him such mighty works? There is, indeed, no one in the Scriptures save the common Savior of mankind, the Logos of God, our Lord Jesus Christ. He it is that issued from the Virgin and appeared on earth as man. He it is whose fleshly lineage cannot be traced, because He alone derived His body from no human father, but from the Virgin alone."[20] Of course, Athanasius recognized that Judaism was a "revealed religion"--for which reason he used the authority of the prophets--but its purpose was now

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[20]Ora. de Incarn. Verbi Dei, 33 PG 25 153A.

consumated and now it stood in opposition to God.

In the same position, the Fathers placed the personal Creator--God became incarnate to the impersonal pagan principle of cosmic intelligibility.[21] In the seventh book of his Confessions, Saint Augustine remarks that he found "in certain books of the Platonists" the words "to the same purpose . . . that 'In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God and the Word was God . . . ' But 'that he came unto his own, and his own received him not; but as many as received him, to them gave he power to become the sons of God, as many as believed in his name'; this I did not read there . . . neither that 'the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us', I did not read there."[22] Neither the Jews nor the Greeks could tolerate that the principle of ultimacy--Yahweh and Logos--could become man. The Jews believed the Incarnation to be irreconcilable with God's transcedence and the Greeks had no idea of divine personality.

For the Fathers, however, the Incarnation with all its historical and ontological consequences was central to their witness. The "enfleshment of the Logos", as Saint Cyril of Alexandria liked to refer to it, was the most

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[21] Werner Jaeger confirms that the idea of the Incarnation (and the suffering God) "conflicted with the a priori categories of the theory of the Divine in Greek theology" (Early Christianity and the Greek Paideia, p. 128); and Gustave Thils says that the Incarnation is for Hellenism and Christianity "un difference radicale et unsurmontable" (Théologie des Réalités Terrestres, vol. 2: Theologie de l Histoire. Bruges, 1949, p. 16).

[22] Saint Augustine, The Confessions, trans. by E. F. Pusey. New York, 1949, pp. 130-131.

significant and critical fact of all existence and, therefore, was the sine qua non of their "philosophy". Their conception of the Incarnation, moreover, was not metaphysical, although, at times, their language was dressed in the garments of pagan Greek philosophy. Their christology was precisely the christology formulated by the council of Chalcedon (451), the very formula which gave them the principle of historical understanding. It states:

> . . . one and the same Christ, Son, Lord, only-begotten, recognized in two natures, without confusion, without change, without division, without separation; the distinction of natures being annulled by the union, but rather the characteristic of each being preserved and forming one person and subsistence, not as parted or separated into two persons, but one and the same Son and Only-begotten God the Logos, our Lord Jesus Christ; even as the prophets from the earliest times spoke and our Lord Jesus Christ taught us Himself.[23]

As we shall see, the definition, oros, of Chalcedon was the assumption behind all Greek patristic teaching, underlying not only beliefs concerning Christ, but the Church, the sacraments, political theology, culture, in a word, history. It was to Chalcedon to which the historian of the Fathers must look for their ontology not Hellenism.[24]

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[23]In J. D. Mansi, Sacrorum Conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio (Venice, 1759). Council of Chalcedon, Actio V, vii, 116F.

[24]On christology, ontology and the Fathers, see J. Danielou, The Lord of History: Reflections on the Inner Meaning of History, trans. by Nigel Abercrombie. London, 1958, pp. 183-202.

The Chalcedonian formula, incidentally, is not to be taken as defining or comprehending the reality to which it refers. Its language smacks of pagan metaphysics, but only because that vehicle was available and useful. According to the formula itself, however, the truth of it depends on the Christian tradition and not, as in the case of philosophy, on the relation of subject to its predicates. There is no question in the formula regarding the scientific or philosophical ideas of "evidence", self-consistency of immanent criterion. Religious truth is a matter of experience and experience in relation to that which words and thoughts which seek to verbalize that truth and the experience of it are but intellectual petrifications, separate moments culled from the reality they inadequately express. The formula of Chalcedon is only a logical projection of something the Fathers knew to be supralogical, the conceptualization of what in fact cannot be placed in the rational categories within which reason naturally acts.

Most modern historians may consider such ideas with contempt or as incompatible with the results of their investigations--accomplished by scientific procedure and with no prejudgment--but, nevertheless, they have no right to view those results as conclusive or even as most probable. An entire chapter will be devoted to a critique of modern historiography which will center upon the question of historical knowledge. Such a chapter is important, for it will, at least neutralize that analysis of the Church Fathers

which refuses them the courtesy of speaking for themselves and thereby insists that their didascalia must be accepted solely as part of the evolution of human ideas. Such a chapter, too, should argue persuasively for the reinstatement of "theology" as a category of history which, incidentally, the Fathers must be misinterpreted. They found "theology" and "history" inseparable. In other words, a criticism of modern methods and attitudes is essential to vindicate our handling of the sources and the conclusions of this study.

The following chapters will reveal a single persistent theme, the substratum of every chapter--the patristic application of the christology of Chalcedon to all the issues which governed their attention. The chapter subsequent to the criticism of modern historiography will in fact introduce the "philosophy of history" according to the Greek Fathers. This brief chapter will concern the word, oikonomía, a word first employed by Saint Paul to describe God's plan of salvation. The oikonomía theoû is nothing other than the Christian "philosophy of history" delineated in the successive chapters of this work. An examination of this word will distinguish it from others with which it might be confused, viz., theología, theology, and pronoía, providence. Such distinctions will give greater clarity to the area of major concern.

The third chapter, on time and eternity, not only describes the idea of creation and its relation to the

"new creation" in Christ, but discusses why the Christian ontology became the occasion for "the intellectual revolution" wrought by the Church in the Roman Empire. For, palpably, if time and eternity were not utterly disparate--but united as the two natures of Christ--then, all existing institutions and ideas must be radically altered (if not abolished) in order to accommodate the Christian vision of history. Again, if eternity has broken into time, the divine can become human, the human divine, because the "real" and the "ideal" are not antithetical. At the same time, another dualism entered the course of history, but not between time and eternity, as the ancients believed; rather between belief and unbelief, between the civitas terrena and the civitas dei, between those in Christ and those in "the order of things" separated from Christ, that is, between the Church and the world, between God and Satan, between Christ and Adam, regenerate and fallen mankind. When the Logos became incarnate, in other words, He opened eternity to mankind. Thus, the import of the following chapter: unity in Christ, the new humanity, and the disunity of man which characterizes the history of Adam.

Christ was both God and man. He was "the last man", the man who made "the last things", οἱ ἔσχατοι, present: judgment, victory over death, the kingdom of heaven are already offered to man in Him. He is the conqueror of death, sin and corruption, an achievement proper only to the end of the current flow of history. The "age" after history is

adumbrated in Christ and those who have united themselves to Him now participate in the life eternal promised by God. Those in Adam, on the contrary, remain subject to the sequence of the Fall: the slaves of Satan who holds temporary sway over the cosmos. Thus, history may be described as "the coincidence of opposites", the coexistence of the impulse towards sanctification and the impulse towards damnation, and the dialectic between the present and the future. The concidentia oppositorum, also, explains how the "church of sinners", the church militant, and the "church of saints", the church triumphant, can be one church without being confused. They intersect in Christ, the "real" and "ideal" Man.

In other words, the "sons of God" on earth, the "sinful" humanity of Christ, are united to Him without absorption or loss of identity. They are becoming what they are, the Body of Christ. The principle of coincidentia oppositorum is, therefore, the term used to explain the process of spiritual growth, the mystical entelechy of divine-human correspondence. Thus, we learn in the fourth chapter that the church is the anticipated realization of the Kingdom of God. The sinner is initiated into the "new life" by his Baptism and is united to his Lord "ahead of time" in the Eucharist. This is possible because the church is human and divine, temporal and eternal, possessing the attributes of the present and the future and sharing in the "ages" of the now passing course of history and the one

unending "age" of eternity. When Christ returns, the church and the cosmos will be prepared for Him while sin, corruption and death are abolished. The "sons of wrath", the unrepentent and unregenerate servants of Satan will be cast away with their master.

During the course of history, however, the church finds itself in diverse and sometimes complex situations with the provisional features of history, that is, the state and culture. These are treated in chapters seven and eight. The secular state belongs to the fallen world, the Fathers said, and has no purpose except to insure justice and order. It is essentially antithetical to the church and Christians can promise no allegiance to the state save the obedience of just laws and the payment of its material assessments. Yet, when the state is Christian, some explanation is necessary to justify the premises of that relationship. The Church Fathers, who accepted the new alliance between Rome and Jerusalem, gave such an explanation during the "christological controversies" of the fourth and fifth centuries. Likewise, the confrontation with secular culture resulted in the church's clarification of its attitude towards the achievements of human reason. The place of reason in history was settled in terms of the Christian oikonomia theou.

The idea of salvation, according to the Greek Fathers, exhausts the entire meaning of "the Christian philosophy of history"--or as they called it, "the economy of history". It is with "the divine economy" that this study is concerned

and not with patristic historiography--none of the Greek Fathers wrote historical narratives in the familiar sense. Interest will be focussed on those principles which comprise the patristic attitude towards history and by which historical events must be interpreted. Throughout the study, too, care will be taken to distinguish--and not as something incidental to this study's aims--the difference between the Greek Fathers, the pagan, Scholastic and modern conceptions of history. These differences will not only tend to clarify the patristic position, but, also, to support the reality of the uniqueness of its witness; and, finally, marking the differences should greatly contribute to this work's contention that the self-assurance with which modern scholarship seeks to derive the patristic "philosophy of history" from purely historical, natural and human sources must be attenuated and the principles of its research deprived of its customary credibility.

It will not be denied that this study is sympathetic to the witness of the Greek Fathers. Yet, it does not argue a sectarian point of view; rather the burden of the work is a defense of that truth which declares that the world is much more than matter in motion, always subject to the scientific method and never impervious to the scientific and philosophical imagination. In other words, this work proposes that human life is open to knowledge and experience whose origin cannot be rationally discerned or empirically verified, but can only be sought, discovered and confirmed

by the human spirit; and that the enterprise is feasible because the possibility, merit and rewards of it have been given, revealed, disclosed by the living and personal Reality which is the true end of man.

CHAPTER II

THE SURD OF MODERN HISTORICAL INQUIRY

Someone may ask whether a chapter on the major weakness--the vitiating irrational quality--of modern historical inquiry is necessary for an understanding of the Greek patristic "philosophy of history". Does such a chapter have any direct bearing on the integrity of our work? Will it help us to comprehend the spirit and doctrine of the Greek Fathers better? Yes, because those historical disciplines within whose field of competence the Fathers fall, approach that period of Western civilization as if the Fathers were subject to its intellectual and spiritual dominion. Research is done with principles of method and judgment fixed to elicit conclusions about the Fathers with which we cannot concur. But the vast majority of historians reject any method or conclusions which would not harmonize with accepted procedures of inquiry; that is, the "objective" collection of "facts" and their interpretation on the basis of what those "facts" yield of themselves. Any other approach to the "evidence" is condemned as unscientific. Thus, most historians proceed as if their methods and aims were alone applicable to the object of inquiry and as if these alone will produce the desired result, truth. Alternate or opposing methods of investigating history have

little reputation, for the historico-empirical method is received by modern scholarship as *fait accompli*.

Thus, research into "Christian origins", "the history of dogma", the history of philosophy, has always--save with some Christian historians--found purely natural and scientific explanations for the existence of Christianity; and, of course, for the *didascalia* of the Fathers. Supranatural, metahistorical "sources" have been preempetorily excluded as data. Consequently, all the teachings of the Fathers are traced to Hellenic (and/or oriental) sources. Modernity has persistently examined every patristic utterance in terms of ancient life and thought. This practice is so common that it is unquestioned and any suggestion that it could be mistaken is quickly dismissed. Repeated use of the historico-empirical method resulting in generally logical and consistent conclusion has increasingly removed any doubt concerning that method. Quite naturally, then, patristic literature must be treated like any other literature, that is, subject to the canons of "evidence".

In this work, however, while utilizing the technical discipline and profound insights of the historico-empirical method, we cannot adhere either to its philosophical presuppositions, or its spirit and aim. We cannot give to it the confidence which most historians claim to do; hence, we shall not treat the Fathers, nor the "source" of their faith, as if they could be explained, classified, and interpreted within "a rational system of observations". We acknowledge

a referent to their "faith", as they did, which is ultimately "known" through something beyond the act of recognition. We challenge that procedure of moderns which prefunctorily throws the Fathers into the historical stockpile of ideas. Under these conditions, therefore, a chapter evaluating the foundations of modern historiography is urgent. Without such an evaluation, we do not believe that our approach to the Fathers will prove either enlightening or convincing.

In order to justify our "method", then, it is necessary to undertake a critique of modern historiographical aims and methods. Any detailed and comprehensive analysis, of course, is neither possible nor mandatory. An attack upon the area of greatest vulnerability, epistemology, will suffice, for modern historiography stands or falls with the possibility of historical knowledge. Placed within the context of the history of Western philosophy, the surd of modern historiography will be in historical perspective; and an exposition of the latter's epistemological principles will make evident that the uncompromising secular approach to the Church Fathers is neither indisputable nor the most meaningful. In short, since we will nowhere in this work deny the verity of the patristic witness, nor trace the "faith" of the Fathers to ancient thought, but divine revelation. Thus, we are compelled to justify our departure from the conventional norms of historical investigation. Our approach is tenable if not more fruitful than the way of the "scientific method" of modern secular historians.

In order to achieve the purpose of this chapter, the rest of it will be sub-divided. The first part will recount the development of modern epistemology from Descartes to Nietzsche and will provide the background for the second part, an examination of the various positions taken by historians on the possibility of historical knowledge. In other words, part one will show what history has said about reason; and part two, what reason says about history. That the one presupposes the other is undeniable; that they are mutually enervating is likewise irrefutable. No doubt should remain thereafter that the popular historical method is not sacrosanct. Moreover, this chapter should make it clear that, at bottom, the tenacity with which modern historians cling to their limiting method can be explained on as the consequence of their "faith", a "secular faith" in human abilities and achievements. This "faith" is palpably hostile to the "religious faith" which is the dynamic of our work.

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The denial of any transempirical entities is part of the entire history of ideas in the modern age which "may be regarded as, in part, a history of the progressive breakdown of the medieval Christian synthesis which had been most powerfully articulated in the Summas of Thomas Aquinas and most movingly and persuasively expressed in Dante's Divine Comedy."[1] That "breakdown" had been undertaken by

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[1]Henry D. Aiken, The Age of Ideology. New York, 1956, p. 25.

those means and premises--with that consciousness--that deliberately excludes the religious interpretation of history, especially the Christian vision of it. The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries cleared away the old Christian principles and values while the eighteenth century began the intense work of reconstituting the ideals of Western life and thought on "radically secular and humanistic, that is to say, non-Christian basis"[2]; a task finally accomplished by the nineteenth century. Now the medieval Weltanschauung was displaced. There was no place for God in an era of science and secular political and social institutions. The art or discipline or science of history, of course, was associated with the new secularism and involved in the problems and attitudes native to this new milieu. Like every other activity of Western man, the study of history declared its independence from any transcedent power, feeling itself free to pursue its interest without any concern for the possible interference from God--"theology" was ejected from history.

The process of liberation was initiated by philosophers (who were often scientists and mathematicians), that is, it was they who sought the theoretical justification for the modern enterprise; it was they who gave the historians the presuppositions for their craft. The philosophers of the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries provided the historian with his epistemological Grund.

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[2]Aiken, pp. 25-26

Even though historians may have not always intentionally adopted one epistemology as over against another, whenever pressed for a theoretical vindication of their labors they have been forced to resort invariably to the philosophical resevoir of the Western intellectual tradition. They have not been able to argue outside the categories intrinsic to the conventional theories of knowledge. Thus, it is not difficult to identify historians and historical schools, as we shall see, according to the epistemological positions their narratives presuppose and, indeed, by the metaphysics out of which that epistemology must necessarily issue.

The first philosopher to which modern historians are indebted is René Descartes (1596-1650). Descartes was not a historian and his works reveal little but vagrant allusions to that art. His philosophy had a direct influence on the French historians, Voltaire, Bayle, Montesquieu, even Bousset, but Descartes had no philosophy of history. His relevance for modern historiography, nevertheless, was as great for history as it was for philosophy. He is a "maker of the modern mind", "the father of modern philosophy", the great architect of the modern spirit. The contributions of Descartes to modernity are twofold; he set the problem of knowledge and the base of scientific inquiry, that is, the determination of truth and the means by which to attain it without reference to any supra-rational criterion. In other terms, no knowledge may be certified as true which does not result from a method which itself

has been ascertained to be certain.

The occasion for Descartes philosophy was the revolutionary teaching regarding the nature of motion announced by Galileo (1564-1642). His conclusions necessitated a complete break with the medieval conception of nature, i.e., the scholastic understanding of the relationship between matter and motion. According to the medieval view, motion came into being, exhausted itself and vanished; it was a transient activity in which only materia and forma had any permanence. But Galileo's experiments demonstrated that motion did not pass from potentia to actua, but was both ingenerable and indestructable. We know motion, he said, only through the effect which, in some incomprehensible manner, it produced on the bodies which it penetrated. Descartes, then, argued that matter must be passive and inert, that it must in no sense be distinguished from the space which it fills and, therefore, to motion must be assigned the responsibility for the animation and organization of all phenomena, that is, matter must be conceived as subordinate to motion as the instrument by which the former is directed and shaped. Potentiality and actuality are replaced by the concept that matter is simply moved from one space to another while in itself remaining essentially unchanged. It follows that if matter is always material and motion the only organizing power, there can be no connection between the body and mind. Thus, arose in modern philosophy the yet unresolved problems of "perception" and

"judgment". Descartes never answered the question why a sensation should appear when a particular motion is registered in the brain or how a mental action should follow from any cerebreal condition. The seemingly inapprehensible relation, if any, between body and mind has evoked, ever since Descartes, speculations concerning them, a perplexity which "has proved to be the surd of every philosophy."[3]

Again, the Cartesian dualism revealed a major defect in the treatment of sense-perception. His "physics" compelled him to postulate the epistemological doctrine of "representative perception."[4] If objects can be known only "mediately", through the medium of concepts, then, the object remains unknown in itself. The "external world" may be inferred only through the sensations which it exudes. From these sensations, the mind must construct a "world" which it can never hope to know, that is, it is only mental constructions of things that we apprehend while the mind is in fact isolated from the world "out there". The object is not actually perceived, but hypothetically inferred. Descartes' epistemology avoided the fault of the opposing theory of "presentative perception" (i.e., the direct knowledge of things without the medium of concepts) which could not account for error, but his theory could not account for

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[3]Norman Kemp Smith, A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'. New York, 1950, p. 585.

[4]Smith, loc. cit. We have, of course, somewhat oversimplified the enormity of the epistemological problems raised by Descartes philosophy. For a detailed statement of them, see Appendix B of Smith's work, pp. 583-592.

truth, because there was no way to confirm concepts by the objects they represent. His successors have all tried to offer solutions to the problems with which Descartes inaugurated modern philosophy, but whether they followed his lead or chose some alternate course the results have been either the same failure or even greater epistemological perplexity.

Along with the epistemological turmoil, however, Descartes endowed modernity with a new faith: the new criterion of all human inquiry--his famous, _cogito ergo sum, je pense donc je sui_.[5] The significance of this formula is immense: since the _cogito_ follows from his _dubito ergo sum_ (which brought him to the conclusion that _de omnibus dubitandum_ which cannot possibly include the doubting subject), Descartes posited the self at the center of the universe.[6] Here is manifested the quintessence of modern secularity--man, not God, is the axis of life and thought.[7] The consequence of making the ego (rather than God) responsible for certitude has, as we know from the history of

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[5]Rene Descartes, _Meditations on the First Philosophy_, in _Modern Classical Philosophers_, edited by B. Rand. Cambridge (Mass.), 1936, pp. 123-124.

[6]See J. Bronowski and B. Mazlish, _The Western Intellectual Tradition: From Leonardo to Hegel_. New York, 1960, p. 224f.

[7]It is interesting to note that the _cogito ergo sum_ has been anticipated by Saint Augustine's _Si fallor sum_ (_De Vera Religione_, LXXIII) and that much of Descartes system is dependent upon medieval thought. See A. G. A. Balz, _Descartes and the Modern Mind_. New Haven (Conn.), 1952.

Western thought, had the effect of dispensing with His services altogether. For history, too, the spirit of Descartes has prevailed: if any meaning is to be found in the flow of events, human reason or reason's creatures must discover it; and, too, the narration of events must be undertaken without religious faith, with the assumption that doubt will produce objectivity and truth.

In general, modernity has welcomed Descartes analysis of knowledge, his "methodical doubt", and his anthropocentricism has remained the unchallenged assumption of Western thought to the present. Yet, not all his contemporaries were happy with the implications of the cogito. Arnold Geulincx (1625-1669) and Nicholas Malbranche (1638-1715) made a serious attempt to overcome the Cartesian epistemological dualism by their philosophy of Occasionalism. They said that "whenever a volition of the mind seems to us to cause a bodily movement, our volition is only the occasion . . . of the movement, while the real, efficient cause is God. Mind and matter never directly interact; the changes in either that seems to us to be caused by the other is really caused by God."[8] The interest of Geulincx and Malbranche was not academic, because both were Catholic priests who saw in Descartes' system the expulsion of God from human affairs and threatened to drive the Christian tradition from

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[8]See the uncomplicated explanation of Occasionalism in William Kelley Wright's A History of Modern Philosophy. New York, 1948, p. 87f.

European civilization. Unfortunately, the weakness of Occasionalism was palpable to almost everyone: it not only coverted God into a *deus ex machina* (without proving His existence), but also gave no scientific explanation for causality or the nature of perception. The Cartesian dualism, far from being reconciled, was made more complex by the intervention of God; and the *ad hoc* intrusion of Deity into nature made it increasingly apparent that He did not improve human understanding of the world.

The philosophers, faced with the continuing problem of *res extensa* and *res cogitans*, were, in the course of the seventeenth century, offering their peculiar solutions to the problem. In his *Ethics*, Benedict de Spinoza (1632-1677) responded to the inherent contradiction in the Cartesian philosophy--the alternation between mechanism and idealism--with Acosmic Pantheism, the reduction of all things to God, *Substantia*, and the declaration that mind and matter were nothing more than modifications of Him. In other words, Spinoza lifted the controversy out of the field of epistemology and into the area of metaphysics. His doctrine did not resolve the problems instituted by the Cartesian dualism, but Spinozism did mean the abrogation of human nature, history and destiny as they were hitherto known in the West; to be sure, Spinozism implied the end of the Christian dispensation.

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnitz (1646-1716), on hearing Spinoza's philosophy, was as much interested in opposing it

as he was in replying to Descartes. The world, (and everything in it) he said, were created by God according to a mathematical plan; each individual substance or "monad" is an isolated and impenetrable reality, complete and "windowless". The unity, the possibility of communication between them, he attributed to a "preestablished harmony", the providence by which God governed the creation. "This harmony", he wrote, "makes all things conduce to grace by natural methods", for God is "the architect of the mechanism of the universe" and "the monarch of the divine City of the Spirits."[9] Thus, Leibnitz answered Descartes dualism and Spinoza's monism with a spiritual pluralism, a pluralism which sought to overcome the insuperable schism between mind and matter, on the one hand, and, on the other, the suffocating, dehumanizing, collectivism of pantheism by a reaffrimation of the Christian faith.[10] Yet, the consequence of his philosophy was only to justify individualism, relativism and subjectivism. Nevertheless, the ideas of Leibnitz have had a great impact on German thought. His influence has reached well into the twentieth century. For example, Herder, Kant, Goethe, Meinecke and Mann are indebted to him. A knowledge of Leibnitz is essential to the under-

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[9]G. W. Leibnitz, Monadology, in Modern Classical Philosophers, edited by B. Rand. Cambridge (Mass.), 1936, pp. 212-213.

[10]On Leibnitz's Christian apologetics and his dependence on St. Augustine, see R. W. Meyer, Leibnitz and the Seventeenth Century Revolution, trans. by J. P. Stern. Cambridge (Eng.), 1952, pp. 51ff, 141ff.

standing of historicism.

But the reaction to Descartes did not come from continental Europe alone. The opposition to his philosophy was no less emphatic in England. There the debate was aggravated by the Stoic notion of "innate ideas". Of course, innatism was implied in the teachings of Descartes although never made explicit by him. John Locke (1632-1704) was greatly alarmed by the British Cartesians. He saw the new trend in English philosophy as a revival of Scholasticism, a cryto-Catholicism--Descartes was educated at the famous Jesuit school of La Fléche--being imported into the Isles. Locke's attack began with a denunciation of scholastic logic and a denial of innate ideas. He insisted that the mind was tabula rasa, a "blank tablet", something passive upon which sense-experience was inscribed. But Locke, too, failed to establish any necessary connection between the mind and "the external world". Truth--the perfect unity of thought and being--was still not achieved, for the duality of subject and object persisted while the Lockean repudiation of innatism had condemned the mind to passivity and gave no explanation for the construction of concepts.

The Anglican bishop, George Berkeley (1685-1753), taking Locke's premises, agreed that man had no direct experience of a material world. In his Principles of Human Knowledge, he stated, "To be is to be perceived," esse est percipi, except when "to be is to perceive," esse est

percipere.[11] In other words, we cannot demonstrate any material substratum for sensations; hence, all knowledge is conceptual. Although not accepting Berkeley's transformation of empiricism into idealism, David Hume (1711-1777) used the thinking of the good bishop (without its conclusions) to drive Western philosophy to the very precipice of scepticism. Berkeley led him to believe that, although sensations were the condition of knowing, no theory was available to explain how one mental resolution should produce a corresponding movement in the body and, to be sure, what connection could be discovered between any cause and its purported effect. There is provided no sensation for causality. We observe only sequence and not necessary conjunction in things. Therefore, we can form no conception of a necessary relation in time between events: the consistent repetition of the same sequence of events can in no means be construed as evidence of causality.

"From the first appearance of an object," Hume argued, "we cannot conjecture what effect will result from it. But were the power or energy of any cause discoverable by the mind, we could foresee the effect, even without experience; and might, at first, pronounce certainty concerning it, by mere dint of thought and reasoning."[12] With this proclama-

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[11] In Classical Modern Philosophers, edited by B. Rand. Cambridge (Mass.), 1936, pp. 290ff.

[12] D. Hume, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, in Modern Classical Philosophers, edited by B. Rand. Cambridge (Mass.), 1936, p. 329.

tion the entire modern enterprise initiated by the Renaissance had its death portended. Without causality, known and workable, the physical sciences and historical investigation would be abolished. Without causality, there can be no prediction, no universal and necessary laws of the universe, no certain analysis of phenomena and events, and no security in experimentation or observation. It is true that Hume was merely taking empiricism to its logical extreme--as well as ridding Western consciousness of *theologia naturalis*[13] which also depended upon the fact of causality. But his epistemology put all human inquiry in doubt. Hume did not solve the problems of the Cartesian philosophy, but his rigid empiricism--to which Cartesianism led--cried out loudly for an immediate and convincing rejoinder.

David Hume, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) exclaimed, had aroused him from his "dogmatic slumbers" (i.e., the German metaphysical tradition); but it was this very same awakening that alerted him to the danger of Hume's thinking to both science and religion. Kant saw his task, therefore, as a reassessment and reconstitution of the entire modern Western philosophical enterprise: to reconcile dualism and monism, induction and deduction, faith and reason. As a theologian, astronomer, physicist, mathematician, historian and philosopher, Kant was well qualified. Of his many writings, the

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[13]See H. D. Aiken's introduction to Hume's *Dialogue Concerning Natural Religion*. New York, 1948, xv-xvii.

Kritik der Reinen Vernunft, the chief source of his epistemology, is recognized as the realization of his ambition. This book has had such immense influence on Western thought that it has led many historians and philosophers to call Kant "the central figure in the entire history of modern philosophy."[14] The Kritik is one of those works without which the history of the West would be other than what it is.

Already in the preface to the Kritik, we learn the nature of Kant's solution: "That all our knowledge begins with experience, there can be no doubt", Kant states, "but although all knowledge arises with experience, it does not follow that all our knowledge comes out of experience."[15] In other words, "the external world" offers sensations to the mind which organizes them through its "innate forms", space and time, and "the categories of the understanding". After the concepts have been formed, the mind identifies the object in its memory as identical with past experiences and the precepts are consequently compared and classified. The entire mental procedure is called by Kant, "the transcendental synthetic unity of apperception": that is, although sense-data stimulates the mind into activity, the mind alone produces knowledge (concepts); hence, this activity is called "pure", "transcendent" (i.e., free of

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[14] W. K. Wright, A History of Modern Philosophy, p. 255.

[15] "Dass alle unsere Erkenntnis mit der Erfahrung anfange, daran ist gar kein Zweifel . . . Wenn aber gleich alle unsere Erkenntnis MIT der Erfahrung anhebt, so entspringt sie darum doch nicht eben alle AUS der Erfahrung" (Kritik der Reinen Vernunft. second edition. Leipzig, 1920, p. 35).

or above sensations). This process relies on perception to set the machinery of the mind in motion; hence, knowledge is a "unity" of action which is "synthetic", involving opposites, sensations and mind.

If Kant is right and all knowledge arises from the mind acting upon sensations, then, what provides the mind with no stimulation cannot be "known". Thus, God, the soul and freedom are matters of faith, removed from the competence of science and philosophy. These "ideals of the understanding" are not subject to the laws of perception and judgment. Faith and reason are irretrievably sundered, no less than subject and object, phenomenon and noumenon--and theology is expunged from history. Yet, Kant believed that he did protect God, soul and freedom from the reason which finds no justification for them; and, too, science and history were safeguarded from the Humean criticism, because causality, far from being required to give evidence of a posteriori character, is imposed upon "the external world" by the mind. The relation obtaining between the ego and the Gegenstand, the subject and the predicate, is the responsibility of the untransgressable "laws of the understanding."[16]

Among all the defects of Kant's epistemology none was to prove more fateful than his teaching that the das-an-sich, the noumenon, "the external world" was unknown.

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[16]N. K. Smith, A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason, p. 583.

When Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814) read the Kritik der Reinen Vernunft, he decided that "the external world" was simply unnecessary. All we know is the self, he said; it is sufficient to posit "the Ego" as the source not only of the machinery of knowledge, but also the sensations themselves. In addition, he postulated an Infinite Ego, God, to account not only for order and life, but morality and justice. Fichte, unlike Kant, ascribed more definite content to the Infinite Ego, even suggesting "that God comes to consciousness of Himself in human minds." The world, then, is "fundamentally more and more spiritual in nature" and humanity is held to have had not only a divine origin but an "immortal destiny".[17] Fichte had not brought the Christian God back into nature and history, however, because his thinking was more akin to pantheism. The Infinite Ego to which he refers is a philosophical abstraction and his ideas about human "origin" and "destiny" belong to Fichte's conception of the immanent processes of nature's evolution.

After Fichte, it was an easy step for Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling (1775-1854) merely to fuse mind and matter. He, like Fichte and other German Romantics, came under the influence of the mystic, Jacob Boehme, who had revived "the philosophy of becoming" stemming from Heraclitus and Plotinus. Therefore, Schelling asserted

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[17]W. K. Wright, A History of Modern Philosophy, p. 304f.

that history was simply the evolution of mind.[18] The mind participated in the great cosmic drama of becoming in which God, "the primal Absolute Idenity", individuates Himself in the world of particular beings while, at the same time, and incessantly returning to the universality of its own Being. So, Schelling's philosophy, under the impetus of Kantian epistemology, the Fichtean revision, German mysticism and vitalism, swung full circle from Cartesian conceptualism to Absolute Idealism. More important, Schelling prepared the way for the colossal efforts of Hegel.

Georg Wilhelm Hegel (1770-1831), falling upon the contradictions and ambiguities of Schelling's system, constructed his own Idealism, a vision of Mind or Spirit, which passed through stages of development in time while coming to consciousness in human reason. This being true, human reason has infinite potentialities. Such a conclusion follows naturally from Hegel's metaphysics, but the epistemological justification for his belief derived from Kant's theory of knowledge or, more precisely, from the criticism of the das-an-sich. Kant had said that the das-an-sich (the world of things behind sensations) is unknowable, but this would mean that something, apart from all accidental circumstances, is radically impervious to the mind, totally outside any conceivable human awareness, something from which

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[18]On the dialectic of the divine and human in German thought, see Nicholas Berdyaev, The Divine and the Human, trans. by R. M. French. London, 1949, pp. 22-48.

the mind is constitutionally alienated--"by the very nature of the thing and our mental processes."[19] Therefore, Hegel said, the das-an-sich is self-contradictory, for it is only possible to know that it is unknowable by some knowledge beyond it. For example, to know that a straight line has an end is to know the end of the line. In other words, if knowledge has no absolute limit, we must be ignorant of it. It follows, then, that there is nothing the mind cannot know. Admitting this, we must further concede that "existence" has no meaning outside its relation to human consciousness. If something cannot be conceived, it does not exist. All knowledge is purely conceptual. All existence is knowable. Something may be unknown, but never unknowable. Even if there were something unknowable, we could not know that it was and, consequently, it would simply have no use, no place in human life.

When Soren Kierkegaard (1813-1855) read Hegel and understood "the monstrous implications" of his Idealism, he made his own philosophy, in part, a reply to Hegel's superbia cognescendi. A good Protestant, Kierkegaard undertook to smash the threat of Hegelianism to Christianity and to put forward his own religious position. Without a personal God Who has revealed His Will to men, Kierkegaard said human reason becomes the sole arbiter of reality. Yet, it is a grundlos reason, a reason without criterion,

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[19] W. T. Stace, The Philosophy of Hegel. New York, 1955, p. 46.

without a base from which to articulate in terms of secure premises. Reason is impotent without divine foundations and is condemned to regressus in infinitum, groping for presuppositions, necessary and universal, which move elusively out of reason's grasp. Hegelianism, Kierkegaard exclaimed, can provide none of the legitimate conditions for knowledge.

The Dane, nevertheless, did admit, whether ironically or not we cannot say, that nothing escapes the mind and all things are judged by it, including the testimony of the senses; and, in fact, there is no way to determine where thought ends and being begins. Reason must have something "immediate", "a given", before its premises (and conclusions) may be guaranteed. Failing to achieve this "given", there is no way to prove that what I feel or believe is anything more than completely subjective; and there is no reason to believe that any attempt to prove by logic or experimentation is really anything more than my arbitrary determination of the matter. Negation, affirmation, suspension of judgment remains an act of my personal interpretation of the external world. Indeed, there is no way to demonstrate there is an "external world" or my "ego".[20]

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[20]Lord Bertrand Russell makes the statement that scepticism is "logically impeccable" although "phychologically impossible" (Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits. New York, 1948, xi). Cf. Also, Miguel de Unamuno, Tragic Sense of Life, trans. by J. E. Crawford Flitch. New York, 1954, p. 117. These philosophers, of course, refer not to "methodological doubt", but to doubt concerning knowledge itself.

Nothing can be proven without a criterion, but in order to establish one, Kierkegaard said, it is necessary to discover the "beginning" of thought. Thus, he asks, "How can I put an end to reflection which was set up to reach the beginning in question?" Reflection has the remarkable property of being infinite. "But to say that it is infinite is equivalent to saying, in any case, that it cannot be stopped by itself; because in attempting to stop itself, it must use itself, and is thus stopped in the same way that a disease is cured when it is allowed to choose its own treatment, which is to say that it waxes and thrives."[21] Only when reflection comes to a halt by something else, and this something else is something quite different from the logical, being a resolution of the will. Only when the beginning, which puts an end to the process of reflection, is a radical breach of such a nature that the absolute beginning breaks through the continued infinite reflection, then only is the beginning without presuppositions. But when the breach is effected by breaking off the process of reflection arbitrarily, so as to make a beginning possible, then, the beginning so made cannot be absolute." It is necessary, in order to end the infinite regress of presuppositions, to give reason something "immediate", a "beginning" which is absolute, incontestable, from which to ascend and descend in its

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[21] Concluding Unscientific Postscript, in A Kierkegaard Anthology, trans. and edited by R. Bretall. New York, 1946, p. 197.

reflections, that is, reason cannot be delivered from the labyrinth of groundless assumptions and categories which it obsessively turns over and over again unless it becomes other than what it is--reason must "change into another kind, metábasis eis állo génos."[22]

According to Kierkegaard, "the absolute beginning" was made two thousand years ago.[23] Christ broke the unending circle of reflection; He transformed reason. If Kierkegaard is not right, if God does not exist and did not break into time, then, man remains in bondage and ignorance. Consequently, all things are relative, all things permissable, as Dostoyevsky said, because there is no criteriological absolute. The God to which Kierkegaard and Dostoyevsky refer, moreover, is the Christian God, because He alone, among all the gods, was incarnated, piercing the shell of the cosmos and the veil of knowledge. The Actus Purus of Aristotle, the Substantia of Spinoza, "the Absolute Idea" of Hegel will not do: these gods are not concerned with man, they have not spoken to him. It is as if these gods did not exist at all. We do not know if they put laws to nature or if they have given cosmic laws, that they will remain. Without the Incarnation, there is no reason to believe, as Bertrand Russell once said, that God is not a demon whose only desire is ultimately to cast

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[22]Concluding Unscientific Postscript, pp. 198-199.

[23]Soren Kierkegaard, Training in Christianity, in An Kierkegaard Anthology, pp. 387-393.

mankind into external perdition. In short, without the Incarnation all existence is the history of the absurd, or perhaps, the corridor to infinite terror.

Friedrich Nietzsche (1840-1900) came to nearly the same conclusion--while denying the Incarnation. He looked out upon the earth and found no God. To have lost God meant utter madness. He is the ineluctable first principle of all thought and life. But God is dead. Nietzsche invented the now famous parable of the Madman:

> "Have you not heard of that madman who lit a lantern in the bright morning hours, ran to the market place, and cried incessantly, 'I seek God! I seek God! As many of those who do not believe in God were standing around just then, he provoked such laughter. Why, did he get lost? said one. Did he lose his way like a child? said another. Or is he hiding? Is he afraid of us? Has he gone on a voyage? or emigrated? Thus they yelled and laughed. The madman jumped into their midst and pierced them with his glances. 'Wither is God', he cried. 'I shall tell you. <u>We have killed him</u>--you and I. All of us are his murderers. But how have we done this? How were we able to drink up the sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the horizon? What did we do when we unchained the earth from the sun? Whither is it moving now? Whither are we moving now? Away from all suns? Are we not plunging continually? Backward, sideward, forward, in all directions? Is there any up or down left? Are we not straying as through empty space? Has it not become colder? Is not night and more night coming on all the while? . . . God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him . . . What was holiest and most powerful of all that the world has yet owned has bled to death under our

> knives. Who will wipe the blood off us? . . . Here the madman fell silent and looked again at his listeners; and they too were silent and stared at him in astonishment. At last he threw his lantern on the ground, and it broke and went out. 'I come too early,' he said then; 'my time has not come yet. This tremendous event is still on its way . . ." [24]

Nietzsche concluded that now, since God was dead, a new and courageous affirmation of life was urgent, "a transvaluation of values" was required; but his own tragic life, his insanity, must persuade us that his naturalism was untenable. There can be no presuppositionless system of ideas. The Madman, to be sure, is autobiographical, but it is also a commentary on Western civilization; and it is evidence for the truth that without an "absolute beginning", knowledge is impossible and history is bitterly meaningless. God is dead, Nietzsche said, and the age of nihilism has begun.[25]

We have now outlined the evolution of modern epistemology, traversing the two centuries from Descartes to Nietzsche, and have shown the manner in which the philosophy of the former led quite naturally to the latter--and how "doubt" has led to doubt not to certainty. The history of modern philosophy discloses only a limited number of epistemologies. The alternatives are empiricism, idealism,

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[24]Quoted in Walter Kaufman's Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist and Antichrist. New York, 1946, p. 81.

[25]See the entire discussion in Kaufman, the third chapter entitled, "The Death of God and the Revaluation", pp. 80-100.

or some variation of them. In the next section--which will begin with idealist historiography--the epistemologies assumed by historians and philosophers of history will be seen to be no other than those already reviewed in this section. Those theories of knowledge repeat themselves not only because they are part of a continuous tradition, but because reason can offer only those choices which its nature permits. When we have finished this chapter, it should be clear that modernity has not only failed to gain any certain knowledge of history and its meaning, but a fortiori we need not be intimidated, nor impressed, by the immense scholarship which deliberately excludes metaempirical realities from history, that is, we are not at all required to accept that analysis of the patristic witness which traces the teachings of the Church Fathers to natural sources.

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Most historians do not usually call themselves idealists, positivists or realists, even though they may be predisposed to one school or another. Most scholars know that Spengler and Hegel are idealists, that Mommsen and Freeman are positivists, but they tend to ignore the philosophical presuppositions of a particular historian. The interest seems to be not in the speculative aspects of any given history, but in method, facts and interpretation. But such an attitude is both delusive and inconsistent. The mind of the historian is the central data in historiography: the method is chosen and applied, the

"facts" are chosen and classified, the past is interpreted. None of this can be done without criterion, without a theory of knowledge, tacit or expressed. Let us turn, then, to this matter--to the decisive issue of epistemology in the writing of history. We will begin with idealism.

It has already been ascertained that idealism acknowledges no existence outside consciousness, thought. Thus, philosophy which is thought is equated with history which is life, existence. Philosophy is history. There is no historical "fact" which is examined as if it were opposed to mind, to consciousness. The past does not exist except as the thought of the past. The temporal character of history is unreal. To know the past "in the only way that is possible, is to make it live again," asserts Giovanni Gentile, "to actualize it; and that means to take it out of time and freeing it from its chronological character, in order to transfer it from the abstract world of facts to the concrete world of the act (the historian's act) of thought, to which all facts belong in the synthesis of self-consciousness."[26] There can be no facts in the sense of a temporal sequence independent of the mind, a chain, as it were, in which it is imagined that events are suspended from beginning to end in some neutral ether. A single event reaches out in a myriad direction which never can be evaluated empirically and whose meaning can never be

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[26]"The Transcending of Time in History", in Philosophy and History: Essays Presented to Ernst Cassirer, edited by R. Kilbansky. New York, 1963, p. 100.

found by mere research. "The past is time losing itself in the eternity of the thought which grasps it."[27]

In other terms, idealism resolves the question of historical knowledge in terms of "the coherence theory of truth", the "internality of relations", the identity of thought and being as opposed to the empiricist idea of "the externality of relations", the duality of thought and being.[28] History, the idealist argues, must not be understood as a mere conjunction of "facts" somehow arranged to elict knowledge, but all "evidence" must be subordinate to a system of thought, the "facts" must be translated into "the categories of history" before they are meaningful. Idealists refuse to contemplate history as an "objective world" of past events to be analysed and classified, be= cause historical thinking is happening now and the world of events is finally only the world of ideas with the historian as the constructive agent. In the words of Hegel, "Cognition, the thinking comprehension of being, is the source and birthplace of a new spiritual form, a higher form, whose principle is partly preserving, partly trans- figuring material. For thought is universal, the genus which does not die but preserves its identify."[29]

Thought examines events now, thought constructs them,

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[27]Gantile, p. 105.

[28]W. K. Wright, A History of Modern Philosophy, p. 320.

[29]The Philosophy of History, in The Philosophy of Hegel, edited by Carl J. Friedrichs. New York, 1963, p. 40.

thought passes judgment on them. Without thought there could be neither the discovery nor the comprehension of events.[30] According to W. H. Walsh, "Experiences in themselves cannot be used to test theories, they have to be expressed, given conceptual form, raised to the level of judgment, because they can serve the purpose. But in the process of expression from which we set out the actual experience is inevitably transformed. It is transformed by being interpreted . . . ."[31] He who believes that he bloss zeigen wie es eigentlich gewesen, Oakeshott exclaims, is deluding himself; he cannot separate method and object. The historian always approaches the "facts" with "a system of postulates", for example, that the past is intelligible. He must remember that "the dependence of the past upon the present is taken to be the principle character of history."[32] Because the truth belongs to a world of ideas, it belongs to present experience. Historical "fact" means nothing more than "to have found a necessary place in the world of ideas." Truth is a matter of coherence which can neither require nor recognize any external test or guarantee: truth exists within the whole.[33]

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[30]See M. Oakeshott, Experience and Its Modes. Cambridge (Eng.), 1933, p. 94f; and R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History. New York, 1956, p. 215f.

[31]An Introduction to the Philosophy of History. London, 1953, p. 75.

[32]Oakeshott, p. 109.

[33]Oakeshott, p. 111.

For the idealist, then, history is another word for philosophy. It is an unfortunate position, because, despite the trenchancy of his argument, the idealist cannot maintain it; he cannot hold that thought absorbs "reality". So long as the idealist considers thought itself to be that by which "reality" is discovered and defined, he must admit that thought itself is "part" of "reality", a part of the "whole", and, thus, he has given the coherence theory of truth a mortal blow. According to the idealist epistemology, thought itself must come under the laws of the understanding, that is, since anything is known only so far as it is limited or distinguished from other things, thought can never be "the absolute whole in which all things have their being."[34] No "object" can be the totality of reality. Therefore, the mind can apply its powers to the object as withdrawn from the whole; but, in the very act of abstraction, the limit of the "object" is defined and the whole is transcended, for idealism says that all knowledge is implicit in any portion of the whole. The thought which the mind is now thinking negates the universality and necessity of any theory, since it must always, one exception, viz., the thought it is now thinking. Again, nothing can be more immediately known to us as the knowing in which we are now-

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[34]G. Calogero, "On the So-Called Identity of History and Philosophy", in Philosophy and History: Essays Presented to Ernst Cassirer, edited by R. Kilbansky, New York, 1963, p. 42.

engaged "and the demand to know knowledge in any other way leads to an infinite regress by its requirement to know the knowledge which knows that knowledge."[35] Finally, if being and thought are identical, then, either they are changing or unchanging: if they are changing, there is no convincing way to isolate and grasp any object; and if they are unchanging, there is no way to account for the observation of change. In other words, idealist epistemology is self-contradictory.

The idealist theory of knowledge may be untenable, but it does make the point well that the historian cannot escape philosophy. Indeed, every chronicle, narrative or annal ever written presupposes some view of the nature of things and their intelligibility. It may be that the historian is not usually concerned with anything but the "facts"; and he may not care about the possibility of discovering them, but he cannot escape the truth that "all opinions whatever are affected to some extent by the attitude we hold about the nature of knowledge."[36] Moreover, the historian must confess that his method and interpretations not only presuppose philosophical questions but raise them. And if Johann Huizinga is right that history "is always an imposition of form upon the past, and cannot claim to be more,"[37] then, surely the philosophical implications

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[35]Calogero, p. 25.

[36]A. Sinclair, The Conditions of Knowing: An Essay Towards a Theory of Knowledge. London, 1951, p. 13.

[37]"A Definition of the Concept of History", in

of historiography are evident.

It may be true that most historians do not offer their accounts of the past in order to construct or justify some philosophical theory, but such theory is inherent to all historical interpretation. The moment the historian attempts to relate events, when he inquires whether events occur by accident or necessity or explains the causes of wars, revolution or the decline of empires; or suggests the economic, social and religious factors centrifugal in the formation of some ancient era, then the historian is thinking philosophically. The historian must ask these questions, says Golo May, and when he does, he is thinking as a philosopher.[38] The historian who says, "Je ne propose rien, je ne suppose rien, je n' impose rien . . . J' expose" simply cannot have a genuine understanding of his work, for he has not taken into serious consideration the influence of the climate of opinion, method, language, the prevalent conception of evidence, or indeed, his inner self. Again, he must decide whether there is truth in history, whether it is different from other truths or whether truth exists at all. It is doubtful that the historian approaches the world of men and events without ideas and emotions,

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Philosophy and History: Essays Presented to Ernst Cassirer, edited by R. Kilbansky. New York, 1963, p. 5.

[38]"Jeder Historiker ist, ob er es weiss oder nicht, auch ein Geschichtspilosoph, wenn er naemlich ein Mann von Geist ist und seinen Geist gebraucht" ("Die Grundprobleme der Geschichtspilosophie von Plato bis Hegel", in Der Sinn der Geschichte. Hrsg. von L. Reinisch, Munich, 1961, p. 14.)

without any conviction that truth exists or that it may be available to him.

Perhaps, the first question should be--what is history? It seems logical to inquire about the nature of that which one is seeking to understand. But in trying to define the nature of history--or any subject--before having scrupulously investigated it, do we not run the risk of imposing a definition and meaning which in fact it may not have? But if we allow history to speak to us with what voice does it speak and with what do we listen? To what does the historian direct his inquiry? Is any inquiry possible without some knowledge of the subject? Can the historian confront the events themselves or enter into the past in order to elicit what he must "know"? The historian, like the physicist, lives in a world of material objects (?) and, although his "evidence" is physical (?), is not the field of investigation, as Cassirer says, "a symbolic universe--a world of symbols"?[39] Again, if our thought moves inductively, if the historian accumulates his data, the disjecta membra, and synthesizes them, does he not in fact impose order on the scattered limbs of the past? Is not Cassirer right when he says, "Ideal reconstruction, not empirical observation, is the first step in historical knowledge"?[40]

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[39] An Essay on Man: An Introduction to a Philosophy of Human Culture. New York, 1953, p. 221.

[40] Cassirer, p. 221.

Very much aware and concerned about the historian's impasse, logical positivism imagines that progress will be made in the emulation of the physical sciences and collaboration with sociology. It eschews the writing of "universal histories" for monographic and national histories. The approach of the positivist is to collect and classify the "facts" and determine the laws of mutual dependence which governs them, furnishing thereby the narrative of the historian with "the principles of explanation of these laws."[41] These laws, moreover, are formed through statistical analysis of interdependently, mathematically computed social factors which ostensibly produces a unity by filling "the interstices of the various special histories by means of civilization and culture, and so-called social history . . . ."[42] Thus, history becomes a science and can legitimately ignore all notions of transcendency, theological or metaphysical. And, too, the question of "end", teleology, can be replaced, as in science, with the idea of "cause", mechanistically conceived. A "fact" is simply datum, then, something mathematically ascertained and placed within a system of hypothesis and justified wholly by empirical verification. In this way, history is become the handmaiden of the higher sciences, standing in relation to sociology, for example, as physiology to zoology.

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[41]By Croce, History: Its Theory and Practice, trans. by Douglas Ainsle. New York, 1923, p. 296. Cf. also R. Collingwood, The Idea of History, pp. 126-133.

[42]Croce, p. 304.

For all its panting after the physical sciences, logical positivism no more eludes the curse of epistemology than the idealism which it abominates. Not only does it confine reason to comparing, relating, distinguishing and abstracting, but also it never defines the relationship between known and knower. Yet, positivism uncritically accepts modern categories of thought and, like "all dogmatic theories of knowledge", postulates "that the object of cognition is something fixed and given" whose "absolute and unambiguous definiteness" can be understood "in an ever more perfect and adequate reflection upon a world of things."[43] The positivist will not think metaphysically; his entire attention is given to "making sense"; his meditation is upon the melody of language, and he recognizes as meaningful nothing save "mathematical and empirical truths" which may be traced, in modern times, to Hume and Leibnitz, the latter being the only philosopher in the history of philosophy that he admires. It may be, perhaps, his contempt for all thinking but his own that blinds the positivist to the inherent defects of his own position.

The first mistake of positivism is the equation of sensation with perception, for by it a disparity is immediately created between mind and "the external world". The positivist cannot ever hope to get to "the far side of our sensations" and must assume the existence of "the external

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[43]R. Kilbansky, "The Philosophical Character of History", in Philosophy and History: Essays Presented to Ernst Cassirer, edited by R. Kilbansky. New York, 1963, p. 325f.

world" by virtue of the sensations we experience. "What gives one the right to believe in the existence of a certain material thing is simply that one has certain sensations", writes A. J. Ayer, "for whether one realizes it or not, to say that the thing exists is equivalent to saying that such sensations are obtainable."[44] "Truth" is the accurate description of sensations--does this rule out all statement about the past?--since any statement which purports to be meaningful must be verified by observation. This is the "principle of verifiability" which considers all ideas and beliefs unconfirmed empirically to be "nonsense", mere tautologies. There is no concern for the ontic referent of sensations, because it cannot be known, or rather, any question regarding its reality is meaningless.

But, then, what sort of statement is the verification principle? It cannot be an a priori truth or even a generalization about sense-experience, for, as E. L. Mascall contends, this principle cannot make assertions, but only register our "linguistic conventions", whereas, if it is a statement of fact, "then it is a synthetic proposition, and in virtue of the very assertion which it makes, itself needs empirical verification."[45] Ayer seems to have fallen into "the snare which the empiricists customarily claim to find amongst the metaphysicians, that of packing into their

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[44] Language, Truth and Logic. London, 1946, p. 50. Cf. R. Carnap, Philosophy and Logical Syntax, in The Age of Analysis, edited by Morton White. New York, 1955, pp. 203-225.

[45] Words and Images. New York, 1957, p. 8.

principles what they want to get out of them, as a conjuror inserts the rabbit into the hat before he comes onto the stage."[46] In fact, Ayer and his school must further concede that "the verification principle", like every aspect of Positivism, carries an implicit metaphysics, that is, the "principle" was contrived in order to give no metaphysical knowledge or, as Carnap puts it, all that which is "over or beyond experience, e.g., about the real Essence of things, about Things in themselves, the Absolute and such like."[47] Language and judgment have been deliberately geared to evince nothing metaphysical.[48]

Metaphysics, however, is unavoidable. One may reject such ideas as Deus, substantia, accidentia, materia prima, etc., but in that very rejection one has taken a metaphysical position, that is, a view about the ultimate constitution of the universe. To say that all knowledge must be sensual is to make an assertion about the nature of "the external world", its intelligibility and the character of the human mind. To recognize all knowledge as empirical is to say that either there is no world "on the other side of sensations" or that "the other side" is unknowable. Either position is inimical to the positivist

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[46]Mascall, p. 8

[47]R. Carnap, Philosophy and Logical Syntax, pp. 213-214.

[48]To be more accurate, the positivist says that "metaphysical propositions" while describing no reality do have an "expressive function", that is, like art they express "emotional or volitional dispositions" (Carnap, p. 220).

attitude towards metaphysics. To be perfectly logical, the positivist must be utterly silent about anything non-sensuous. He has no right to say whether or not there is a non-sensuous reality or even that our knowledge must be restricted to the senses, for in either case he is saying something about the nature of things: the denial of the non-sensuous is a contradiction, the affirmation of only a knowable sensual world is untenable. And finally, the positivist dichotomy of knower and known is clearly a metaphysical stance, for thought is a function of being and "representative perception" presupposes an attitude towards reality.

It is not a persuasive argument either that the alliance with and the imitation of the physical sciences have permitted logical positivism to banish metaphysics from philosophy and history. Science, too, has its metaphysical presuppositions.[49] Thus, Alfred North Whitehead wrote, "there can be no living science unless there is a widespread instinctive conviction in the existence of an Order of things."[50] This "instinctive conviction", he continues, derives from the medieval idea of "the inexpungable belief that every detailed occurrence can be correlated with its antecedents in a perfectly definite manner, exemplifying general principles."[51] This "belief", in its turn, rests upon "the

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[49]See A. E. Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science. London, 1932.

[50]Science and the Modern World. New York, 1952, p. 4.

[51]Whitehead, p. 13.

medieval insistence of the rationality of God."[52] In other words, it is historically true that "the faith in the possibility of science, generated antecedently to the development of modern scientific theory, is an unconscious derivative from medieval theology."[53] To be even more precise, the "scientific faith" is contingent upon not only medieval theology but the whole range of circumstances prevailing at the birth of the physical sciences. Philosophically, it was a birth preceded by a long metaphysical struggle between monism and pluralism, vitalism and mechanism, mysticism and humanism.

Many thinkers in the nineteenth century were fully cognizant of the weaknesses of logical positivism and disdained the hyposticization of science. Not only were their metaphysics obvious, but also science and positivism were leading Western man into an insufferable collectivism and were smothering individual creativity beneath their joyless mechanism. Historicism led the revolt against the nineteenth century idea of "progress" and opposed to scientific materialism its own Platonic and Romantic ontology by which historicism sought to halt the exhaustion of human freedom and man's uniqueness at the empirical level. Thus, most historicists, believing that the critical issue lay with epistemology, simply ignored current theories of knowledge and turned to antiquity for guidance. They took

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[52]Whitehead, p. 13.

[53]Whitehead, p. 14.

a metaphysical posture in complete opposition to the popular trend. They repudiated mechanism and materialism for philosophical spiritualism and vitalism.

One of the chief spokesmen for historicism was Friedrich Meinecke (1866-1952). Accepting the Platonic dualism, he posited a relationship between the human mind and a timeless ueberwirkliche Welt.[54] This "world" is unchanging in contrast to the physical or wirkliche Welt which exists in a state of change, pánta rhei. The former is reached by contemplation, the latter by observation--it is the empirical order which contains in itself neither law nor truth. Applying his philosophy to history, Meinecke says that the usual methods used to investigate the past offer us no criterion for judging the value of any particular "epoch". The past cannot be penetrated--not only for epistemological reasons--because every "epoch" in history is insulated, like a Leibnitzean "monad". Nevertheless, every moment in history is immediate to the timeless reality of the world above; therefore, an understanding of the past comes through grasping the universal and eternal values the ueberwirkliche Welt gives to all "epochs". "Vertically, not horizontally, does historical life strive," Meinecke exclaims, "toward the heights it can achieve. In every epoch, in every individual formation of history, egotism

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[54] Gedanken ueber Welt- und Universalgeschichte, in Meinecke Werke (bd. II) hrsg. von Carl Henrichs. Stuttgart, 1959, p. 147.

reigns, striving upward to a higher world."[55] For historicism, then, the meaning of events is not found in the process of nature, but above it, for events have no substratum, no "natural continuity", no temporal "substance".[56] By placing its pluralistic vitalism in opposition to scientific mechanism and epistemological dualism, historicism believes that it has overcome collectivism and materialism and freed humanity from both.[57]

But having avoided "the Charybdis of reducing everything to verifiable behavior or identifiable men and women in precisely identifiable places and times,"[58] historicism floundered against the Scylla of its own Leibnitzean individualism--subjectivism and relativism.[59] Meinecke insisted that the universality of the ueberweltliche Welt was supposed to eliminate this danger,[60] but none of his protestations could prevent "the anarchy of values". "That

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[55]"Virtikel, nicht horizontal strebt das geschichtliche Leben zu Hoehe, die es ueberhaupt erreichen kann. In jeder Epoche, in jedem individuellen Gibilde der Geschichte regen Egoismus emporstreben in eine hoehere Welt" (Geschichte und Gegenwart, in Meinecke Werke (bd. II), p. 99).

[56]R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History, p. 213.

[57]See C. A. Beard and A. Vagts, "Currents of Thought in Historiography", American Historical Review, XLII (1936-1937), 466f.

[58]I. Berlin, Historical Inevitability, p. 16.

[59]See G. Barraclough, History in a Changing World. Norman (Okla.), 1956, pp. 1-7.

[60]Kausalitaeten und Werte in der Geschichte, in Meinecke Werke (bd. II), p. 82f.

historicism is the progenitor of relativism is too obvious a fact to require demonstration", writes Professor Butterfield. "Everything is related, judged and evaluated in relation--and far too often only in relation--to time, place, context and environment; there are no absolutes; there is no transcendent sanction for man's action; morality itself is atomized, particularized, pulverized, until in the end it is held to be 'impossible to think one man essentially more wicked than another'."[61] And, too, historicism is subjectivst, that is to say, its monadological relativism leads to solipsism, because the timeless world of eternal verities is something which is understood individualistically, privately, without public verification; and since that "world" cannot be demonstrated to exist, historicism offers humanity only solipsism.

Yet, historicism does come to the heart of the matter: it orients us to the real issue in modernity, "the imponderable which is the human personality."[62] It is not only his prejudices, the strength of his emotions, the laws of his thinking that puzzles us, but man himself. What is man? Has he always been the same, has he changed, will he change in the future? There seems to be no evidence with which to answer any of these questions. But if we do not, then, we have no certainty that our study of history is accurate or

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[61] History and Human Relations. London, 1951, p. 108.

[62] Henri Pirenne, "What are the Historians Trying to Do?", in The Philosophy of History in Our Time: An Anthology, edited by Hans Meyerhof. Cambridge (Mass.) 1959, p. 90.

ever will be. Past epochs will be closed to us not only epistemologically but anthropologically. How can there be any genuine knowledge unless we know what man is and are assured that he was and always will be the same? Unless we "know" what he is, what right have we to demand that the historian be impartial and seek objectivity as an ideal? Might not the true definition of man solve the enigma of knowledge? And could we not discover whether there is a God and whether man is ordained to Him as to his End? And if we knew our destiny might we not also know our origin and, therefore, lay to rest all the other vexatious questions confronting mankind?

In as much as modern man has resigned himself to recognizing "the mystery of origins" and seems unable to determine his end, does it not seem vain to seek to "know" history as it happened? If perchance we should uncover by some magic or machine the past as it was, what could it possibly benefit us? Would the knowledge permit us to predict the future or in some way alter the present? We should have to first ascertain whether history was "determined" or "undetermined". If "undetermined" in the past and even in the present, could we be sure that it would be so in the future? If history is "open", in what direction ought mankind to move? What is the criterion for the choice? Who shall tell us? The state? Will each man decide for himself? Perhaps, God? Does He exist? Do we know His Will? Has He spoken clearly? Has He spoken at all? If,

on the other hand, history is "determined", does it have a goal? Will it have a goal? Are we to understand the goal of history to be under the control of a Mind (beneficent or malicious?) or impersonal forces? Without freedom, internal and external, of what value is our knowledge of the past or anything else? Perhaps there is a third alternative--the coexistence of determinism and freedom. But how do we "know" that we exist in such a condition? And if we satisfied ourselves that we do exist, how should we "know" in what respects we are free? Or that we had not confused freedom and bondage?

All these questions raise yet another of equal importance--does history have a meaning? Theodor Litt suggests that each generation must find its own meaning, its own Endziel.[63] He denies that history has a meaning per se, because if it had, then, history would have "norms" which would deprive it of freedom and without freedom there would be only power and power leads only to tragedy. It does not seem to have occured to Litt that the meaning of history is simply tragedy. The Kantian, Karl Popper, agrees that history has no universal meaning. He rejects Greek cyclicism, Spenglerian Untergangstheorie and Saint Augustine's civitas dei, in a word, all the traditional opinions concerning the meaning of history.[64] In his optimism,

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63"Die Selbstbesonderung des Sinns der Geschichte," in Der Sinn der Geschichte. hrgs. von L. Reinisch. Munich, 1961, p. 81f.

64"Selbstbefreiung durch das Wissen," Der Sinn der Geschichte, p. 106.

Popper instructs us to learn from the past and the present and by their illumination to establish our own Zielsetzung. The only precondition for the search for truth, he maintains, is a democratic and pluralistic society. But Popper leaves us without any convincing reason for accepting democracy and pluralism rather than some other form of government and social order. Indeed, both Litt and Popper say, unconvincingly, that hitherto man has found no meaning in history, but this notion does not certify that there is none.

But the liberal tradition has received curious support from Christian thinkers. Karl Leowith says, "There never has been and never will be an immanent solution to the problem of history."[65] Time is a mystery, Toynbee asserts, and we do not know the design of the universe.[66] Meaning comes only with faith, that is, the Christian Faith and without it, history is absolutely sinnlos. Faith gives the power which unaided reason does not possess. Reinhold Niebuhr concurs, but adds that modernity has erred, because it has placed its faith in "the empirical strategy of the rational faculty."[67] It wants to see history as the story of man's increasing power and freedom, his emancipation from the ambiguities of existence. The cross of

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[65] Meaning in History. Chicago, 1937, p. 191.

[66] "Sinn und Sinnlosigkeit," in Der Sinn der Geschichte. hrsg von L. Reinisch. Munich, 1961, p. 87.

[67] Faith and History. New York, 1949, p. 3.

modern man is the vanity of his imagination, his egotistical assumption that human reason has the capacity to chart "the scientifically observable structures of nature" and thereby acquire "a simple rational answer to the problem of the meaning of his existence."[68] He does not see historic catastrophes as judgments against the idolatrous worship of rational institutions, the wrath of God against the idols of culture and civilization, against the inclination of men and nations to regard their tenuous and tentative forms of human order and justice as final forms of human existence, because modern man interprets his tragedy as progress towards perfection.

In fact, historical growth is equated with redemption from evil.[69] In the words of Albert Camus, "The revolution of the twentieth century believes that it can avoid nihilism and remain faithful to true rebellion [against metaphysical and religious bondage], by replacing God with history. In reality, it fortifies the former and betrays the latter. History in its pure form furnishes no value of itself. Therefore, one must live by the principles of immediate expediency or keep silent or tell lies . . . ."[70] Man is not redeemed, he is consumed by history. He has been cast completely upon his own inadequate

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[68]Niehbuhr, p. 58.

[69]Niehbuhr, p. 109.

[70]The Rebel, trans. by Anthony Bower. New York, 1956, pp. 289-299.

resources and has been reduced to impotence. Having driven God from history, he sought to replace Him with himself, but instead man has become less human, the servant of his own passions and powers.[71] Nevertheless, he remains obdurate beneath the blows of suffering and terror, for he is somehow convinced that science and technology will some day banish all fear of the future and all nostalgia for the past. But he is a somnambulist, ignoring the demands of the very ratio by which he hopes sua sponte to create his "brave new world". His life is a charade, without foundation, without certitude. His existence is arched, like some cruel and voluptuous parabola, without meaning or purpose, between the nothingness of desire and nothingness of despair. His way makes no sense, for there is no God--of whom the question must be asked--to give man the truth.

What, then, has this chapter told us? We have seen that the history of modern Western thought began with "doubt" and has brought modernity only despair. All thinking initiated with "I think" leads necessarily to agonizing ignorance, not even able to prove its own existence. Therefore, reason must have an extra-rational foundation if it is to escape the infinite regress of presuppositions and attain to "the sure path of knowledge". Otherwise, modern historiography, unavoidably associated with the current modern "crisis in knowledge", can make no assertion about history

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[71]Camus, p. 73f.

and no pronouncements about "historical evidence" which lies beyond doubt. The scientific method of modern historical writing offers no certainties and, consequently, has no right to deny validity to an alternate, even opposing, understanding of history and the nature of historical "evidence". The modern historian has no basis for his exclusion of "theology" from history; and no basis for declaring that all "evidence" must have a natural source. Thus, when the Fathers accept an extra-natural source of "evidence", there is no basis for dismissing their "faith" as subjective, superstitious, self-deceptive or fabricated.

In other words, if, as Meyerhof says, "the methods of history are often dubious and suspect",[72] then, why are the conclusions of Harnack, Holl, Koch, Wolfson, etc., concerning the nature of the patristic witness, given such credence? Why are Saint Gregory of Nyssa or Saint Cyril of Alexandria examined in terms of Plato or Aristotle or Zeno? Why do scholars look for the source of patristic christology and ontology in the cults of Mithras, Magna Mater and Isis? Who do historians assume that similarity in doctrine necessarily implies identity of origin? Why is it impossible that the ancient cultures and religions are merely preparatory to the Christian revelation? Why cannot the pagan similarities to the Christian doctrine and piety have been providential anticipations in human nature

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[72] The Philosophy of History in Our Time: An Anthology, p. 20.

of what God could and would accomplish in Christ? Rather than saying that paganism influenced Christianity, why might we not say that God rendered the evangel appealing and familiar to the world in which the Church appeared through antecedent analogies and types? This is what Saint Paul meant by "the fullness of time". Why cannot modern historians understand the Fathers in this way?

Very little has been accomplished by secular historians with "the liberation of history from theology". Their methodology has left them with materials they call "facts" which have permitted them to give us a historical narrative which may or may not be accurate; but the narrative is suspect, even as its epistemological assumptions are indemonstrable. In addition, to those assumptions, "the subject matter of history presents a problem", as do "the nature of the facts", "the primary aim of a historical narrative", "the language of history", the "theory" and "interpretation" of history. Furthermore, there are the questions of "freedom", "values", "meaning" as well as "method".[73] Thus, we ask, why does he not revise his thinking about history? Why not reintroduce "theology"? He will not for many reasons, but primarily because his "secular faith" will not permit it. Then, we proceed with our "method" with no fear of his criticism.

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[73]Hans Meyerhof, The Philosophy of History in Our Time: An Anthology, pp. 18-25.

CHAPTER III

THE ECONOMY OF GOD: A DEFINITION

In the preceding chapter we learned about the history, nature, scope and fate of the modern historian's "secular faith". We observed that "faith" gave rise to doubt and, finally, despair. The primary data of his "faith" was unhallowed reason. "The economy of God", the Will of God, on the other hand, is the primary data of the patristic "philosophy of history". That "philosophy", in fact, is no other than an intellectual delineation of the "economy". Nevertheless, the "economy", oikonomía, is not the totality of the Christian revelation which also includes "theology", theología, the "knowledge of God" in Himself. Moreover both are distinguished from "providence", pronoía, or God's concern for all His creation. Pronoía, unlike oikonomía and theología, may be discerned in things without the special revelation of God, the Incarnation: but the Incarnation illuminated "providence" and lends to human reason insights it could not otherwise obtain.

In this chapter, then, we intend to define the concept of oikonomía, showing its scope and limit and thereby distinguishing it from both theología and pronoía. It is necessary to make these distinctions, because they are generally not drawn. The failure to understand the difference

between these ideas leads, as it has lead, to errors concerning the nature of the patristic witness to the Christian revelation. In other terms, if "providence", "theology" and "economy" are simply identified, the result will be the complete perversion of Christianity's uniqueness, its exclusiveness. Either we must concede that all religion is fundamentally the same, since "economy" and "theology" must be revised to accommodate "providence"; or we must deny the existence of "providence" in order to accommodate the Christian revelation. In the first case, we relativize all religions; in the second, we absolutize Christianity at the expense of history. Now, if we maintain the distinction between "revelation" and "providence", but equate "economy" and "theology", as we shall see, error in christology and triadology will ensue, even as it did during the Scholastic period and the Protestant revision of that "theological" rationalism. In brief, a definition of oikonomia theou is necessary to give the following chapters clarity and accuracy.

The word "economy" means literally "the law of house", or, as it was commonly applied in antiquity, "the management of the household" or "the administration of a state".[1] In the Christian sense, "economy", oikonomia--or as it was used in Latin texts, dispensatio--is synonymous with God's

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[1]For the many uses of the word oikonomia, see W. F. Arndt and F. W. Gingrich, A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Christian Literature. Chicago, 1957, 562; and A Lexicon Abridged from Liddell and Scott's Greek-English Lexicon. Oxford, 1953, 478.

plan of salvation, His "secret arrangements" for man's redemption. "For He has made known to us in all wisdom and insight the mystery of His Will, according to His Purpose which He fixed in Christ as an economy for the fullness of time," wrote Saint Paul, "to recapitualate all things in Christ, things in heaven and on earth" (Eph. i, 9-10). The "economy" is the revelation of God's eternal Will, "the mystery of Christ, which was not made known to the sons of men in former generations as it has been now disclosed to His holy prophets and apostles by the Holy Spirit" (Phil. iii, 4-5). Their witness was "to manifest to all creation the economy of the mystery hidden for ages in God Who created all things" (Eph. iii, 9-10).[2]

Following Saint Paul, Saint John Chrysostom says that the "economy" is a "mystery", "and well may it be called so, since it is not manifested to all, not even the angels--for how could it be when it was 'made known by the Church'? Therefore, Saint Paul states that 'without controversy great is the mystery'. Great, indeed, it was: for God became Man, and Man became a God."[3] And Saint Basil the Great writes,

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[2]The Greek text is found in Novum Testamentum Graece, edited by Eberhard Nestle. Twenty-fourth edition. Stuttgart, 1960.

[3]Ep. ad I Tim. XI, 1 PG 62 555. Cf. St. Ignatius of Antioch, in The Apostolic Fathers (vol. II) trans. by K. Lake. Loeb Classical Library. London, 1925, Ad Eph. xx, 1; and xviii, 2; St. Irenaeus, Contra Haer., V, praef. PG 7 1120; St. Methodius of Olympus, De Jonah Hist., 2 PG 18 329D; St. Athanasius, Ora. de Incarn. Verbi. Dei, 54 PG 25 192B; St. Gregory Nazianzus, Poem. Dogm., X, 5-9 PG 37 465; St. Gregory of Nyssa, Ora. Catech. 25 PG 45 65D; and St. Maximus the Confessor, Ad Thal. 60 PG 90 921AB.

"The economy of our God and Savior concerning man is his recall from the fallen state, a return to communion with God which the disobedience of Adam had caused. This is the reason for the visitation of Christ in the flesh, the pattern of His life described by the Gospels: His suffering, the Cross, the Tomb and the Ressurection. Thus, man is saved by Christ, receiving the ancient adoption."[4] In the words of Saint Gregory of Nyssa, the entire purpose of the "economy" was "to transform what was assumed by Christ into something divine and incorrupt."[5] And Saint Maximus the Confessor tells us that "as a result of the economy, Christ is already working the things of the future, looking to future joy, the satisfactory contentment of the knowledge which is the end promised to the Lord's beloved."[6] In other words, the "economy" is the magnalia Dei, those divine acts, beginning with the Incarnation, by which man is brought into communion with God, "to become partakers of the divine nature" (II Pet. i, 4).

Although the Incarnation initiated "the economy of salvation", the Greek Fathers recognized two other preparatory "economies" leading to the finality of the divine epiphany: the economies of the Jews and of the Gentiles,

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[4]De Spirit. Sanct., 34 PG 32 128D. See St. Athanasius, Contra Ar. II, 6 PG 160B; and St. Gregory of Nyssa, De Bapt. PG 46 416C.

[5]Contra Eun. V PG 45 693A.

[6]Cap. Theol. et Oecon. II, 24 PG 90 1136B.

especially the Greeks. Thus Saint Gregory of Nazianzus referred to the covenant between God and Old Israel as oikonomia;[7] and Saint Athanasius identified the God of the Jews with "the Logos Who became incarnate for our salvation."[8] The Gentiles, too, had their preparatio evangelica, even if, in many instances, it took the form of anti-types or pseudo-analogies of the Christian truth, such as Er, son of Armenius, who rose from the funeral pyre, or Orpheus returning from Hades."[9] "For nothing good has happened among men without the Divine Logos," Origen exclaimed, "who has visited the souls of those who are able even if but a short time to receive these operations of the Divine Logos".[10] And Clement of Alexandria, as we know, described Greek philosophy as "a schoolmaster to bring 'the Hellenic mind' to Christ, just as the Law was for the Hebrews."[11] The "economies", like all the good in the cosmos, were decreed by the Father but executed by the Son and the Holy

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[7]Ora. II, 24 PG 35 433A. Cf. Gal., iii, 24.

[8]Contra Gentes, 45 PG 25 89B. Cf. St. Irenaeus, Contra Haer. IV, 14 PG 7 1011A-1012A.

[9]Origen, Contra Celsum, trans. by H. Chadwick. Cambridge (Eng.), 1953, II, 16, 56; St. Justin Martyr, I Apol., 60 PG 6 417Af; and see L. Bouyer, The Paschal Mystery, trans. by Sister Mary Benoit. London, 1951, pp. xviii-xxiii, 321-325.

[10]Contra Celsum, VI, 78. Cf. Rom. i, 14-16; Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, in The Ante-Nicene Fathers, vol. 2, edited by A. Roberts and J. Donaldson. Grand Rapids, 1951, I, 5; St. Justin Martyr, I Apol. 46 PG 6 397C.

[11]Strom. I, 6. See A. C. Purdy and G. H. MacGregor, The Jew and the Greek: Tutors Unto Christ. New York, 1936.

Spirit Who permeates all things.[12]

The moment the Greek Fathers began to explain the divine source of the "economies", they were discussing theología, that is, the "knowledge", gnōsis, apart from His relation to the creation, God in Himself. Theología is, according to Saint Maximus the Confessor, that which concerns "the unending, unlimited, undefinable, both good and wise, powerful and providential, the Judge of all being."[13] The relationship of the Persons of the Trinity to one another, says Saint Gregory of Nyssa, is "the mystery of theology" (to tēs theologías mystérion).[14] In other terms, theología is the "knowledge" of the Divine Nature and Persons and does not, as it has been understood in the West since the rise of Scholasticism, comprehend the totality of the Christian experience.[15] The Fathers, Greek and Latin, certainly recognized an intrinstic relation between theología and oikonomía, but the two levels of discourse were not confused. Theología is fundamentally closed to reason whereas oikonomía is open to it.[16]

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[12]St. Justin Martyr, II Apol., 10 PG 6 461B; St. Athasius, Ora de Incarn. Verb. Dei, 8 PG 25 109A; St. Gregory of Nyssa, Ora. Catech. 25 PG 45 65D; St. Cyril of Jerusalem, Catech. VI, 6 PG 33 548A, etc.

[13]Cap. de Char. Cent. II, 27 PG 90 992D. Cf. St. Basil, Ep. VIII ad Caes. 3 PG 32 252A.

[14]Contra Eun. IV PG 45 624A.

[15]For example, one need only read Summa Theologiae by Thomas Aquinas or Calvin's Institutes of the Christian Religion or Paul Tillich's Systematic Theology.

[16]It is probably with Augustine's analogy between the

In itself, the Trinity is beyond reason, beyond "the sense and the operation of the intellect, and all things sensible and intellectual, all things in the world of being and non-being . . ."[17] The knowledge of God is existential not metaphysical, "mystical" not rationalist.[18] The knowledge of God, moreover, differs according to the capacity

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human mind--memoria, intellectus and voluntas--in his De Trinitate that we find the first example of theological rationalism in the Early church.

[17]St. Dionysius the Areopagite, Myst. Theol., I PG 3 997B. See also Ep. ad Diogn., in The Apostolic Fathers, (vol. II), trans. by K. Lake. London, 1925, VIII, 1; St. Justin Martyr, Dial. c. Tryph. 4 PG 6 484D; Clement of Alexandria, Strom. V, 2 PG 9 109A; St. Basil the Great, Adv. Eun. I, 6 PG 29 521f; St. Gregory Nazianzus, Ora. XXXVIII, 2 PG 36 294B; St. Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eun. 10 PG 45 828f; St. John Chrysostom, De Incompr. Dei III, PG 48 720; St. Maximus the Confessor, Theol. et Oecon. I, 1 PG 90 1084A; and St. John of Damascus, De Fid. Orth. 2 PG 94 800B.

[18]The "mysticism" of the Greek Fathers, contrary to Scholastic and post Scholastic thought, was neither individualistic, exotic, erotic nor private and never opposed to the experience of the church. All the theology of the Fathers was "mystical", because the object of this discipline, God, is "ineffable". See Fr. Eusebius Stephanou, "An Approach to Christian Philosophy", The Greek Orthodox Theological Review, II, 1 (1956), 24f. Also, the Greek Fathers believed that the church possessed all Truth and nothing they taught was in opposition to its tradition. Thus, St. Irenaeus wrote, Ubi enim Ecclesia, ibi et Spiritus Dei; et ubi Spiritus Dei, illic Ecclesia, et omnis gratia: Spiritus autem veritas (Contra Haer. III, 24 PG 7 966C); and St. Maximus proclaimed, "I have no private teaching, only the common doctrine of the Catholic Church"--egō dógma ídion ouk écho, allà tò koinòn tès Ekklesías tēs Katholikēs (Rel. Mot., 6 PG 90 120C). Cf. St. Cyril of Jerusalem, Catech. XVIII, 23 PG 33 1044AB; St. Basil, Hexa. III, 5 PG 29 65A; St. Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eun. XII PG 45 984A; St. Dionysius, Div. Nom. I, 1 PG 3 589B; St. John of Damascus, De Imag. III, 3 PG 94 1320D-1321A. On the mysticism of the Greek Fathers, see V. Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church, trans. by Members of the Fellowship of St. Alban and St. Sergius. London, 1957, pp. 7-66. Observe that Daniélou, in comparison,

of those to whom it is given. The special grace of the "economy" uncovers for the believer the gnōsis of God as Trinity and, indeed, the very meaning of the Incarnation. "Who illumined you with the faith of the Holy Consubstantial and Worshipful Trinity?", Saint Maximus the Confessor inquires almost rhetorically. "Or who made known to you the economy of the Incarnation of the Second Member of the Holy Trinity? (Tís soi egnórise tèn ensarkon oikonomían tou henòs tês hagías Triádos;) And who taught you about the natures of incorporeal beings and the reasons for the beginnings and consumation of the visible cosmos? Or the resurrection from the dead and eternal life? Or about the glory of the kingdom of heaven and the dread judgment? Was it not the grace of Christ dwelling in you, the pledge of the Holy Spirit? What is greater than this grace? What is better than this wisdom and knowledge?"[19]

Again, "economy" is distinguished from "providence". Providence, pronoia, is the term used by the Greek Fathers to describe "the care which God has for all things."[20]

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defines non-patristic theology in non-mystical terms. Theology is, he says, ". . . the use of the human understanding to arrive at the object of faith, intellectus quarens fidem (The Lord of History, p. 245).

[19]Cap. de Char. Cent. IV, 77 PG 90 1068A. There is also an "economy of the Spirit", but it is generally related to the work of the Son. See V. Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church, pp. 156-173.

[20]On the idea of providence in the Greek Fathers, see H. de Juaye DuManoir, Doqme et Spiritualité chez Sainte Cyrille d'Alexandre. Paris, 1944, p. 86; and St. John of Damascus, De Fid. Ortho. II, 29 PG 94 965A.

This contains a "knowledge" open to all men, possessing something both "knowable" and "utterable". "For what can be known about God is plain to them", writes Saint Paul. "Ever since the creation of the cosmos His invisible Nature, namely, His eternal Power and Deity, has been clearly perceived in the things that have been made." (Rom. i, 19-20). Providence is the act of God by which He preserves and governs the cosmos, preventing the collapse of all things into nothing (Neh. ix, 6; Ps. xxxvi, 6; Matt. x, 29). Providence includes God's care for unbelievers and all things outside Christ's sanctification (Matt. vi, 26). Unlike the "economy", providence is something dark and mysterious (Ps. xxxvi, 6, Rom. xi, 33). Nevertheless, there is a sense in which providence is also an "economy", for it it exercized to spiritual ends. All human effort would be in vain without providence. Pronoía existed before the Incarnation and exists now. It was and is involved in ordering the ways of men, the conditions and circumstances of men to the slightest detail (Prov. xx, 24). For example, the writer of the letter to Diognetus called "the changing of the seasons", oikonomía theoū.[21] In fact, Saint Gregory of Nyssa designated providence as "the economy of the cosmos"--kósmon oikonoménon.[22] Again, providence overrules and overcomes the wicked designs of Satan (Phil. i, 12).

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[21]Diog., IV, 5.

[22]Ora. Catech., praef., pg. 45 12A. Cf. St. Methodius of Olympus, Conviv. dec. Virg.,II Pg. 18 64B.

Providence, in a word, is the mercy and love of God for His creation, even though it is not "the economy of salvation" whereby the Father saves all those who abide in the Son.

By the expression oikonomia theou, the Fathers generally meant oikonomia soteria, "the economy of salvation", the special, historical revelation of God's "plan" for the redemption of mankind in Christ. Theology is the saving gnosis of the Trinity which comes through Christ; but it is a "knowledge" of God apart from his providential relations with His creatures. Theologia is mystikos, "mystical", the knowledge of a "mystery". Providence is the immanence of God in nature, the guiding, sustaining and enlightening force in history. We may call "the economy of God" christological history "the history of salvation", which brings the "knowledge" of union, henosis, with the Trinity; but providence is a kind of "natural revelation" given to all men for the preservation of the race and the cosmos as well as a means to lead men to faith. Providence concerns "natural history", man outside of Christ, although making provision before the Incarnation for His Advent and even now making provision for His return, parousia. Oikonomia and theologia are unique, privileged, limited, but pronoia is common, universal and unlimited. With this in mind, we may now turn to the exposition of "the economy of God" according to the Greek Fathers.

CHAPTER IV

TIME AND ETERNITY: THE COSMIC SETTING

We have defined the most general concept of Greek patristic thought--"the economy of God"--but now we must identify the specific components of the Christian "philosophy of history". The first component of that "philosophy" or "economy" is its cosmological setting--time and eternity. It is here, too, that the Fathers introduced to the ancient world new cosmogonic and cosmological principles which helped to reshape Graeco-Roman civilization. Their "intellectual revolution" was not their description of the physical world, but their declaration that the cosmos was contingent and man's destiny, subject neither to time nor fate, was revealed by a Deity Who, although Master of all things and transcending all the categories of reason, condescended to share the life of His creatures so that they might share the life of the Creator. It is the Logos, then, Who was the center of "the philosophy of the Church Fathers". It was the Logos that was the basis of their "radical revision", their "revolt" against the classical scientia.[1] The idea of time--and its relation to eternity--was the conception which was viewed by the

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[1]See C. N. Cochrane, Christianity and Classical Culture. New York, 1957, iii-vii.

Fathers as the most critical intellectual problem in their debate with the ancients.

For the Greeks, time determined the constitution of history, the very nature of human existence. Their naturalism--in art, philosophy, politics, ethics, etc.--issued from their conception of time. Their belief that the city-state was the right unit of human society and the most perfect medium for education was based on the ideas that the good life is found here and now. Virtue, for the Greeks, was the fullness of manhood and the complete realization of human potentialities. In other terms, since time exhibits nothing but constant recurrence, an unending cycle and coming-to-be (Aristotle, de Generatione et Corruptione, II, xi, 338A), life is a series of adjustments, something to be endured, something to be exploited if it were to be made tolerable--if at all meaningful--in the relentless circle of time. Thus, the Greeks had no word that meant cosmic purpose--télos was understood as "accomplished" or "completed". The christian idea of éschatos was alien to them. They were concerned with "first principles" not "the last things". History had no end, for it was eternally recurring, ánakyklōsis, returning upon itself again and again.[2]

We can see this idea clearly illustrated in the sixth book of Polybius' Histories. Kingship, he said

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[2]G. Florovsky, "Eschatology in the Patristic Age: An Introduction", The Greek Orthodox Theological Review, II, 1 (1956), 132F.

deteriorates into despotism, aristocracy into oligarchy and democracy into anarchy. This is the nature of political development, he tells the statesman, and it must always follow the same course. He who has seen "how each from the other naturally arises and develops will be able to understand when and how the growth, perfection, end and change of each is likely to occur once more."[3] The natural transformation of one kind of government to its opposite follows "the cycle of political revolution, the course appointed by nature in which constitutions change, disappear and finally return to the point from which they started."[4] "Lycurgus had perfectly well understood that all the above changes take place naturally and necessarily", Polybius observed.[5] "That all existing things are subject to decay and change is a truth which scarcely needs proof; for the course of nature is sufficient to convince us."[6] Polybius, a typical Greek, believed that the permanent cycle of time, the principle of cyclism, was not a phenomenon, but an underlying substance in things, a hypokeiménon, something not servile to nature and hidden from the sense.[7]

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[3]The Histories, (3 vols.), trans. by W. R. Paton. Loeb Classical Library. London, 1923, Book VI, 4, 4.

[4]Polybius, VI, 9, 9.

[5]Polybius, VI, 10, 10.

[6]Polybius, VI, 8, 57.

[7]R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History, pp. 33-36.

For this reason, too, the Greek historian made his task an "inquiry", discovering when nature would disclose the truth in things, their aitiai. History could do no more, for there was for the Greeks no absolute beginning or end. Creation would have implied something utterly contrary to reason and the philosophical and scientific tradition of Hellenism; and it would have meant the existence of inconceivable power. Yet, they acknowledged that behind all the vicissitudes of the phenomenal world there was an unseen realm of things beyond it, a world of "repose" and "permanence". It was here that they looked for the hypokeimenon of time's movement. Because, too, there was no unity in phenomena, the Greek historians spoke of "histories" not history,[8] for unity is found in the world of contemplation.

Greek historiography, then, presupposed, even if not always consciously, the dualism of time and eternity, becoming and being, matter and form. These concepts conspired to make the Greek experience of history endless, beginningless time, moving tirelessly from point to point, suggesting in itself nothing but itself and infallibly, immutably riveted to its own totality. Some of the Greeks, of course, sought a way out of time, out of the flux of history, looking for salvation up and away from the world of the senses. The solution, they said, had to be objective, ontological, rational. They would not have accepted

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[8]Collingwood, p. 22.

the Kantian explanation of time, "Time is nothing other than the form of the inner sense, i.e., the intuition of ourselves and our inner circumstances."[9] Again, "Time is the formal condition a priori of all appearances in general."[10] The Greeks would not have rejected his theory of time because Kant had not seriously dealt with the cycle of past, present and future.

Time was not simply an intellectual problem for the Greeks, but an existential agony. They wanted to extricate themselves from it. Time was an ontological impediment to happiness, to freedom from suffering and death. Thus, Plotinus (204 A.D.-270), contemptuous of sensible things, even his own body, struggled to emerge from the world of Ulysses and Circe, to "a life never varying, not becoming what previously it was, the thing immutably itself, broken by no interval."[11] Only in "eternal repose" can the soul find beatitude, only in "the vision of the good" where there is the cessation of all activities native to temporal existence, can man know truth.[12] The realization of this desire, he said, was possible only if the soul escapes the body, that is, time.[13] Consequently, Plotinus

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[9]Kritik der Reinen Vernunft, p. 68.

[10]Kant, loc.cit.

[11]The Enneads, trans. By S. MacKenna. New York, 1951, III, 1, 7.

[12]Plotinus, VI, 8, 10-11.

[13]Plotinus, III, 7, 7-8.

completely rejected the idea of the resurrection in the Christian sense. The "true resurrection", the "true awakening", he argued, is "resurrection from the body not with the body."[14] The Christian belief in the resurrection would have meant to him--and all the Greeks--that the present imprisonment in the flesh, in time, would only be renewed endlessly, hence, negating the very object of philosophy.

Plotinus may have received comfort and virtue from his "mysticism", but he achieved nothing else. The Enneads does not show that he confronted the problem of time; he does not even pretend to give an analysis of it. We must turn to Saint Augustine for the first and most profound scrutiny of time. "What then is time?", he inquires in the eleventh book of the Confessions. "If no one asks me, I know: if I wish to explain it to one that asketh, I know not: yet I say boldly that I know that if nothing passed away, time past were not; and if nothing were coming, a time to come were not; and if nothing were, time present were not. Those two times, then, past and to come, how are they, seeing the past is not, and that to come is not yet? But the present, should it always be present and never pass into time past, verily it should not be time but eternity. If time present (if it is to be time) only cometh into existence, because it passeth into time past, how can we say that either this is, whose cause of being is,

[14]Plotinus, III, 6, 6.

that it shall not be; so, namely, that we cannot truly say that time is, but because it is tending not to be?"[15]

After pondering questions about the length of time-past and time-to-come, intervals which have no meaning if there is no past, present and future, Augustine continues: "I ask, Father, I affirm not: O my God, rule and guide me. Who will tell me that there are not three times . . . past, present and future; but present only, because those other two are not? Or are they also; and when from future it becomes present, doeth it come out of some secret place; and so, when retiring, from present it becometh past? For where did they, who foretold things to come, see them, if as yet they are not? For that which is not, cannot be seen. And they who relate things past, could not relate them, if in mind they did not discern them, and if they were not, they could not be discerned. Things past, then, and to come, are."[16] Reason, says Augustine, can tell us that past and present and future seem to be, but it is difficult to explain in what manner. The soul apprehends times as "the present of things past, memory; present of things present, sight; present of things future, expectation,"[17] but the soul informs us only that the modes of time are grasped as present while not certifying the nature of past and future in themselves. There is no way to compare or measure what

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[15] The Confessions, trans. by E. B. Pusey. New York, 1949, pp. 253-254.

[16] St. Augustine, p. 256.

[17] St. Augustine, p. 258.

no longer exists and what has not yet come to be. Reason is mute.

It is probably for this reason that the Greek Fathers gave no such analysis of time.[18] Not unlike Augustine, too, they affirmed that time was created with the cosmos.[19] But unlike him, they placed time wholly within the "economic" order, that is, the order of being: time is an ontological concept which is understood, if at all, historically not theologically. Although the fact of time is related to the fact of God as Creator, God is incomprehensible--Augustine compared the Trinity to the faculties of the soul--and cannot be subsumed under the category of being.[20] God

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[18]Vladimir Lossky devotes but a single page to the Greek Fathers on time (The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church, p. 102) while our other authorities, Tixeront, Altaner, Quasten, make no allusion to the matter, that is, no mention of an Augustinian analysis. The approach of the Greek Fathers to time is historical and cosmological.

[19]St. Augustine, De Civ. Dei, XI, 6; St. Basil, Hexa. I, 6 PG 29 16C; St. Maximus the Confessor, De Ambig. PG 91 1164BC.

[20]Greek patristic ontology is usually misunderstood. It is true that the Fathers often speak of God as "being", but never existentially. The object of knowledge is being, says St. John of Damascus, but God "does not belong to the class of existing things; not that He does not exist, but He is above all things having being, even above existence itself. For if knowledge concerns being, surely what is above knowledge is above being (hyper ousián); and conversely, what is above being is above knowledge, God, then, is incomprehensible . . . " (De Fid. Orth., I, 4 PG 94 800AB). The association of God and "being", therefore, is no affirmation, but a negation in the mouth of the Greek Fathers, for being is vacuous. The word is used to avoid any affirmation (St. John of Damascus, 800B). It is otherwise, with Thomas Aquinas who applies "names" substantially: Et ideo aliter dicendum est, quod hujusmodi quidem nomina significant substantiam divinam, et predicantur de Deo substantialiter sed deficunt a repraesentatione ipsius (Summa

is the creator of the ages and all that is in them, testifies Saint Maximus the Confessor. He brings them into existence from nothing, "not imperfectly nor in parts, but altogether and completely."[21] Saint Dionysius the Areopagite says that God even transcends eternity which is His creature.[22] The idea of creation, whether appertaining to the visible or invisible worlds, is a mystery and nothing tempted the Greek Fathers to speculate beyond the Biblical account. It is true that the cosmology found in their commentaries upon the Biblical narrative "is necessarily expressed in terms of the conception of the universe which prevailed in their own age", but their hexaemarai are indebted to Plotinus or Aristotle or Plato for language and modus operandi, but not for truth.[23] In other words, the

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Theol., edited by D. DeRubeis, etc., Turin, 1926, PP. q. 13, a. 2). In the words of Etienne Gilson, "If God is being, He is not only total being: totum esse, but . . . He is more especially true being: verum esse, and that means that everything else is only partial being, hardly deserving the name of being at all" (The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy, trans. by A. H. C. Downes. New York, 1940, p. 64). That God is above all the categories of reason, see also St. Maximus the Confessor, Cap. Theol. et Oecon. I, 7 PG 90 1087C. This fact contradicts, incidentally, Emil Brunner's allegation that a continuity exists between patristic and Scholastic theology on the question of God and being (Revelation and Reason, trans. by O. Wyon. Philadelphia, 1946, p. 345).

[21] Cap. Theol. et Oecon. I, 5 PG 90 1085A. Cf. II Macc. vii, 28.

[22] Div. Nom. II, 10 PG 3 673D. Cf. St. Maximus the Confessor, Cap. de Char. III, 28 PG 90 1025B.

[23] V. Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church, p. 104f; and G. Florovsky, "Eschatology in the Patristic Age: An Introduction", 31f. For a study on the

Fathers investigated nothing beyond that which had been delivered to them by "the Law and Prophets and Apostles and Evangelists."[24]

There is no material synthesis of the Christian tradition and "the wisdom of the world" in the cosmogeny of the Fathers. They give ample testimony to the truth that creation is not an idea of a philosophical nature. They did not compromise with ancient dialectics which knew nothing about creationism other than the sense which Plato gave it, that is to say, the Demiurge, the designer of the cosmos, the one who arranged pre-existing matter, gave it order, kósmos, fashioning all things from that which is co-eternal with him. The "creator" of the Timaeus does not bring matter, hyle, into existence, for it exists as the autonomous pure potentiality of being even without his will to order.[25] On the other hand, the God of Christianity

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relation between Christian thought and ancient wisdom in the Hexaemaron of St. Basil the Great, see Yves Courtonne, Saint Basile et l'hellenisme. Paris, 1934. On the mystery of the Divine act of creation, see St. Cyril of Alexandria, In Joan. Evang. I, PG 73 132-145. On the value of pagan wisdom, in general, St. Gregory of Nyssa, for example, said that he found Plato most useful, but only when he was in agreement with the church and its Holy Scripture. Where there is conflict, he said, "we must abandon the Platonic chariot"--hè Platonikon hárma (De Anima et Res., PG 46 49C). This matter of the attitude towards and the utilization of pagan wisdom by the Greek Fathers--almost always misconstrued by modern scholarship--will be taken up in the last chapter of this study.

[24]St. John of Damascus, De Fid. Orth., I, 1 PG 94 789B; and St. Dionysius the Areopagite, Div. Nom., I, 1 PG 3 588Aa

[25]"In order to establish the relation between the world of ideas and materia and to form an ordered world, the Cosmos, from its chaotic suring, matter must be shaped by

created ex nihilo both the world of sense and intellect. Again, the Fathers make no adjustment to Platonic dualism, because not only does the distinction of dimensions not imply the notion of irreconcilable disparity between things visible and invisible, things temporal and eternal. In his Oratio Catechetica Magna, Saint Gregory of Nyssa clarifies "an argument . . . we have received from the Fathers, an argument which is no mythical narrative, but which from its very nature invites our credence." There are, he continues, two means of human apperception corresponding to the nature of existing things. "The world of thought is bodiless, without sensibility or form while the world of sense, by its very name, is perceived by the organs of the senses." Though distinguished, they are not opposed absolutely, because "a certain harmony is maintained by the consonance of opposites through the Wisdom which preserves all things; and, thus, there is a symphony of the entire creation itself, no break in the two worlds, only conformity with the Divine Wisdom--intercourse, unity between things sensible and intellectual--in order that all things might equally participate in the good and no existent be without

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mind," writes Eduard Zeller about Platonic cosmogeny. "To illustrate this idea, Plato makes use of the mythical form of the creator. This does not involve a creation ex nihilo, an idea which was entirely unacceptable to the Greek mind, but merely the reduction of the primitive state of chaos into an ordered and designed Cosmos" (Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy, thirteenth edition, trans. by W. Nestle, New York, 1959, p. 165.

a share in that superior nature."[26]

All that exists was created by God, states Saint Basil, including time which shares in both sensible and intelligible realities. "Perhaps, these words 'In the beginning God created' signify the instantaneous and imperceptible moment of creation. The beginning . . . is indivisible and immediate. For just as the beginning of the road is not yet the road and the beginning of the house is not yet the house, so the beginning of time could not yet be time, not even the least portion of it. The objection that the beginning is a time, does not take into consideration the division of time--beginning, middle and end. It is absurd to imagine a beginning of a beginning; and if we further divided the beginning in two, we make instead of one--or more precisely, several, or even an infinite number of beginnings--many, for all that which is divided is divisible to the infinite. Then, when it is said, 'In the beginning God created', it is to teach us that the Will of God made the cosmos to arise in less than an instant . . . ."[27] Since time has an absolute beginning, it will have an end, Basil says in another place, and to deny either the beginning or the end of things is blasphemy against the Only-Begotten Son of God.[28]

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[26]Ora. Cat. Mag., VI, PG 45 25BC. Cf. St. Maximus the Confessor, holon ton ex horatōn kai haoratōn synistámenon (Mystagogia, 7 PG 91 684D-685A).

[27]Hexa. I, 6 PG 29 16CD. See note 19, page 89.

[28]De Spirit. Sanct. 43 PG 32 145D-148A. Erich Frank

Another Father, Saint Maximus the Confessor tells us further that time was not only created, but it is contingent, measured and made subject to the categories of being.[29] "Beginning, middle and end characterize things which are extended in time," he explains, "and any period of time possessing these attributes, as someone has said, is an Aeon."[30] Because time, which is a measurable movement, may have any number of Aeons . . . it is subsumed under the category of 'when' experiencing interval and receiving the beginning to that existence. Of course, if time and its Aeons were beginningless, then, much more would the things within them be curtailed by the same limitations."[31] The end of the entire temporal process, Maximus says elsewhere, is God Himself. He is "the beginning, middle and end of all things as their energy--yet suffering no change--for He is their beginning as Creator, their middle as their providence and the end of all as their boundary."[32] In a word,

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makes the interesting observation that the Christian conception of time, the idea of its creation with the cosmos, is neither to confuse it "with the metaphysical assumption that the world had a beginning in time nor to make any concession to the notion that the principle of its creation is to be found within the world" (Philosophical Understanding and Religious Truth. New York, 1956, p. 59). Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol. PP. q. 46, a. 2; and Summ. Contra Gentiles, in The Basic Works of St. Thomas Aquinas, (vol. II), Edited by A. C. Pegis. New York, 1945, II, 38.

[29] Gnost. Cent., I, 5 PG 90 1085A.

[30] St. Maximus the Confessor, loc. cit.

[31] St. Maximus the Confessor, De Amb. PG 91 1073BD.

[32] Cap. Theol. et Oecon. I, 10 1085D-1088A.

time is not cyclical, because it contains not only a beginning and an end, but "aeons" or measurable durations of time, which are terminated by intervals and can be equated with no other period of time. And, too, time is not eternal, because when its purpose is fulfilled, time will come to an end--or, at least, lose its temporal character--and flow into eternity.

If we turn to Saint John of Damascus, we will find a clear summary of the patristic explanation of time and its difference from the "age" and "eternity":

> "He created the ages Who Himself was before all the ages and of Whom the divine David said, 'From ages to ages Thou art' (Ps. xc, 2); and Saint Paul also says, 'Through whom He created the ages' (Heb. i, 2) . . . The life of each man is called an age . . . a period of a thousand years is called an age . . . the whole course of the present life . . . the future life, the immortal life, after the resurrection. Again, the word 'age' is used not to denote time itself nor yet any part of time measured by the movement and course of the sun [i.e. clock-time] . . . but the kind of temporal motion and interval that is coextensive with eternity. For 'age' is to things eternal what time is to things temporal. Now, seven ages of the cosmos are mentioned, that is, from the creation of heaven and earth to the general consumation of things and the resurrection of men . . . the eighth age is the future age. Before the cosmos was established, when there was no sun to divide the day from the night, there was not an age that could be measured, but there was nevertheless a certain temporal motion (ti chronikòn kinēma) and an interval coextensive with eternity (aidíos). And in this sense,

> there is but one age, and God is referred to as aionios and proaionios, for the age or aion itself is His creation. For God, Who alone is without beginning, is Himself the Creator of all things . . . But we speak also of ages of ages, in as much as the seven ages of the present cosmos includes many ages . . . Further, everlasting life and punishment show that the age to come is unending. For time will not be counted by days and nights (oudè gàr metà tês hemérais kaì nuxìn ho chrónos 'arithmésetai) after the resurrection, for then there will be rather but a single day with no evening . . . ."[33]

It is noteworthy that although the Greek Fathers identify eternity as something other than time--whether time qua the ages or time qua the omnipresent medium of living--it is not their practice to limit "the present age" to time and "the future age" to eternity.[34] Thus, Saint Dionysius the Areopagite says that "sometimes the Scriptures declare the glories of a temporal eternity and an

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[33] De Fid. Orth. II, 1-2 PG 94 861B-864C.

[34] Erich Frank, following the Augustinian-Thomist tradition, insists that eternity "is an idea of which we can have no notion or experience." It is difficult to understand, then, how he can define "the Christian concept of eternity" as "timeless, something beyond time and incommensurable with it, for if we have "no notion or experience" of eternity, we could not know that it was impossible to have no "notion" or "experience" of it. He is only partly correcting in saying that "the Christian term 'eternity' should be distinguished from the Greek term aeon which means 'everness'. For the Greek philosopher, aeonion is that which is always (aei), unending, and conveys the idea of infinite duration. Everness is an everlasting now, a perpetual present" (Philosophical Understanding and Religious Truth, p. 60; and p. 77, note 16). We shall see later that the Greek Fathers believe that Christians already experience eternity.

eternal time, although we understand that more strictly it describes and reveals eternity as the home of things without end and time as the home of things which have birth."[35]

Time and eternity are not distinguishable absolutely, then, because the latter is in touch with the former through an "age"; eternity dips into time, to be sure, through the Incarnation. Furthermore, "the future age" is a kind of temporal period, for, as Oscar Cullmann rightly observes, "all talk about the coming age that does not take this time quality [of eternity] in full earnest is philosophical reinterpretation." Again, he states that "time is nothing but a part, defined and delimited by God, of this unending duration of God's time. Nowhere does this come so clearly to expression as in the . . . fact that the word, aion ('age'), is the same word that is applied to a limited division of time; otherwise expressed, between what we call eternity and what we call time, that is between everlastingly continuing time and limited time . . . . Eternity is the endless succession of the ages (aiones)."[36] In other words, eternity does succeed time, but not as if eternity had appeared at the end of history abruptly: time contains many ages which pass into one another and into eternity which is the final, unending age.

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[35] Div. Nom., X, 3 PG 3 123A

[36] Christ and Time, trans. by F. V. Filson. Philadelphia, 1960, pp. 62, 65-66. See also the discussion in E. D. Burton, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians. Edinburg, 1948, pp. 462-433; and Matt. xii, 32; Mark x, 30; I Tim. i, 17, etc.

According to the Greek Fathers, there are seven ages of limited duration and an "eighth age" which has no end. "The time of this life (ho tou bíou toútou chrónos)--this, the first creation--was accomplished in one week (hebdomádos) of days; and the formation of beings began with the first and was completed on the seventh or last day," writes Saint Gregory of Nyssa, "for it is written, 'there was one day', in which beings were created, then a second, and so on until everything was done. The seventh day was the end of creation . . . . This is the time of the cosmos (kósmou chrónon) . . . . The nature of time is determined by the week of days (te hebdomádi tōn hemerōn he tou chrónou physis). This grace by which we measure the days of time, beginning with 'the one day' and enclosing the number seven, we return again to 'the one' measuring always by the circle of weeks the whole interval of time. Until the things which have motion have passed away and once the transciency of motion has ceased, as the Apostle says (I Cor. vii, 31), there will come the time when things are no longer tossed about, changing and altering, but there will exist a creation which remains forever the same through the successive ages."[37]

After the consumation of "this creation", Saint Gregory continues, there will come another "age" in which all the necessities of "the bodily life" (sòmatikes zoēs)

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[37]De Octava, PG 44 608C-609D.

will disappear and the purification of the cosmos will be realized. It is "the eighth day", the Ogdoad, which "purifies" and "circumcizes" the life of the anterior ages, the Hebdomas.[38] "The hebdomatic time having ceased (hebdomatikou pausamenou chronou), the eighth day (hemera ogdoe) will appear after the seventh, since it no longer receives within it a succession of numbers: it abides uninterruptedly 'the one', never divided by the dark of the night . . . ."[39]

In his Hexaemeron, Saint Basil the Great elaborates the same theme in greater detail:

> "God who made the nature of time measured it out and determined it by intervals of days; and wishing to give it a week as a measure, He ordered the week to revolve from period to period upon itself, to

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[38]Danielou contends that the idea of Ogdoad-Hebdomas found in the Greek Fathers "comes directly from the school of Pythagoras," in particular, the De mensibus of John of Lydia. (He could also have mentioned Philo's De officio Mundi). He believes, therefore, that by this doctrine history "could not be more completely emptied of all significance; we are here in the midst of Hellenistic thought" (The Bible and the Liturgy, trans. by scholars of Notre Dame's Liturgical Studies. Notre Dame, 1956, p. 265). But Danielou's chief authority, Yves Courtonne, is not categorical. The language is clearly from "une source pythagoricienne", but it is used with "pieux dessein" (Saint Basile et L'hellenisme, pp. 34-36). Because the conception of time and eternity, creation and consummation, Christian cosmology differs radically from pagan cyclism and "Basile est oblige d'en charger complement le sens" (Courtonne, p. 36). No doubt the Fathers made formal use of Greek philosophy, but their ultimate authority is Genesis. See P. Duheim, Le Systeme du Monde: Histoire des Doctrine Cosmologique de Platon a Copernic, (vol. II), Paris, 1954, p. 408f.

[39]St. Gregory of Nyssa, De Oct. PG 44 609D-612A. Cf. his De Beatit., 8 PG 44 1292AB.

count the movement of time, forming the week of one day turning upon itself seven times. A proper circle begins and ends with itself. Such is also the character of eternity, to revolve itself and end nowhere else. If, then, the beginning of time is called 'one day' rather than the 'first day', it is because the Scriptures wishes to establish its relationship with eternity. It was, in reality, quite natural to call 'one' the day whose character is to be wholly separated and isolated from all others. If the Scriptures speak to us of many ages, saying everywhere, 'age of age' and 'ages of ages', we do not see it to enumerate them as first, second and third. It follows that we are hereby shown not so much the limits, ends and successions of ages, as distinctions between various states and modes of action. 'The day of the Lord', says the Scriptures, 'is great and very terrible'; and elsewhere, 'Woe unto you that desire the day of the Lord: to what end is it for you? The day of Lord is darkness and not light'. A day of darkness without evening, without succession, without end is not unknown to the Scriptures, and it is the day the Psalmist calls the eighth day--it is outside the time of weeks. Thus, whether you call it day or eternity, you express the same idea. What gives this state the name 'day' is that it is not several, but only one. If you call it eternity, still it is unique and not manifold. Thus, it is in order that you carry your thoughts forward towards a future life that the Scriptures marks the word 'one', for it is the day which is the very image of eternity, the first fruits of days, the contempo- of lights, the holy Lord's day, honored by the resurrection of our Lord."[40]

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[40]*Hexa*. II, PG 31 20A-21B.

This witness of Saint Gregory of Nyssa and his brother, Saint Basil, is not at all peculiar to them, but is the common tradition of the Church.[41] It would be unfair to call their teaching about time and eternity "Hellenic"--they "oppose all neoplatonic distortion and hypostatization of time"[42]--or "Origenist" or even "Cappadocian". Saint John Chrysostom--a so-called "Antiochian"--(if we follow modern scholarship in its division of patristic "schools")--offers us the same explanation of time: "What is the eighth day, but the great and manifest day of the Lord, the day, like a consuming fire inside an earthen vessel, the day when the heavenly powers tremble or as Saint Matthew says, 'Then the powers of heaven will be shaken--the fire showing forth the kingdom? It is called the 'eighth day', the revelation of a transformed state of things and the renewal in the future life. This present life is nothing else than one week (hebdomàs mià), beginning with the first day and ending with the seventh day, and then returning (anakykloúmenos)

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[41]Barnabas, in The Apostolic Fathers, (vol. I), trans. by K. Lake. London, 1925, XV, 1-9; St. Ignatius of Antioch, Ep. ad Magn., IX, 1; Origen, Sel. Ps. PG 12 1624BC; Clement of Alexandria, Stom. VI, 16; St. Irenaeus, Contra Haer. I, 18 PG 7 645B; St. Hippolytus, Frag: In Genes. PG 10 585A; St. Methodius of Olympus, Conviv. dec. Virg., VII, 6 PG 18 133A; St. Cyril of Jerusalem, Catech., 10 PG 33 982A; St. Gregory Nazianzus, Ora. XLI, 2 PG 36 429C-433B; St. Athanasius, De Sabb. et Circum., 5 PG 28 141A; St. Maximus the Confessor, Cap. Theol. et Oecon. I, 51 PG 90 1101C; and cf. Psalm. VI and I Pet. iii, 20.

[42]". . . gegen alle neuplatonische Verunendlichung und Hypostatisierung der Zeit." (H. Urs von Balthasar, Kosmische Liturgie: Das Weltbild Maximus des Bekenners. Einsiedeln, 1961, p. 123).

to itself in regular order, to the same beginning and arriving at the same end. Wherefore, the Lord's day is not so much to be designated the eighth day as the first day; for the weekly cycle does not extend to the number eight. When all things have stopped and dissolved, then, the course of the eighth rushes into the center of time. There is no return again to the beginning . . . ."[43]

We see, then, that the Greek Fathers are unanimous in their treatment of "the biblical week". As Daniélou says, it is "a figure of the whole time of the world in contrast to the eighth day of eternity". More precisely, the eighth day or "age" conducts the creation into eternity. According to Daniélou, however, this doctrine is not as "realistic" or "historical" as the teaching of many of the Latin Fathers who sought not only to expound the same concept of time and eternity, but also wanted "to find in the week a key to the succession of the ages."[44] Apparently the Latin patres were not satisfied with the cosmological approach of their brothers in the East and went in quest of greater historical detail, more extensive application of the "ages". To whom does Daniélou turn? Saint Augustine, for there appears to be no one else.[45]

What is the sabbath? Augustine inquires. It is a

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[43] De Compunctione ad Stel. II, 4 PG 47 415-416.

[44] The Bible and the Liturgy, p. 275.

[45] If there are other Latin Fathers who follow Augustine, Daniélou fails to mention them. See The Bible and the Liturgy, pp. 275-286.

share in God's "rest", His eternal "repose".

> "This Sabbath shall appear more clearly, however, if we count the ages as days, in accordance with the periods of time mentioned in Scripture. The first age, as the first day, extends from Adam to the deluge; the second, from the deluge to Abraham, equal to the first, not in length of time, but in the number of generations, there being ten in each. From Abraham to the advent of Christ there are, as the evangelist Matthew calculates, three periods, in each of which are fourteen generations--one period from Abraham to David, a second from David to the captivity, a third from the captivity to the birth of Christ in the flesh. There are thus five ages in all. The sixth is now passing, and cannot be measured by any number of generation . . . . After this period God shall rest as on the seventh day, when He shall give us (who shall be the seventh day) rest in Himself . . . the seventh shall be our Sabbath, which shall be brought to a close, not by an evening, but by the Lord's day, as an eighth and eternal day, consecrated by the resurrection of Christ, and prefiguring the eternal repose not only of the spirit, but also of the body . . . ."[46]

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[46] De Civ. Dei, XXII, 30. Augustine repeats the same analysis in Enarrationes in Psalmos VI and Sermon 259 PL 38 1197f. According to Daniélou (The Bible and the Liturgy, p. 227) the latter show "a definite millennialism". Millennialism or Chiliasm "is specially used of the period of 1000 years during which Christ, as has been believed, would return to govern the earth in person" and "is used to describe a vague time in the future when all flaws in human existence will have vanished, and perfect goodness and happiness will prevail" (A. von Harnack, "Millennium", Encyclopedia Britannica, (vol. XVII). New York, 1911, p. 461). This doctrine is nowhere to be found in the New Testament except Revelations XX (if taken literally). The idea of the future earthly Messianic kingdom stems directly

The Greek Fathers, too, believed that history was divided into "ages", but they do not seek to identify them. Their attention is dominated by the life of the cosmos as revealed in "the doctrine of Genesis."[47] This book, moreover, is important to them not only for its creationism and its theological implications, but, as we shall see in the following chapters, for its introduction to "christological history."[48] Indeed, God created all things, seen and unseen. One dimension is involved with the other just as Christ Himself, the incarnate Logos. Creation imitates Him; it is the unity of two orders of reality. Christ is the unity of two ontic stasis, as

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from Jewish apocalyptic literature. "Es war eine schlimme Erbschaft, die Christen von den Juden eubernahmen" (A. von Harnack, Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte, (bd. I). vierte aufl. Tubingen, 1909, p, 114). In the East, it was held by Pappias (in St. Irenaeus, Contra Haer. V, 33 PG 7 1214A); Barnabas, IV, 15; Hermas, X, 16; St. Justin Martyr, Dial. cum Tryph. 80 PG 6 664A-668A; St. Hippolytus, Christ. et Antichr. 61 PG 10 780B; St. Irenaeus, Contra Haer., V, 34 PG 7 1215B; and St. Methodius of Olympus, Conviv. dec. Virg. IX, PG 18 177B. The "sub-Apostolic fathers" and Apologists, says the German historian, Harnack, used Jewish literalism in order to oppose Marcionism, Gnosticism and Origenism, all representatives of Greek rationalism and spiritualism ("Millennium", p. 463). In general, the Greek Fathers never accepted this view and even seriously questioned the canonicity of the book of Revelations. The Eastern Church has held to their testimony and, in fact, that book is not to be preached from during the Divine Liturgy. See B. Orchard, etc., A Catholic Commentary on Holy Scripture. New York, 1953, 962C. We mention Millenianism here only to dispense with it; it does not belong to history according to the Greek Fathers; therefore, it will not be alluded to again. To be sure, it is an interesting subject, but Millennialism has no bearing on our understanding of the Greek Fathers.

[47]J. Daniélou, The Lord of History, p. 14.

[48]Daniélou, pp. 183-202.

Vladimir Solovyev asserts, the one created the other uncreated, temporal and eternal. Thus, also, the significance of the christological controversies and their resolution by the church's ecumenical councils is crucial not only for orthodoxy in itself, but for the entire Christian understanding of history.[49] Thus, the Fathers spoke about history not so much in terms of the import of particular events, but the soteriological implications of them, their place in the divine mosaic of history.

History, the Greek Fathers said, is a process, an unfolding, the realization of the unseen Will of God in the temporal becoming.[50] Although history, God's economy, rushes towards its "recapitulation in Christ", the material creation itself displays an "orderly succession", the particular is not lost in the general purpose of the cosmos. According to Saint Gregory of Nyssa, the pivotal word

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[49] Lectures Concerning Godmanhood, trans. by Peter Zouboff. Poughkeepsie (N.Y.), 1944, pp. 169-218. Cf. St. Maximus the Confessor saying that the church and the cosmos reflect the unity found in the two natures of Christ--peri tàs diaphórous tōn ónton oúsias asygchýton hénosin (Myst., 24 PG 91 705B); and Daniélou says that "the christological definitions open the way to a right judgment of the theological meaning of history" (The Lord of History, p. 190); and in the same work, he asserts concerning the council of Chalcedon, "Just as the dogma of the hypostatic union, illuminating the course of past history, enabled us to reconcile the two opposite tendencies of the Old Testament, reaching their single culmination in Christ, so the same doctrine, illuminating time to come provides the definitive interpretation of world history in the period waiting before the second advent" (Daniélou, p. 201).

[50] St. Cyril of Alexandria, Thesaurus XII PG 75 292B-293A.

in our understanding of this "orderly succession" is akolouthía (a following, sequence), a word first used by Aristotle. When "the cosmos was layed down in the beginning," Saint Gregory explains, "God established at once and collectively all things with impulse, power and cause, energy ab initio and concurrently the law of their beings by the impetus of His Will . . . . But the power and wisdom simultaneously on creatures for their fructification and perfection required a certain necessity, a sequential order . . . and as the necessity of nature's order demands, things follow the succession (akólouthon) of their becoming . . . ."[51] In another place, Saint Gregory of Nyssa states that everything possesses the innate and necessary elements for the perfecting of its nature, including man. "We suppose that the human seed contained from the first moment of its existence the inherent potentiality which is unfolded and manifested through a natural succession (physikes akolouthías) towards its end and not employing anything which might gain its completion in advance, but simply proceeding towards it gradually."[52]

Saint Gregory does not espouse historical mechanism or chance, for he describes things as having, to be sure a nature, but a nature which, while always self-identical, changes. "It is vain to murmur and grieve about the inevitable course of events," he tells his sister, Macrina,

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[51] Apol. Hexaem., PG 44 72BC.

[52] De Hom. Opfic., 29 PG 44 236B.

"because though every detail of the arrangement in the design is unknown and everything is wisely guided through a certain succession (taxei tini kai akolouthia) by a skillful art to partake in the divine nature."[53] The terminus is predetermined, but not in such a way that can be charted by human reason. Thus, Saint Gregory remarks that "if anyone, beholding the present course of the cosmos--which is marked with intervals and proceeds in a certain order--should argue that it is not possible for the proclaimed cessation of these moving stages ever to occur, such a man palpably does not believe that in the beginning the heaven and the earth were made by God. Unless we admit a beginning to motion, we surely cannot admit an end to it . . . ."[54]

The télos to which history is guided depends upon divine providence, but God does not, like some great Marionettemeister, stand above history manipulating men and events. He acts within in history and is responsible for the place of every created being within His soteriological plan. "If nothing in the world happens without God," exclaims Saint Gregory of Nyssa, "but all is linked to the divine Will, Wisdom and Prudence, then, everything

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[53] De Anima et Res. PG 46 105A. It is curious that so many scholars refer to Gregory as a platonist in the face of his soteriological use of Aristotle's akolouthia. On Gregory's relation to platonism, see J. Daniélou, Platonisme et Théologie Mystique: Doctrine Spirituelle de Saint Grégoire de Nysse. Paris, 1944.

[54] De Opf. Hom., 23 PG 44 209B.

exists according to His design (logos) and bears the imprint of His Wisdom and providential care. A blind and reasonless (alogos) occurrence can never be the work of God; for it is the property of God, as the Scriptures say, 'to make all things in Wisdom' (Ps. civ, 24)."[55] God will do no violence to the integrity of His work. "Wherefore, providential character is shown in that it preserves the nature of each individual," writes Saint Dionysius the Areopagite, "and in making provision for their freedom and independence, it has respect for their state, providing both in general and in particular, according to the nature of the nature of those for whom it cares, that they receive its providential benefactions which are bestowed suitably on each by its multiform and universal activity."[56] And Saint Clement of Rome affirms that "the movement of the heavens," the "seasons", "men and beasts" are sustained by God's providence, and even "the unsearchable places of the abysses and the unfathomable realms of the lower world are controlled by the same ordinances."[57]

Testifying to the same tradition as do the Holy Scriptures, the Greek Fathers distinguish under that providence chronos or "calendar time" and kairos or "historical time."[58] Chronos is measured by the "ages" while kairos

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[55] De Infant. Qui Praem. Abrip., PG 46 168A.

[56] Div. Nom., IV, 33 PG 33 733BC.

[57] I Clem., Ad Corinth., XX, 2-5.

[58] P. S. Minear, "Time and the Kingdom," Journal of Religion, XXIV (April, 1944), 81. Cf. I Clem., Ad Corinth.,

is relative to a person, group, nation--a crucial moment, the krísis of decision in which the Creator's purpose is fulfilled or rejected in them. Kaíros is "the religiously decisive time ordained by God wherein judgment and salvation are realized in and through human choice."[59] Oscar Cullmann tells us that the New Testament very clearly elucidates the difference between kaíros and aíon. The "characteristic thing about kaíros is that it has to do with a definite point in time which has a fixed content, while aíon designates a duration of time, a defined or undefined extent of time."[60] In the "execution of God's plan of salvation," the kaíroi are chosen by God which makes them elements in "redemptive history".[61] Thus, Christ said, "My kaíros has not yet come . . ." (John v, 6); and Saint Paul announced to the Athenians, "And He made from one every nation of men to live on the fact of the earth, having determined kaíroi of their habitation, so that they could seek God . . ." (Acts xvii, 26-27); and Saint Peter says that "the prophets searched to learn what manner of kaíros was meant by the Spirit dwelling in them when it testified to the sufferings destined for Christ and to the glory to come" (I Pet. i, 11).

XX, 10; Ign. ad Polyc., III, 2; Ep. ad Diogn. XI, 5; Barnab. IV, 9; Prov. xvi, 4; Acts, i, 7; Eccles. iii, 1f., etc.

[59]Minear, 84.

[60]Christ and Time, p. 39.

[61]Cullmann, p. 40.

In his commentary on the book of Daniel, Saint Hippolytus of Rome writes, "When the times (kairōn) are fulfilled, and the ten horns spring from the beast in the last times, then the Antichrist will appear among them."[62] Saint Irenaeus, describing the "economy" as "a comprehensive recapitulation", states that by it God was "seeking His own handiwork to save the very man who had created after His Image and Likeness, that is, Adam, filling up the times (kairoùs) of his condemnation, which had been incurred through disobedience--times (kairoùs) which the Father had placed in His own power."[63] And Saint Gregory of Nyssa writes concerning the Person of Christ, "In the passion of human nature, Christ fulfilled the economy of our redemption; he parted for a time (kairòn) from his body, but never parted Himself from either of these which were united to His Person . . . ."[64] Finally, Saint John Chrysostom explains the phrase of Christ, "Mine hour has not yet come": Christ did not utter these words "as being subject to the necessity of times (kairōn) or the observance of an 'hour'--how can He be so, Who is the Maker of times (kairōn) and the Creator of the times and the ages (tōn chrónōn kai aiónon)? To what else then did He allude? He desires to show that He works all things at their time (kairôu) and not all at once; because a kind of confusion

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[62] Frag: Dan., 7 PG 10 648B.

[63] Contra Haer. xxiii, 1 PG 7 959C.

[64] Contra Eun. II, PG 45 548BC.

and disorder would have ensued, if, instead of working them at the right moment (kairois), He had mixed them together, His Birth, Resurrection and Judgment."[65]

God is the ruler of history, then, and nothing can frustrate His plan for it. That plan, too, is propelled from beginning to end by critical events, in particular, the Incarnation. Yet, this plan does not involve determinism, neither "cyclical" nor "predestinarian". The Fathers dismissed the former in the name of "linear" history; and the latter, they do not find in the Christian tradition, that is, the idea of "predestination" according to Augustine, the Scholastics and the Reformers.[66] This idea presupposes the doctrine of analogia entis: the predication of being to God and His creatures analogically. Analogia entis, the analogy of being, means that, although God is transcendent, the similarity between God and man implies that the knowing process of the human mind is "analogous (albeit imperfectly) to the divine Mind".[67] Therefore, arises the conflict between "divine sovereignty" and "human freedom", for it is logical to believe that if God knows the future, it is determined; but, if the future

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[65] In Joan. Homil. XXII, 1 PG 59 133.

[66] Generally, the predestinarian tradition stemming from Augustine consists of three basic principles; "(1) God has chosen certain persons to constitute the elect. (2) He has caused this election to be efficacious so that they will infallibly get to heaven . . . . (3) God's choice of the elect was entirely gratuitous and previous to any consideration of forseen merits . . . ." (R. Garrigou-Lagrange, Predestination, pp. 6-7.

[67] See the discussion in E. Gilson, The Spirit of

is determined, what becomes of human freedom? If God knows all things as happening, how is man a free agent?[68]

Despite this insuperable problem, predestinarians cling to the doctrine. They do so on the basis of such Biblical texts as Romans viii, 28-32:

> "We know that in everything God works for good with those who love Him, who are called according to His purpose. For those whom He foreknew He also predestined to be conformed to the image of His Son and in order that He might be the firstborn among many brethren. And those whom He predestined He also called; and those whom He called He also justified; and those whom He justified He also glorified."

In his Commentarius in Epistolam ad Romanus, Saint John Chrysostom places the question of "election" in the context of the divine "economy": "For the calling was not forced upon them, it was not compulsory. Everyone is called, but not all obeyed" (οὐ γὰρ ἠναγκασμένη γέγονεν ἡ κλῆσις οὐδὲ βεβιασμένη. Πάντες μὲν ἐκλήθησαν, ἀλλ' οὐ πάντες ὑπήκουσαν). Those who do obey are "conformed to the Image of His Son" and are become "many brethren",

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Medieval Philosophy, pp. 248-268.

[68]Calvinism, of course, denies that "the absolute sovereignty of God" negates "human responsibility". It prefers to maintain a "paradox": "God's sovereign decree and man's responsibility do present themselves to the human mind as an apparent contradiction . . . . This paradox . . . the Calvinist readily adopts, even though he cannot solve it. However, he adopts this paradox not because he holds to two coequal fundamental principles, God's sovereignty and the freedom . . . of man, but just because he wants to let God be God" (H. H. Meeter, Calvinism: An Interpretation of Its Basic Ideas. Grand Rapids, (N. D.), pp. 36-37).

explains John. "Now all these things are said of the economy."[69] In another passage, John explains Saint Paul's rhetorical question in Romans ix, 20, "Has not the potter power over the clay . . . ?" That God can "make from the same lump of clay one vessel to honor and another to dishonor" does not imply the destruction of free-will, nor any kind of determinism, asserts John, but the two "vessels illustrate the power and difference between the economies" (eis oikonomion exousian kai diaphoran).[70] In other terms, "honor" ensues from the experience of the Christian life and "dishonor" from the forces of the Adamic life.

God requires obedience for salvation, but He employs nothing coercive. "For God does not make men good by compulsion and force", John says in another commentary, neither is His election and choice compulsory on those who are called, but persuasive (protreptike). And that you may learn that His calling does not compel, consider how many of those who have called come to perdition. It is clear, therefore, that salvation and destruction lies within our own power".[71] Predestination does not violate the human will, because "it concerns Him Who calls and him who is called."[72] The Will of God and the will of man

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[69] Ep. ad Rom. XV, 1 PG 60 511. Cf. St. Cyril of Alexandria, Hom. Pasc., 10 PG 77 617D.

[70] St. John Chrysostom, XVI, 8 559.

[71] Ep. ad I Cor., XLVII, 4 PG 61 268.

[72] St. Cyril of Alexandria, Ep. ad Rom. PG 74 828A.

cannot be conceived apart from each other. "As the saving grace of God will not descend upon the soul which flees from it", states Saint Gregory of Nyssa, "so the human will has not the power to raise to perfection the man devoid of that grace . . . righteousness and the grace of the Holy Spirit in confluence (proelthousai eis tauton) alone can fill and elevate the soul to the life of the blessed."[73]

These statements by the Greek Fathers about predestination and human freedom were not made for the sake of some pet opinions concerning the one or the other, for the synergism expressed in their witness was in accord with the christology of the church.[74] It is interesting that in his summary of Christian doctrine, Saint John of Damascus discusses the idea of divine prescience and predestination, but does no more than deny "theological determinism". He offers no refutation, no explanation of the matter and seems unconcerned that God's foreknowledge might extinguish human liberty.[75]

The "determinism" which did capture the attention of the Greek Fathers, however, was the challenge that came from the pagan notion of fate, fatum, eimarmene.

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[73]De Inst. Christ. PG 46 289C.

[74]See V. Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church, p. 197f.

[75]See chapter thirty, De praescientia et praedestinatione, De Fid. Orth., II PG 94 964A-980D.

It not only threatened divine foreknowledge, but the very existence of the Christian economy itself. If paganism was correct, then, the Christian conception of time, eternity and salvation would be abrogated. Fatalism was obviously related to cyclism, as Plutarch said:

> "I say then that Fate, though comprehending as it were a circle the infinity of all those things which are and have been from infinite times and shall be to infinite ages, is not in itself infinite, but determinate and finite; for neither law, reason, nor any other divine thing can be definite. And this you will better understand, if you consider the total revolution and the whole time in which the revolutions of the eight circles . . . having finished their course, return to one and the same point, being measured by the circle of the same, which goes always after one manner (Tim. 39D). For in this order, which is finite and determinate, shall all things . . . be reduced to the same situation, and restored again to their first beginning . . . . But for the better clearing of this matter, let us understand that whatever is in us or about us is not wrought by the course of the heavens and heavenly influences, as being entirely the efficient cause . . . . Hereafter then, when the same cause shall return, we shall do the same things we do now, and in the same manner, and shall again become the same men; and so it will be with all others. And that which follows after shall also happen by the following cause; and, in brief, all things that shall happen in the whole and in everyone of these universal revolutions shall again become the same. By this it appears . . . that Fate, being in some sort of way, infinite, is nevertheless determinate and finite; and it may be also in some sort seen and comprehended . . . that it is as it were a circle. For as a motion of a

> circle is a circle, and the time that measured it is also a circle; so the order of things which are done and happen in a circle may be justly esteemed and called a circle."[76]

Fate, he says further, "comprehends not all things clearly and expressly, but only such as are universal and general."[77]

The Greek Fathers undertook the refutation of fatalism in the name of God and human freedom. Thus, Saint Gregory of Nyssa argued that fate was irreconcilable with the providence of God, for either the one or the other controls the cosmos.[78] Nor can any compromise be acceptable, such as identifying God with fate.

> "If it has neither life nor choice, it cannot be considered to have essence. How, then, do you testify that it has power so that it oversees rational beings, ruling and protecting irrational creatures, those which share in and possess life,

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[76] Of Fate, in Moralia, trans. by W. W. Goodwin, etc. Boston, 1874, 3.

[77] Plutarch, 4. He, not unlike the other adherents of fate, could not, without negating such concepts as "fortune" (tyche), "chance" (automaton) and "providence" (pronoia), attributes to fate control over all things in detail. Plutarch calls "fortune" the "cause by accident when it is found in thing which merely is done for some for some end, but has in it free will and election"; and "chance" or causal adventure is of a longer extent than fortune which it comprehends, and also, several things which may of their own nature happen, sometimes one way sometimes another. "Fortune is proper to men", chance to "things animated" and "providence" is that by which the gods "have universally and throughout" and "most excellently and most wisely ordained and disposed everything in the world" (7-9). On the Fathers and their repudiation of fate, see P. Duheim, Le Système du Monde, (vol. II), pp. 408-416.

[78] Contra Fatum, PG 45 149B.

> the animate and the inanimate; and, at the same time, quickening together those with and those without choice while disallowing virtue to the virtuous. Are all with life? By what means do you understand the existence of this thing about which you are babbling? It is not animal, it is not irrational, surely it cannot be equated with God. How can someone who knows no virtue or righteousness be God? It is none of these, what is it? You call it by the name which seems fitting, fate, the ever nowness of time. For by every movement, whether river or stars or man, time is coextensive. Thus, it makes no difference whether the confluence of the waters indicates a current of waves in that instant of the nowness of time or whether a ship is given a breeze by it or a man ambulates or the stars are in constellation. For every detail in the passage of motion is determined, whether the change is from where it is or to where it is not.?[79]

In his argument against fate, Saint Basil the Great attacks the question of God, evil and the stars. He denies that the stars, as instruments of fate, govern the action of men. "If their wickedness [the stars] is from nature," he writes in the Hexaemeron, "the Creator will be the author of evil, but, if they are evil by their own choice, then, firstly, they will be creatures endowed with a will and in possession of freedom and sovereign desires, a thing which is madness to believe . . . and, furthermore, how senseless is it not to assign good and evil to each star according to its importance, rather than taking for granted that because a star was in this particular place, it is

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[79]St. Gregory of Nyssa, 160B.

beneficent, and that, because it is seen to be in conjunction with another star, that the same and one becomes malevolent or, again, that when it abandons that configuration, it suddenly forgets evil."[80] Nearly two centuries before, Saint Hippolytus of Rome offered similar arguments, but they were based more on such matters as the indiscoverability of the horoscope and the impossibility of fixing its procedure.[81]

In a homily, Saint John Chrysostom attacks fate from another point of view. "Recompense and punishment are not addressed to creatures not gifted with free will. No, Christ would not have promulgated the Law, He would not have made us to understand an exhortation, nor accomplished so many great things, if mankind was submitted to the yoke of necessity. On the contrary, we are free, we are the lords of our own decisions" (eleútheroi kai proairéseós ésmen kýroi).[82] And Saint Irenaeus exclaims, "Man, gifted with reason in which consists his likeness to God, has been provided by His Creator with free will. He has placed in our custody freedom and to such a degree that man depends only on himself either to become wheat or straw."[83]

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[80] Hexa. VI, 7 PG 29 132D-133A.

[81] Contra Haer. IV, 1-4 PG 16 3056C-3066A.

[82] Habita Post. Presby. Goth. VII, 6 PG 63 509.

[83] Contra Haer. IV, 4 PG 7 938A. See also St. Cyril of Alexandria, Hom. Pasch., 14 PG 78 785A-788A; St. Gregory of Nyssa, Ora Catech., 5 PG 45 25C; St. Gregory Nazianzus, De Providentia, PG 37 427A; St. Cyril of Jerusalem, Catech.

And finally, Saint Basil defines freedom as any action which is unconstrained and compelled by no external force. "Now, virtue depends on our free decision and not necessity. This free decision is exercised with regard to things which are within our power. Thus, to act upon anything within our power is precisely what constitutes free will."[84]

Although it is true that the Greek Fathers opposed ancient fatalism in the name of God and human freedom, the ultimate issue was neither of these--they were ancillary arguments which in isolation did not abolish the cyclical conception of time. If cyclicism remained, then, God was powerless to save man and man was still in "this system of cosmic bondage," as Origen observed.[85] Only a linear conception of time contingent upon the teaching of Genesis could have any soteriological value. "Where are they who disbelieve the resurrection?" asks Saint John Chrysostom. "Who are they, I pray. For I am an ignorant man--nay, certainly I know. Are they Gentiles or Christians who disbelieve the work of creation. The two denials go together: the denial that God created ex nihilo and the denial that He raises up the dead" (tón gár autón esti mè

IV, 18 PG 33 477; and St. John of Damascus, De Fid. Orth. II, 27 PG 94 960B.

[84]Hom. Quod Deus non est Auct. Mal., 7 PG 31 345B. Cf. Clement of Alexandria, Strom. II, 6. On this matter of free will according to the Greek Fathers, see Nicholas N. Gloubokowsky, "Grace in the Greek Fathers", The Doctrine of Grace, edited by W. T. Whitley, London, 1932, 61-113.

[85]Contra Celsum, IV, 67.

sygchorein ex ouk ontown poiein ti to theo, kai ta keimena me legein auton anistan).[86] Creation and recreation are inseparable: the first creation by God through the Logos and the recreation of the cosmos by God through the incarnate Logos, Jesus Christ. This will be made clearer in the next chapter.

But if the Greeks were correct, then, man was condemned to the cosmic perpetuum and all individual existences "were hopelessly or inextricably involved in the cosmic rotation, in these cosmic rhythms, and 'astral courses' (this was precisely what the Greeks used to call 'destiny' or fate, he eimarmene, vis positionis astrorum).[87] Obviously, then, Christ is not the Savior, there was no resurrection from the dead, no unending beatitude, no participation in the divine nature. History is not theologically vindicated, God is impotent before the omnipotence of the anakyklosis. But the experience of the Greek Fathers was the witness to the experience of generations of Christians before them. "For it is not, as I said, an earthly discovery which was given to Christians," declared the author of the Epistle to Diognetus, "nor do they take such pains to guard some mortal invention, nor have they been entrusted with the economy of human mys-

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[86] Acta Apost. II, 4 PG 60 31. Cf. St. Athenagors, De Resurr. Mort., 13 PG 6 1005A; and St. Gregory of Nyssa, Ora Catech. 35 PG 45 89A.

[87] G. Florovsky, "Eschatology in the Patristic Age: An Introduction," p. 33.

teries. But in truth, the Almighty and All-creating God Himself found among men the truth from heaven, and the holy and incomprehensible word, and established it in their hearts, not, as one might suppose, by sending some minister to men, or an angel, or a ruler, or one of those who direct earthly things, or one of those entrusted with the governance of heaven, but the very Artificer and Creator of the universe Himself, Christ Jesus . . . ."[88]

In summary, then, the contrast between the Greek and Christian conceptions of time reveals the essential difference between them. Hellenism declares that time (and history) is cyclical, repeating patterns and forms in nature. History, therefore, is the realm of change. Fate looms heavy and silent over all things. There is, however, a world of permanence, the world of thought, subject to nothing but its own laws. That world is reached only by the human spirit. Hence, time and eternity are coincidental but disparate. The Greeks did not believe in creation ex nihilo. On the other hand, the Fathers taught that all things, visible and invisible, were created by God. The two worlds are distinguishable, but they interpenetrate; they came from God, they will return to Him. History passes through seven "ages"--called "days" by the book of Genesis--only to be greeted at the end of its course by an "eighth age" or "day", an everlasting period of time, eternity. Time is linear, not cyclical.

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[88] Ep. ad Diogn., VII, 1-2.

To this fact, Christianity adds a paradox: the "eighth day" is already present in time with the Incarnation of the Logos of God Who entered history to save it. He was the unity of the created (visible and invisible) and Uncreated. Christianity recognizes no ontological dualism and the Incarnate Logos is perfect evidence of this truth. He is the embodiment of reality. The christological formula of the council of Chalcedon (451) perfectly illustrates this truth.

CHAPTER V

CHRIST AND ADAM: THE HISTORY OF MANKIND

In the preceding chapter, we saw the basic intellectual problem which confronted the Greek Fathers: to oppose Christian creationism to pagan cyclism. Their task, of course, implied much more than the refutation of the presuppositions to the classical *scientia*. They were not speculating on metaphysical ideas, but proclaiming a truth which, if it was to have any evangelic value, must replace a system of principles which stood in diametric opposition to the Christian cosmogeny and cosmology. The teachings of the Greek Fathers on time and eternity were intended to supply the background for the Christian truth concerning man, concerning God's plan for his salvation. Unless eternity could enter time, unless the autonomous orders of time and eternity could merge, then, the Incarnation would be inconceivable. But the Christian revelation is precisely the claim that the eternal Logos descended into the space-time continuum and became true man even as He was true God. He created the cosmos and now He shared in the life of His creatures that they might be restored to the divine condition from which mankind had fallen with the disobedience of Adam. But, in

consequence of the presence of the incarnate Logos, Jesus Christ, the cosmos is divided, because, despite His--or perhaps, as a result of--His epiphany, all men have not embraced Him. History is the story of belief and unbelief.

To be more accurate, the history of mankind is the history of two peoples with two heads, Christ and Adam, that is, "the fallen race of Adam" and "the race of Christ".[1] Adam is "the head of sinful humanity" and Christ "the head of redeemed man". In the words of Daniélou, "Adam's relation with Christ could be considered in terms of the opposition between sinful man and justified man, or in terms of the development of the spiritual man from the natural man."[2] The history of mankind is, since the advent of Christ, the account of a conflict between Adam-Man and Christ-Man, Paradise lost and Paradise regained, freedom and slavery, "a cosmic drama", as Cochrane calls it, "but the drama is not Promethean, it tells no story of 'virtue' in conflict with 'chance' or 'necessity'".[3] History is the history of two Persons and two "ages": the history of the fallen world of which Satan is "temporary ruler", "the god of the age" and "the age to come", which

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[1]Origen, Contra Celsum, III, 53; St. Basil, Ps. LIX, 3 PG 29 465C. Cf. St. Augustine, De Civ. Dei, XIV, 28; and II Cor. vi, 14-18; I Pet. ii, 9.

[2]From Shadows to Reality, trans. by Dom Wulstan Hibberd. London, 1960, p. 31.

[3]Christianity and Classical Culture, p. 367.

is somehow already present, whose Lord is God.[4]

The first witnesses to the Christ-Adam story are found throughout the Holy Scriptures. The various allusions found in the Old and New Testament, become explicit in the writings of Saint Paul. "For as by one man came death, so by one man has come also the resurrection from the dead. For as in Adam all die," he declares, "so also in Christ shall all be made alive." (I Cor. xv, 20-23). "Therefore, as sin came into the world through one man and death through sin," Paul tells the Romans (v, 12-14), "and so death spread to all men because all men sinned--to be sure, sin was in the world before the law was given, but sin is not counted where there is no law. Yet, death reigned from Adam to Moses, even over those whose sins were not like the transgression of Adam, who was a type of the One who was to come." He who is in Adam must die, but he who is in Christ shall live. "What is sown is perishable, what is raised is imperishable. It is sown in dishonor, it is raised in glory. It is sown in weakness, it is raised in power. It is sown a physical body, it is raised a spiritual body. Thus it is written, the first man, Adam, became a living being; the last Adam became a life-giving spirit . . . the first man was from the earth, earthy; the second man is from heaven." (I Cor. xv, 42-48. Cf. xv, 53-57.)

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[4]J. Daniélou, The Lord of History, p. 7. See also Gen. iii, 1, 6, 14, 24; Eph. vi, 6-11; and Rom. vi, 5; I Cor. xv, 15; II Cor. vi, 2.

The race of Adam was struck down by Satan; it is "the flesh and blood" which cannot enter the kingdom of heaven (I Cor. xv, 50). The word Saint Paul uses to designate the "inheritance" of Adam is sárx (i.e., "flesh", sinfulness) and "of Christ", pneûma (i.e., "spirit", sanctified).[5] Every man, to some degree, shares in sárx, but the man in Christo can overcome it--he is being transformed by grace to pneûma. This is "progress"--the attenuation of sárx, the increasing power of pneûma.[6] More precisely, the Holy Spirit makes the "pneumatic man" ontologically different from the "sarkical man".[7] In the words of Saint Paul, "So, then, brethren, we are debtors no longer to the flesh, to live according to the flesh, for if you live according to the flesh you will die, but if you live according to the Spirit you put to death the deeds of the body and will live. For all who are led by the Spirit of God are the sons of God. For you did not receive the spirit of slavery to fall back into fear, but

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[5]See the discussion in E. D. Burton, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians, pp. 492-495; and J. S. Romanides, "Original Sin According to Saint Paul," St. Vladimir's Seminary Quarterly, IV, 1-2 (1961-1962), 13-20.

[6]G. Thils, Théologie des Réalities Terrestres, vol. II: Théologie de L'Histoire. Bruges, 1949, p. 57.

[7]Thils, p. 65. The Christian idea of "progress" is clearly in marked contrast to the modern notion of it as "material and social improvement", "the spread of the new urban-mechanical civilization", "the application of science to daily life and the mechanical control of the forces of nature." See C. Dawson, Progress and Religion. New York, 1960, ch. 1-3, 10.

you received the spirit of sonship. When we cry, 'Abba! Father!' it is the Spirit Himself bearing witness with our spirit that we are the children of God, and if children, then heirs, heirs of God and coheirs with Christ (syg-klērovómoi dè Christoũ), provided we suffer with Him in order that we might be glorified with Him." (Rom. viii, 12-17).

The "spiritual man", Paul says countless times, "lives by faith through grace" (Rom. i, 17; Eph. ii, 8) in Christ in Whom the Father "as an economy for the fullness of time" intended "to recapitulate all things in Him, things in heaven and things on earth." (Eph. i, 10). Nothing compares to the magnalia Dei in which the Father "accomplished in Christ when He raised Him from the dead and made Him to sit at His Right Hand in heavenly places, for above all rule and authority and power and dominion, and above every name that is named, not only in this age, but also in that which is to come; and He has put all things under the feet of Christ and has made Him the Head over all things for the church which is His Body, the fullness of Him who fills all things completely." (Eph. 1, 20-23). "For in Him all the fullness of God was pleased to dwell," Paul tells the Colossians (1, 19-20), "and through Him to reconcile to Himself all things whether on earth or in heaven, making peace by the blood of the Cross." In brief, Christ is the very cohesion of the cosmos, the unity by which the Church is "one" (Eph. iv, 1-6)

and through which man and the cosmos are "made partakers of the divine Nature." (II Pet. i, 4).

To "the sons of God" in Christ, Paul contrasts "the children of wrath" in Adam. They are "dead in trespasses and sins," he cries, "following the course of this cosmos (kata tón aiōna tou kósmou toútou), the prince of the power of the air, the spirit which is now at work in the sons of disobedience. Among those we all once lived in the passions of our flesh (sarkòs), pursuing the desires of body and mind, and so we were by nature children of wrath, like the rest of mankind . . . ." (Eph. ii, 1-4). The unity which characterizes Christ is wanting in Adam, for his sons are not only "blind" to the truth of Christ, but arrogant in their wisdom, self-seeking, wicked and idolatrous (Rom. i, 18-32), "tossed to and fro and carried with every wind of human teaching, by the cunning of men, by their craftiness in deceitful wiles." (Eph. iv, 14). The love which unites the church (I Cor. xiii, 1ff) is displaced by hate in Adam. "None is righteous, no, not one; no one understand, none seek after God," Paul laments. "All have turned aside to their own way, together they have gone wrong; none does good, not even one. Their throat is an open grace, they use their tongues to deceive . . . the way of peace they do not know. There is no fear of God before their eyes." (Rom. iii, 10-18)

Following Saint Paul, the Greek Fathers explain salvation as unity in Christ and damnation as the disunity

of Adam.[8] The unity of Adam was lost by "the original sin", says Saint Maximus the Confessor, and instead of the one Man, "the first Man", humanity was "broken up, separated, individualized" whereas God "is working continually in the cosmos to effect the coming together of mankind in Christ."[9] And Saint Cyril of Alexandria states that it was Satan who "fragmented us".[10] Similarly, Saint Athanasius said that "Satan has dispersed us".[11] Of all

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[8]Henri de Lubac looks not to Saint Paul nor even to Plato for this belief, but "rather to the Stoic conception of universal being" (Catholicism, trans. by L. Sheppard. London, 1950, p. 9). It is a wonder that he did not turn to the platonic tradition, e.g., Plotinus says, "Multitude, then, is a revolt from unity, and infinity a more complete revolt by being infinite multitude; and so infinity is bad, and we are bad, when we are a multitude." (Enneads VI, 6, 1). On the indebtedness of Saint Paul to Stoicism, J. S. Stewart remarks, "Paul preached a historic religion, rooted and grounded in the historic events of the Incarnation, the Cross, and the Resurrection: the Stoic teachers preached pantheism, a religion with no roots in history at all. At the centre of Paul's devotion was a personal God . . . of Stoic devotion . . . a dim, ill-defined something, world-spirit, fate, destiny--call it what you will--Paul's debt to Stoic ideas and terminology must not be overestimated . . . ." (A Man in Christ. New York, 1949, p. 60).

[9]Quaest. ad Thal., 2 PG 90 272A. Cf., St. Gregory of Nyssa, tēs gàr physeos hemōn dia tēs idías akolouthías kai en ekeíno pròs diakrisin toū somatos kai tès phychès kinetheisēs, pálin synepse tà dia krithénta kathaper tini kollē te theía légō dynámei pròs tēn árrekton hénosin tō diaschísthen synarmosas (Ora. Catech., 16 PG 45 52B). Cf. Eph. v, 31, proskollesétai. According to Liddell-Scott, it means "to glue on, fasten" (p. 603).

[10]In Joan. Evangel. VII, PG 74 96D. See St. Clement of Rome, I Ep ad Corinth., XXIX, 2; St. Augustine, PS. LVIII, 10 PL 34 698.

[11]Contra Ar. I, 1 PG 26 13A.

the wonders of Christ, exhalts Saint Gregory the Theologian, "none is to be compared to the wonder of my salvation: Minute drops of blood making the whole cosmos new, working the salvation of all men, as the drops of fig-juice curdle milk, coagulating, reuniting them together as one."[12] And Saint Hippolytus announces, "The Logos of God . . . took upon Himself the holy flesh by the holy Virgin . . . in order that by uniting His own power with our mortal body, and by mixing (mixas) the incorruptible with corruptible, the strong with the weak, He might save man from dissolution"--sose ton apollymenon anthropon.[13]

Originally, the union with God for which Christ was born, was possessed by Adam. He contained in himself the whole human nature. "For the name Adam is not yet given to the man," writes Saint Gregory of Nyssa, "as it was in subsequent narratives. The man created was no particular man, but is universal man. Therefore, we are supposed to understand that God by His providence included all mankind in this first creation by this general term [Adam] for human nature . . . ."[14] This Man was created on the sixth day[15] in "the image and likeness of God"--kat eikona kai

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[12]Ora. XLV, 29 PG 36 662D-664A. Cf. St. Gregory of Nyssa, Ora. Catech., 16 PG 45 52BD.

[13]De Christ. et Antichrist., 4 PG 10 732B.

[14]De Hom. opif., XVI PG 44 185B.

[15]As we know, the Greek Fathers understood the septenary week as a figure of the history of the world. Nevertheless, the Genesis narrative was taken by them as quite

kath' homoiōsin, Imago et Simultido. According to Saint John of Damascus, God created man "of a visible and invisible nature, after His own image and likeness; on the one hand, man's body He formed from the earth, and on the other, his reasoning and thinking soul. He bestowed upon him by His own inbreathing, and this is what we mean by 'after His Image'. For the phrase 'after His Image' clearly refers to the side of his nature which consists of mind and free will, whereas 'after His Likeness' means similarity in virtue so far as that is possible."[16]

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historical even if, in most instances, the days were not believed to be twenty-four hour periods. See St. John Chrysostom, Gen. Hom. IV, 2 PG 53 42; St. Gregory of Nyssa, De Hom. opif., XVI PG 44 185B; St. Basil the Great, Hexa. IV, 3-4 PG 29 81D-83B; Theodoret, In Loc. diff. Script. quaest., XI PG 80 91-92. Concerning Eden itself, St. John of Damascus asserts that it was a place, but that it also has a spiritual or figurative sense (De Fid. Orth., II, 11 PG 94 916B). Sherwood says that he can find no certainty in the writings of the Greek Fathers that Eden was a geographically identifiable place, but they did believe that the paradisical condition of man once existed ("St. Maximus the Confessor", in Ancient Christian Writers, vol. XXI, trans. by P. Sherwood. Westminster (Md.), 1955, p. 229, note 260.

[16]De Fid. Orth., II, 12 PG 94 920B 921A. See St. Athanasius, Ora de Incarn. Verbi Dei, 3 PG 25 101B; St. Basil, Ep. CCXXIII, PG 32 864C; St. Gregory of Nyssa, In Verb. Fac. Hom., I, PG 44 273B; St. John Chrysostom, De Mund. Creat. II, 3 PG 56 443; St. Cyril of Alexandria, In Joan. Evang., IX PG 74 276D; St. Justin Martyr, I Apol., 43 PG 6 1096A; St. Cyril of Jerusalem, Catech. XVIII PG 33 477AB. Yet, the "Image and Likeness" are profoundly mysterious, because they are ecktypes of the Holy Trinity--tes trisypostatou theotetos to mysterion (St. Gregory of Nyssa, Quid Sit Ad Imag. Dei, PG 44 1329B; and St. Cyril of Alexandria, Thesaurus, PG 76 1088). In addition, the idea of the Image is more meaningful when it is put in relation to Him Who is the very Image of the Father (Col. i, 15; Phil. ii, 6; Rom. viii, 29; and St. Irenaeus, Contra Haer. V., 16 PG 7 1167C); and Z. C. Xintaras, "Man--The Image of God According to the Greek Fathers," The Greek

The "Image and Likeness" belong to Man, to human nature in which all men participate.[17] Thus, in the Fall--ironically caused by "reason" and "freedom", Imago Dei et Simultido, in which these were to some extent lost--the "Image" was shattered, "divided, split up, broken into many individuals."[18] Adam is become multiple: he

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Orthodox Theological Review, I, 1 (Aug., 1954), 48-62. St. Augustine says, "And we indeed recognize in ourselves the image which, though it be not equal to God, or rather, though it be very far removed from Him . . . is yet nearer to Him in nature than any other of His works, and is destined to be yet restored, that it may bear a still closer resemblance. For we both are, and know that we are, and delight in our being and our knowledge of it . . . we perceive in the mind and hold in the memory . . . and [are] excited to desire the objects . . . ." (De Civ. Dei, XI, 26). All the Fathers, Greek and Latin, acknowledged "a certain co-ordination, a primordial correspondence between the being of man and the being of God in the fact of the creation of man in the image and likeness of God," writes Lossky. The difference between the Greek Fathers and Augustine is that the latter "takes as his starting point the image of God in man, and attempts to work out an idea of God, by trying to discover in Him that which we find in the soul created in His image. The method he employs is one of psychological analogies applied to the knowledge of God, to theology." In contrast, the Greek Fathers began "with what revelation tells us of God in order to discover what it is in man which corresponds to the divine image. This is a theological method applied to the knowledge of man, to anthropology. The first way seeks to know God by start- from man created in His image; the second wishes to define the true nature of man by starting from the idea of God in whose image man was created" (The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church, pp. 114-115). It is from Augustine's "psychology", incidentally, from which he and the Scholastics developed the filioque clause that was added to the creed of Nicea officially by Pope Leo IX (1048-1054).

[17]Lossky (p. 121) makes the observation that "nature" and "person" are different ideas, the former applying to mankind, the latter to individuals. Also, "person" is that which distinguishes the individual from "nature". Adam was both "nature" and "person" even as Christ.

[18]Lossky, p. 123.

persists in every "person",[19] but every fragment in alienation from the whole, like a monad. Love was lost by the Fall, St. Gregory of Nyssa deplores, and love was in Christ "the character of the image renewed"--ho charakter tēs eikonos metapoiētai.[20] In other words, the fall of Adam, the fall from fellowship with God, the fall from unity with himself, led mankind into the state of alienation from God and himself. He was now "egotistical", governed by need and desire, subject to the power of Satan, sin and death.[21] As Saint Gregory of Nyssa expresses it,

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[19]St. John Chrysostom, In Pasch, II, 2 PG 59 723.

[20]De hom. Opif., V PG 44 137C.

[21]The question of "original sin" is understood by the Greek Fathers completely differently from the subjective view of Augustine. It is by virtue of his submission to Satan, sin and corruption that a man dies and not, as Augustine divined, because each man has inherited the guilt of Adam through the transmission of "original sin" (e.g., De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione et Baptismo Pavulorum). His moralistic approach to the question pushed Satan, corruption and death to the background during his controversy with Pelagius and thereby raised ideas and reach conclusions which had no place in the Christian tradition. "Man does not die because he is guilty of the sin of Adam," explains Fr. Romanides. "He becomes a sinner because he is yoked to the power of the devil through death and its consequences" ("Original Sin According to Saint Paul", p. 21). See also J. Meyendorff, "'Eph.' 8 (Rom. 5, 12) chez Cyrille d'Alexandrie et Theodoret," Studia Patristica, II (pt. 4), Berlin, 1961, 157-161; and Rom. v, 12; I Cor. xv, 26; Gal. i, 4; Eph. vi, 12, etc; and St. Justin Martyr, Dial. cum Tryph. 88 PG 6 685C; St. Athanasius, Contra Ar. I, 51 PG 26 117C; St. John Chrysostom, Ep. ad Rom. X PG 60 473-484; St. Cyril of Alexandria, Ep. ad Rom. PG 74 781-785; and St. Hillary of Poitier, De Trin. I, 13 PL 10 34A-35C; St. Cyprian, Ep. LXIV, 5 PL 4 405AB. On Augustine and the Latin Fathers, see E. W. Watson, "Grace and the Latin Fathers to Augustine," in The Doctrine of Grace, edited by W. T. Whitley. London, 1932, 106-113.

"sharing in Adam's nature, all men participate in his exile from Eden";[22] and Saint Athanasius, "all men were lost through the transgression of Adam."[23]

The nature of Adam no longer enjoyed order, serenity, physical well-being and the ecstasy of fellowship with the Creator. He suffers every manner of evil, for his inclination is toward evil. "Now since man's nature was deceitfully led astray by Satan, away from the discernment of the good, the inclination of his choice has been directed to the opposite and his life subjected to every base thing; his nature has been mixed with death in a thousand ways," Saint Gregory of Nyssa says, "for every form of evil is a way of death."[24] Saint Basil gives this thought greater precision, saying, "Man's nature is such that if the rational power does not rule, if it loses predominances, it yields to the energy of the body. Consequently, a chaotic abnormality in their mutual relations is created and makes the spirit a slave to the flesh, denying to it the possibility of responding to the highest spiritual demands. Clearly, this breaking down of the necessary harmony between body and spirit is unlawful, a transgression against human nature."[25] And Saint John Chrysostom says that "with death [Paul means] the throng of

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[22] De Ora Dom. II, PG 44 1185A.

[23] Contra Ar. II, 16 PG 26 271B.

[24] De Ora Dom. II, PG 44 1156C.

[25] Const. monast. II, 3 PG 31 1344.

passions also came . . . . For when we let the flesh have its own way in everything, and it passes over its proper bounds--rising up against the soul--then, the flesh ruins everything . . . as creating anarchy in human nature."[26]

Therefore, the entire history of Adam is nothing other than the dominion of death. Death followed his disobedience to God and the cause of that disobedience was the free choice of pleasure, hedone.[27] When Adam came from "the hands of God", he was not bound to "the motions of pleasure and pain in his faculties of sense," Saint Maximus the Confessor states, but rather he was endowed with the power for the ineffable enjoyment of God, "the natural desire of the mind for God" and had Adam remained as God made him, he would never have suffered corruption and death; "nor would he have initiated the chain of carnal generation that weighs so heavily upon mankind, but certainly would have enjoyed the life prepared for him."[28] Instead, Adam gave himself up to sensuality and through the senses to sense objects, "so that his very movement after his fall was the desire for pleasure outside the scope of his nature and reason was enslaved to the senses and sense-knowledge from whence, at the same time, mankind derived the fatal attachment to his passions

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[26]Ep. ad Rom. XIII, PG 60 515.

[27]St. Methodius of Olympus, Ex Lib. de Resur., 13 PG 18 284A.

[28]Quaest. ad Thal. LX PG 90 628A-629A.

which resulted in the bestialization of his rational nature."[29] Thus, the choice of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil rather than the tree of life did not mean, as Satan promised and Adam expected, deification (Gen. iii, 5), but the misery of self-love and self-worship.[30]

Saint Gregory of Nyssa makes a comparable observation when he writes in De virginitate, Epistola exhortatoria ad frugi vitiam that Adam was like the first link in a chain, "each link necessarily set in motion by the last, the movement being transmitted in a continuum from the first through all the intermediate links", so are the passions of men interconnected, "and from one to grasp all" (kai di enos epikratesantos) in "a chain of evil": pleasure to vainglory, to avarice, pride, pride to jealousy, jealousy brings hypocrisy which produces cruelty, and the end of all is hell, darkness and fire. "See how the chain of evil arises from a single source, the passions from pleasure."[31] By a free act of will man disobeyed God

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[29]St. Maximus the Confessor, prol. 253C.

[30]St. Maximus the Confessor, 260A. Cf. St. John Chrysostom, Gen. Hom. XVI, PG 53 125; and John calls the "serpent" which tempted Eve, "the type of sensual pleasure"--kai toutou typos ho ophis--because it cannot lift itself above the ground, "so those subject to it cannot raise themselves above sensual pleasure" (Ep. ad Rom. VIII, PG 60 463).

[31]De Virg., 4 PG 46 344B. Satan, Gregory says in De Vita Moysis, leads men through the perverse succession of sins and works throughout history to bring evil things to men--agei tēn kakēn tēs hamartias akolouthian ho dia

and initiated a chain of events that found him ever more deeply engulfed in the ways of pleasure. It was not merely physical pleasure, but as Saint John the Evangelist said, "the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eyes and the pride of life" (I Jn. ii, 16). Thus, the history of the civitas terrena is the history of pleasure, the history of man's aggrandizement while he slips deeper into moral and spiritual decadence, ever deeper into the power of Satan. Even nature "groaneth and travaileth", vanitati enim creatura subjecta est. Adam, the head of creation, had fallen and the cosmos fell with him and all became increasing subject to sin, death and corruption.[32]

According to Saint Athanasius, corruption remained on the race of men, "the rationality of man and the Image in man was disappearing"--ho dè logikòs kaì kat' eikóna genómenos ánthropos hephanízeto.[33] Man, he said, could have looked to the heavens, listened to the prophets and other holy men, even plumbed the depths of his own soul to find God again, but because he was "overcome by the pleasures of the moment and the illusions and deceits sent

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tēs historías energeîn ta kakà, toîs ánthrópois kategoroúmenos (PG 44 416C). According to St. Augustine the result of the Fall (i.e., Satan's seduction to "fleshly pleasures") is "fornication, uncleanness, lasciviousness, drunkenness, revellings . . . idolatries, witchcrafts, hatreds, variance, emulations, wrath, strife, heresies, envyings" which receive their impetus from the soul (De Civ. Dei, XIV, 2). Cf. Gal. v, 19-21.

[32]St. John Chrysostom, Ep. ad Rom. XIV, PG 60 530; St. Cyril of Alexandria, Ep. ad Rom. PG 74 821CD.

[33]Ora. de Incarn. Verbi Dei., 6 PG 25 105C.

by the demons, men did not raise up their heads toward the truth, but loaded themselves with sins and evil, so as no longer to seem rational, but judging from their ways they appeared insane (ἀλόγους)."[34] In their "impious self-confusion" and "darkness of mind", the nations began to make gods of men, such as the Egyptians who ventured to deify their rulers and their sons; and "in our own time Antinous, Hadrian's favorite" was worshipped by command of the Roman emperor and thus immemorialized his "licentiousness". "The devising of idols was the beginning of fornication," Athanasius says quoting the book of Wisdom (xiv, 12). Men personified their own lusts and wickedness, like Eros and Aphrodite.[35] Everywhere there was adultery, stealing, murdering, plunder, war, nations rising up against nation and the entire earth was divided by civil strife. "Nor were even crimes against nature far from them, for, as the Apostle and the witness of Christ says, 'For their women changed the natural use into what was against nature; and likewise also the man, leaving the natural use of the woman, burned in their lust one toward another . . . (Rom. i, 26f)."[36]

Disobedience led man from hedonism to idolatry and idolatry to those lusts and imaginations which caused

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[34]St. Athanasius, 12 117C.

[35]Contra Gent., 9 PG 25 20D.

[36]Ora de Incarn. Verbi Dei, 5 PG 25 105B. Cf. St. Basil the Great, Ps. XXXII, 6 PG 31 340B.

him to forget the knowledge and glory of God, "to the glorifying of the creature rather than the Creator and deifying the works rather than their Cause, Creator, Master and God."[37] The cosmos was filled with the knowledge of God and His providence, the cosmos preserved its harmony, but Satan had "scattered" Adam and made himself "the god of the age". What was God to do? Athanasius asks. He could not abrogate His creation and admit defeat or that He was without compassion. Even if man would repent, it would be impossible for him to end sin, corruption and death and, indeed, he would not regain his former union with God. "What--or rather Who--was it that could bring the grace and recall man according to the requisites of the situation? Who, save the Logos of God Himself Who also in the beginning had made all things ex nihilo? The Logos and Him alone could transform corruption to incorruption and, too, maintain for the Father His consistency of character. For He alone, being the Logos of the Father and above all, was in consequence both able to recreate all and worthy to suffer on behalf of all, becoming the Intercessor with the Father."[38]

The divine solution was to send the Logos "in the fullness of time" and "born of a woman" so that He might remodel "the old man, Adam, by a new creation."[39]

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[37]St. Athanasius, Contra Gent., 8 PG 25 17B.

[38]Ora de Incarn. Verbi Dei, 7 PG 25 108D-109C.

[39]St. Hippolytus, Contra Haer. X, 29 PG 16 3451B.

He was incarnate in order to return man to fellowship with God and, consequently, Christ had to subject all things to Himself and thereby realize the primitive destiny the race or, in the words of Saint Justin Martyr, suum plasma in semetipso recapitulans.[40] His purpose, then, was "recapitulation", to sum up all things--omnia ergo recapitulans recapitulatus est--by waging war against our enemy, and crushing him who at the beginning led us away captive in Adam . . . in order that, as our species went down to death through a vanquished man, so we might ascend to life again through a victorius man."[41] In order to "recapitulate in Himself the ancient formation of man . . . to kill sin . . . to deprive death of its power and to vivify man", "the Son of God became the Son of man, Man" and, consequently, to bestow in Himself "the adoption of sonship". For "by no other means could we attain incorruptibility and immortality unless we had been united to Incorruptibility and Immorality Itself. For how could we be joined to Incorruptibility and Immortality unless first those had become that which we almost be. Only then could the corruptible be swallowed up by Incorruptibility and the mortal by the Immortal that we might receive the adoption of sons."[42]

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[40]Quoted by St. Irenaeus from Justin's lost work against Marcion, Contra Haer. IV, 6 PG 7 937B. Cf. St. Methodius of Olympus, Conviv. dec. Virg. III, 8 PG 18 73B.

[41]St. Irenaeus, V, 21 1179BC. Cf. St. Maximus the Confessor, Cap. Theol. et Oecon., I, 15 PG 90 1088D.

[42]St. Irenaeus, Contra Haer. XIX, 1 PG 7 939B. Cf. St. Cyril of Alexandria, Ep. ad Rom., PG 74 828D-829A.

In other words, if the Incarnation brought a "new creation", then, there is also a "second Adam", "a second Man". Saint Irenaeus gives us the reason: "For if Adam who sprang from the earth was given form and substance by the hand and skill of God, but Christ was uncreated, then, He . . . must seem an abberation not being Adams analogy . . . . But this is tantamount to saying that He appeared only reputatively a man when He was in fact not human and therefore was made man without any intrinsic relationship to our race. For if He did not receive the substance of flesh from a human being, neither was He man nor the Son of Man; and if He was not made what we are, He achieved nothing significant for us in what He suffered and endured. But everyone will admit that we are a body taken from the earth, and a soul having been given spirit from God; therefore, the Logos of God was made man, recapitulating in Himself His own handiwork; and on account of this He may rightly call Himself the Son of Man . . . ."[43] Irenaeus later repeats, "It was necessary . . . that the Lord coming to the lost sheep made His economy a comprehensive recapitulation, and seeking His own handiwork, should save that very man who had been created after His Image and Likeness, that is, Adam . . . ."[44]

We find the same testimony in the Apologetica of

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[43]St. Irenaeus, XXII, 1 956AB.

[44]St. Irenaeus, XXIII, 1 960A. Cf. Origen, Contra Celsum, IV, 4.

Saint Gregory the Theologian. The purpose of the Incarnation, he says, was to deify us and bestow upon man "heavenly bliss". "This is the wish of our schoolmaster the law, the prophets, which intervened between us and Christ, Christ Who is the perfection and end of the spiritual law; of the God Who emptied Himself, of the One Who assumed flesh, of the new union, God and man, one consisting of two, and both in one. This is why God was united to the flesh by means of the soul, and natures so disparate were knitted together by the affinity of the element which mediated them; so all became one for the sake of all, and for the sake of one, our progenitor, for the sake of our soul's obedience, and flesh for flesh, because it had served sin and the soul shared in its condemnation. Thus, Christ, for the sake of Adam, became subject to sin even though He was greater than sin and transcended it."[45] "We were all in Christ," Saint Cyril of Alexandria exclaims, "and the common person of humanity is formed anew in Him. Therefore, is He called the second Adam (éschatos Adám), because He communicated to our whole nature all the blessings of happiness and glory, just as the first Adam (prōtos Adám) had brought upon us the curse of corruption and ignominy."[46] And again in the same

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[45] Ora. II, 23 PG 35 432B-433A. Cf. St. John Chrysostom, Ep. ad Rom. X, PG 60 475. Christ is "the new cosmic Adam" for the Fathers, says Lossky, appearing in an "age" conditioned by sin for the redemption of history (The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church, p. 137).

[46] Commen. In Joan Evang. I, PG 73 161C. Cf. St. John of Damascus, De Fid. Orth. IV, 13 PG 94 1137C.

commentary, " . . . in the unique temple that He has assumed for us and from our race, the Logos dwells in all, in order that having us all in Himself, He might reconcile us all in one Body to His Father . . . ."[47]

Saint Gregory of Nyssa relates the entire doctrine of recapitulation to the resurrection:

> "Christ cohered again the disunited elements, cementing them, as it were, together with the cement of His divine power, reuniting what had been severed in a union never to be broken. And this is the resurrection, namely, the return--after the dissolution--of those elements that had been before linked together into an indissoluble union through a mutual incorporation; thus, the primal grace which had been invested in humanity is resumed and mankind restored to eternal life when the evil that has been mixed with our kind has evaporated . . . as happens to any liquid in a broken vessel which contained it . . . . For as the principle of death took its rise in one person and passed from his successively to his progeny, likewise the principle of the resurrection extends from One Person to humanity. For He who reunited to His own proper body the life that had been assumed by Himself--by virtue of that power which had fused with both these components at their original formation--then, upon a more general scale . . . conjoined the intellectual to sensible nature which now progresses freely to the extremities by their natural consequences. For when in that concrete humanity which He had united to Himself, the soul, after the dissolution returned to the body, then, the uniting of several portions passes, as by a new principle, in equal force to the entire human race. This, then, is the mystery of God's economy with

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[47]St. Cyril of Alexandria, Comm. in Joan. Evang. I, PG 73 164A.

> regard to His death and resurrection from the dead; viz., instead of preventing the corruption of His Body to death and the necessary concomitants to our nature, He brings everything back to itself in the resurrection. Consequently, that He might become Himself the common ground of life and death--having established in Himself that nature which death has divided--Christ Himself is the very principle of the union for the separated members."[48]

Christ, the new Man, unites Himself to all believers. He returns to them freedom from sin, corruption, death and Satan and, at the same time, gives them a share in His divine nature through His regenerate humanity effected by His passion, death and resurrection.[49]

The deeds of Christ, already begun to be realized in the church are deeds which somehow are acts which belong to another time.[50] It is not only because He is "the heavenly man", "the Son of man" prophecized by Daniel,[51] but He is "Man in the last of days"--kai ep'

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[48]Ora Catech., 16 PG 45 52BD. Cf. St. John Chrysostom, Hom. in Joan. XII, PG 59 83.

[49]Christ's victory over sin, death and Satan, then, is a doctrine of redemption utterly different from Scholastic idea of the Atonement propounded by Anselm of Caterbury, i.e., the idea that Christ pays the debt for sin and thereby releases man from the legal penalties of sin. This teaching is juridical not patristic.

[50]See Hans Urs von Balthasar, Die Kosmische Liturgie, p. 177f.

[51]"I looked in the visions of the night, and behold on the coulds came one like a Son of man; he came forward to the Ancient of Days, and they brought Him into His Presence. And to Him was given dominions, glory and power, and all peoples, nations and tongues shall serve Him. His

eschaton hemeron anthropon[52]--and "Man according to the divine economy"--holon gar tes kata anthropon oikonomias.[53] The redemptive acts of Christ are the fulfillment of promises and preparations of the past and the realization in the present of realities which reach from the future. In the words of Saint Athanasius, "For as the Gospel of Christ is the fulfillment and accomplishment of the ministration which was delivered by the law of Israel, so future things will be the end of those things which exist now, the Gospel being completed, and the faithful receiving those things which are not seen now but they expect."[54]

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power is eternal power, that shall never end, and His Kingdom shall never be destroyed." (Dan. vii, 10-14). Cf. Matt. xxvi, 63-65. The scholarship which has attempted to gainsay the identity of Christ and "the Son of man" has been losing ground. It has failed to put its denial within the context of Christian eschatology. Thus, Albert Houssiau writes, "Jésus est venu du ciel, du Père. La vie humain de Jésus est donc déjà une venue celeste, eschatologique" (La Christologie de Saint Irénee. Louvain, 1955, p. 60); and Stephan Verosta says, "Das allgemeine christliche Geschichtbild ist kosmisch . . . geschichtstheologisch-eschatologisch" (Johannes Chrysostomus: Staatsphilosoph und Geschichtstheologe. Graz, 1960, p. 148); and see L. Bouyer, The Meaning of Sacred Scripture, trans. by M. P. Ryan. Notre Dame, 1958, p. 164f.

[52]St. Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eun. V, PG 45 716D.

[53]St. Gregory of Nyssa, II, 504A.

[54]Et quoniam Christi Evangelium absolutio est atque finis illius ministreri, quod per legem traitum fuit Israeli, ita res futurae finis erunt praesentium; posteququam completa fuerint Evangelia, et fideles homines illa acceperint, quae nunc etsi non visa exspectant (Ep. XI, 1 PG 26 1414B). The Greek is wanting. Cf. St. Maximus the Confessor, ho mèn nómos skían échei toũ Eủanqelíou. Tò dè Eủaqqélion, eikṍn esti tṍn mellontṍn aqathṍn (Cap. Theol. et Oecon. I, 90 PG 90 1120C).

It is precisely in terms of "the recapitulation of all things" that the words of Saint Athanasius have any meaning. For the Gospel is "the good news" of salvation *in Christo.* The Incarnation, the life of the Savior, His redemptive acts were not done only to Himself and subsequently imputed by God to His sons, but they were and are accomplished for and in the things that were and are recapitulated. In his *Theophania*, Saint Gregory of Nazianzus gives this truth vivid clarity: "This is our present festival; it is this which we are celebrating today: the coming of God to man that we might go forth, or rather that we might live to God--stripping off the old man that we might put on the New. For just as we died in Adam, so we might live in Christ (*én tō Adám . . . én tō Christō*), being born with Christ and crucified with Him and rising with Him" (*Christō kaì syggennómenoi, kaì sysstauroúmenoi, kaì synthaptómenoi kaì synainstámenoi*.[55] In the first homily on Easter, he exclaims, "Yesterday I was crucified with Him (*synestauroúmen*); today I am glorified with Him (*syndoxázomai*); yesterday I died with Him (*synenekroúmen*); today I am made alive with Him (*syzopoioúmai*); yesterday I was buried with Him (*synethaptómen*); today I rise with Him (*syneqeíromai*)."[56]

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[55]*Ora*. XXXVIII, 4 PG 36 320B.

[56]*Ora*. I, 4 PG 35 397B. Emile Mersch draws our attention to the importance of the language of Gregory. "To *act-with.* In order to express this incessant communion of operation the Saint makes free use of the verbs

Again, in In Laudem Caesarii Fratris, "It is necessary for me to be buried with Christ, to be joint-heir with Christ, to become the son of God, indeed, God Himself--Christō̄ syntaphēnai me, deī̄ Christō̄ synanestēnai, sygklēronomēsai Christō̄, yìon génesthaei theoû, theòn autón."[57]

Saint Gregory Nazianzus then returns us to the theme of recapitulation in Christ as something opposed to Adamic mankind: "Today is salvation come into the cosmos, to whatsoever is visible or invisible. Christ is risen from the dead, rise with Him. Christ is returned again to Himself, you return also. Christ is freed from the tomb, be freed from the bond of sin. The gates of hell are opened and death is destroyed, and the old Adam is put aside, and the New Adam is realized; if any man be in Christ, he is a new creature, be renewed."[58] And in the same oration, Gregory relates the idea of recapitulation to the Christian eschatology, declaring that "today we are celebrating the resurrection itself, no longer in hope, but already as having come to pass, the gathering of the whole cosmos itself."[59]

The redemptive acts of Christ, then, make present

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compounded with syn (with), which the Apostle Paul had coined for the same purpose" (The Whole Christ, trans. by J. R. Kelly. London, 1956, p. 310).

[57]Laud. Caes. Frat., 23 PG 35 785B.

[58]Ora. LXV, 1 PG 35 624B.

[59]St. Gregory of Nazianzus, 2 625A.

what is in fact the destiny of the cosmos. Already are established those conditions existing beyond the course of history with Christ Himself as the perfect evidence.[60] In His very Person Jesus Christ is promisio vitae futurae.[61] He has destroyed death, "the last enemy" and its patron, Satan, while reconciling God and the creation. He is not only the image of the saved man, but the manifestation of "the eighth day" the anticipation of eternity. In that "day" or "age", Saint Basil tells the monks near Caesarea, we shall know God "the final blessedness". But Christ is God and "the final blessedness", for "as the Gospel says, 'I will raise them up on the last day'. He calls the transition from knowledge of the created to the contemplation of the uncreated a resurrection, speaking of that knowledge after which there is no other, as the last day . . . ."[62]

The idea of recapitulation and the idea of the end are interwoven, just as christology and eschatology are implicit in one another. For if God was made man in order that we might be made "gods", then, eternal life, which

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[60]See St. Maximus the Confessor, Cap. Theol. et Oecon. I, 51 PG 90 1101C.

[61]See J. Daniélou, From Shadows to Reality, pp. 11-21; Emil Brunner, Revelation and Reason, pp. 95ff; Karl Barth, Die Kirchliche Dogmatik, bd. I. Zollikon-Zuerich, 1948, p. 115f; and G. Florovsky, "Eschatology in the Patristic Age: An Introduction," 27f.

[62]Ep. Vii, 7 PG 32 275B. Cf. St. Ignatius, Ep. ad Eph. XX, 1; Barnabas, I, 7; St. Irenaeus, Proof of the Apostolic Preaching, 30; St. Gregory of Nazianzus, In Laud. Caes. Fratr. 21 PG 35 784B.

follows the present history of the cosmos, is already here. The humanity incorporated into Christ, the God-Man, already shares in "the eighth day". The "end" of man is deification, but the "end" is now; therefore, the process of recapitulation is the process of deification, as Saint Maximus said.[63] It is a process begun in the church, "the eschatological community", "the fullness of Him Who fills all things (Eph. i, 23)". The church is the "leaven" in creation which will continue to grow until at "the glorious appearance of Christ" will the earth and God be "all in all".[64] In other words, the "end" is already present yet still to be achieved--coincidentia oppositorum--for men are already being brought into unity with Christ while some are still "scattered". The "race of Adam" and the "race of Christ" exist together. The forces of sin, corruption and death coexist with the power of deifying grace albeit abrasively. Satan was beaten decisively at Calvary: the war is over, but the fighting continues.

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[63] Quaes. ad Thal. LX, PG 90 640A.

[64] The New Testament faith, writes Oscar Cullmann, is that although Christ has not taken visible possession of His cosmos which He "now rules invisibly over heaven and earth, and works visibly in and through the Church; his function in every relation, including his high-priestly work, is now continuing, in that he intercedes for us with the Father and brings all our prayers before him (John 14-14ff)" (Christ and Time, p. 168). Cullmann's remarks are correct, but incomplete in so far as the Greek Fathers are concerned. He ignores the Eucharist and the sacramental processes of sanctification.

This vision of deification, this knowledge that God is deifying the cosmos--that is, gaining both incorruptibility and immortality--is no invention of the fourth century Fathers. It is found from the very beginning of the Christian tradition. The New Testament informs us that man and the cosmos are being freed from "the powers of darkness" and being assimilated to the divine.[65] The same belief is found in the sub-Apostolic Fathers. Thus, the Didache mentions "the knowledge and faith of immortality" which the Father "had made manifest in Jesus";[66] and Barnabas speaks of "the God in us"[67] and "the second creation";[68] and again that Christ is the fulfillment of the prophecies of Isaiah, "the beginning of eighth day, the beginning of another world . . . the joy of the eighth day on which Jesus rose from the dead . . . ."[69] Saint Clement of Rome repeats to satiety such expressions as "through Jesus Christ" and "life incorruptible from our union with the Holy Spirit."[70] And Saint Ignatius of Antioch calls Christians, theophoroi[71] while speaking of

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[65]For example, John x, 34; Eph. iv, 24; Gal. iv, 3-7; II Pet. i, 4, etc.

[66]Didache, in The Apostolic Fathers, (vol. I), trans. by K. Lake, London, 1925, IX, 3.

[67]Barnabas, XVI, 7-8.

[68]Barnabas, VI, 11.

[69]Barnabas, XV, 4-8.

[70]II Clem. XIV, 5.

[71]Ep. ad Eph. IX, 2. It is not until Clement of Alexandria, however, that the expression theopoiein (to make

the Eucharist as "the medicine of immortality and the antidote to death"[72] for them who "live in Christ",[73] "entirely in God", "full of God" and have "received incorruptibility and eternal life."[74] And the Apologists make like assertions. Saint Athenagoras of Athens says that the incorruptibility and eternity which characterize God alone is bestowed upon those in Christ;[75] and Saint Theophilus of Antioch calls Christians "the race of God" since they have become gods.[76] The view of the Apologists, says Gross, is linked with the church and the idea of the "end", for it is "sharply eschatological".[77]

In the third century, Saint Methodius of Olympus wrote, "For becoming like God means to banish corruptibility" (Homoiósis gàr theoû phthorâs ápophygé)[78] "We were not made gods from the beginning. At first, we were merely men, and then at length became gods . . . ," wrote Saint Irenaeus. "For it was necessary first . . . that what was mortal should be conquered and consumed by

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a god) is used (Paed. I, 12 PG 8 368AB).

[72]St. Ignatius of Antioch, XX, 2.

[73]St. Ignatius of Antioch, VIII, 1.

[74]Ep. ad Polyc. II, 3.

[75]Leg. Pro Christ. 4 PG 6 897B.

[76]Ad Autoly. II, 27 PG 6 1096A.

[77]J. Gross, La Divinisation du Chrétien d'après les Péres Grecs. Paris, 1938, p. 143.

[78]Conviv. dec. Virg. I, 5 PG 18 45B.

immortality and the corruptible by incorruptibility, and that man should after be made the image and likeness of God."[79] Only by the Incarnation, he says in another place, "could we have attained incorruptibility and immortality . . . we had to be united to be united to Incorruptibility and Immortality."[80] And Saint Hippolytus of Rome declares, "And you shall be a companion of God (homilètès theoú) and joint-heirs with Christ, no longer enslaved to the lusts or passions and never again wasted by disease, for you have become God"--Gégonas gàr theós.[81] In the same passage, Athenagoras calls deification the renewal of Adam and Adam a type (typos) of the renewed man.

In the fourth century, Saint Athanasius, most scrupulous to protect the divinity of Christ against the Arians, insisted, "For man would not have been deified if he were joined merely to a creature, if the Son were not the true God;[82] nor would have men been brought into

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[79]Contra Haer. IV, 38 PG 7 1109B.

[80]St. Irenaeus, III, 19 939B.

[81]Philosoph. X, 34 PG 16 3454Cf. Cf. St. Augustine, "Accordingly, vices are then only to be considered overcome when they are conquered by the love of God, which God Himself alone gives, and which He gives only through the Mediator between God and man, the man Christ Jesus, who became a partaker of mortality that He might make us partakers of His divinity" (De Civ. Dei, XXI, 16; and IX, 15); and St. John of Damascus, De Imag. I, 21 PG 94 1252C.

[82]This is the famous patristic maxim, Quod non est assumptum, non est sanctum. See St. Irenaeus, Contra Haer. V, praef. PG 7 1120A; St. Gregory Nazianzus, Poem. Incarn. adv. Apollin. PG 37 468; St. Gregory of Nyssa, Adv. Apollin., 53 PG 45 1252C; St. Cyril of Alexandria, Comm.

the presence of the Father unless the Deifier had been in His nature the true Logos who put on the body. And we would not have been delivered from sin and its curse . . . hence, man would not have been deified unless the Logos who became flesh had been by nature truly and properly from the Father. For the union was that He might unite what is man by nature to Him who is God by nature and man's salvation, deification, thereby secured."[83] Saint Gregory the Theologian approaches deification, from another angle: "This is the purpose of 'the great mystery' (Eph. v, 32): that God was incarnate and became a beggar for us in order to raise the flesh and recover His Image and remake man; therefore, all things had to be one in Christ who became perfectly in all whatsoever He Himself is . . . and that we might bear in ourselves the stamp of divinity by Whom and in Whom we are made, and are so receiving our form and type from Him . . ." (tosoũton ápʼ aútou morphōthéntes kaì typothéntes).[84]

Saint Gregory of Nyssa leaves us with no possibility to interpret deification in a moral or figurative

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[83] Contra Ar. II, 70 PG 26 296AB.

[84] In Laud. Caesar. Frat. 23 PG 35 785. B. Otis, like so many scholars, fails to understand the Greek Fathers. Because of Gregory's teaching about deification, for example, Otis calls him "a crass materialist", because he "immortalizes the flesh" and, as the rest of "the anti-philosophical piety of the East [he] was steadly tending toward more and more physicalism" ("The Throne and the Mountain: An Essay on St. Gregory Nazianzus", Classical Journal, LVI (1960), 162).

sense: "Now He Who sustains nature is commingled in us (hemîn ho synéchon) was fused to our nature (katemíchthe) in order that we might become divine through our fusion (epimixía) with God. And by His resurrection from the dead He placed us outside the power of the tyrant and thus commenced for our mortal race the very principle of immortality."[85] And Saint Cyril of Alexandria expands Gregory's observation: "Man on earth was subjected to death, how would he return to incorruptibility? It was necessary for mordant flesh to participate in the living power of God. Now the vivifying power of God is the Only-begotten Logos. Therefore, He was sent as Savior and Liberator, He became flesh. Not that His divinity somehow modified by His condescension, nor that He ceased to be Logos, but as He was born of a woman according to the flesh, He appropriated to Himself a body from her, and implanted Himself in us by an indissoluble union and thereby rendered us superior to death and corruption. He was dressed in our flesh in order to raise us from the dead and open, consequently, the road leading back to incorruptibility in flesh freed from death."[86]

In other words, we could recite ad infinitum the evidence from the Christian tradition in support of this continuous and persistent belief in deification as the

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[85] Ora Catech., 25 PG 45 65D-68A.

[86] Commen. in Luc. V, 19 PG 77 908D-909A.

destiny of the cosmos--kata charin not kat' ousian,[87] but there is no need. It is necessary, however, to know that the evidence is not limited to the tradition of the church. The Old Testament had plainly and directly prefigured the saving work of Christ, for as Saint Luke (xxiv, 27) tells us, "And beginning with Moses and all the prophets, Christ interpreted to them (His companions on the road to Emmaus) in all the Scriptures the things concerning Himself." Historical events in the life of the Hebrew peoples--"types"--foretold the "economy of God".[88] Among the Gentiles, also, the hope of Christ's salvation took the form of confused myths, legends, even untruths which contrast and illuminate the real truth.

God has done everything that man might be saved and come to the knowledge of the truth. Men have resisted Him, perverted what truth they possessed and gone their own way. In the words of Saint John of Damascus God has called to them "through groans and trembling, by the deluge of water--and the utter destruction of almost the entire human race--by confusion and diversity of tongues, the burning of cities, the figurative theophanies, by wars, victories, defeats; by signs and wonders, by manifold displays of power, by the Law and the Prophets: for by all these means God earnestly strove to emancipate man

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[87]St. Maximus the Confessor, Cap. Theol. et Oecon. II, 21 PG 90 1133D.

[88]St. Ignatius of Antioch, Ep. ad Eph. XVIII, 2; and Ep. ad Phil. V, 2.

from the universal and enslaving bondage of sin which had cast his life beneath every form of evil . . . ."[89] Indeed, God was leading Adam from immorality and corruption, from illicit social and familial relationships to Christ, "to contempt for the flesh which brings us unafraid into the peaceful haven of incorruption."[90] It was "the love of the flesh" which spoiled the first creation, but God was educating mankind in expectation of "the new creation". The "fallen world" of Adam was being led by God's several "economies" to the great "economy" in Christ.

The old covenant between God and the Jews provided them with "types" concerning Christ, the Messiah. For instance, Saint Justin Martyr compares Christ to Jacob: "As, therefore, Christ is the Israel and the Jacob, even so we, who have been quarried from the bowels of Christ are the true race of Israel";[91] and to Noah, "For righteous Noah, along with other mortals at the Deluge, i.e., with his wife, his three sons and their wives, being eight in number, were a type of the eighth day, wherein Christ appeared when he rose from the dead, forever the first in power. For Christ, being the first-born of every creature, became again the chief of another race regenerated through Himself in water, and faith, and wood, containing the

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[89] De Fid. Orth. III, 1 PG 94 981B.

[90] Conviv. dec. Virg. I, 2 PG 16 41BC.

[91] Dial. cum Tryp., 135 PG 6 788D.

mystery of the Cross; even as Noah was saved by wood [the Ark] when he rode the waters of destruction with his household."[92] And Saint Cyril of Jerusalem parallels Christ and Moses: "Now we turn from the old to the new, from the type (*typou*) to the reality (*alētheian*). In the first, we have Moses sent to Egypt by God; in the second, Christ is sent forth from the Father into the cosmos to tear it away from sin . . . ; and then, the blood of the lamb repulsed the destroyer; now, the blood of the blameless Lamb, Jesus Christ, banished the demons; then, the tyrant pursued the ancient people . . . ; now the daring and abominable author of evil, Satan, follows us to the streams of Salvation. Pharoah was drowned in the sea; Satan disappears into the waters of salvation."[93]

Saint Basil the Great offers us a summary of patristic "types":

> "The nature of the divine is very frequently represented by the rough and shadowy lines of the types; but because divine things are prefigured by small and human things, it is obvious that we must not therefore conclude the divine nature to be small. The type is an exhibition of things expected and gives an imitative anticipation of the future. So, Adam was a type of 'Him that was to come' (Rom. v, 14). Typically, 'That roch was Christ' and the water a type of the living power of the Logos; as He says, 'If any man thirst let him

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[92]St. Justin Martyr, 138 793AB.

[93]*Catech*. XIX, 3 PG 33 1068BC.

> come unto me and drink' (John, vii, 37). The manna is a type of the living bread that came down from heaven; and the serpent on the tree a type of the Cross, the passion of salvation . . . . Similarly, the history of the exodus of old Israel is recorded to show those who are being saved by Baptism. For the first-born of the Israelites were preserved, like the bodies of the baptized, by the giving of grace to them that were marked with blood. For the blood of the sheep was a type of the blood of Christ; and the first-born, a type of the first formed. And in as much as the first formed necessarily exist in us, and, in sequence of succession, is transmitted till the end, it follows that 'in Adam' we 'all die' and that 'death reigned' until the fulfilling of the law and the coming of Christ. And the first-born were preserved from the destroyer by God, so showing that we who were made alive in Christ no longer die in Adam. The sea and the cloud . . . typically prefigured the grace to be . . . the sea is typically a Baptism . . . which brings the expulsion of Pharoah; and, in the same way, Baptism causes the exorcism of Satan. The sea slew the enemy . . . and in Baptism, too, dies our enmity towards God . . . ."[94]

The implications of typology, as Saint Ignatius of Antioch says is that "Christianity does not base its faith on Judaism, but Judaism on Christianity . . . ."[95]

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[94] De Spirit. Sanct., 31 PG 32 25B-28B. Cf. Barnabas, VII, 10; XII, 5, 10; St. Irenaeus, Proof of the Apostolic Preaching, 25; St. Cyril of Alexandria, Comm. in Joan. Evang. III, PG 73 500AC; St. Maximus the Confessor, Cap. Theol. et Oecon., 100 PG 90 1124C, etc. On patristic typology, there are no better sources than the two works by Jean Daniélou, From Shadows to Reality and The Bible and the Liturgy.

[95] Ep. ad Magn., X, 3.

There is a sense, too, in which Hellenism is based on Christianity. The redemption of Christ, as we said, was likewise anticipated by the Greeks as "antitypes" or, as Jules Gross calls them, "Hellenic analogies."[96] For example, the idea of deification may be traced from Homer to Plotinus. Among the Greeks, it is understood as immortality, something without any relation to the moral condition of the soul. It might even be better to call the Greek conception of deification, "heroization", because the difference between gods and heroes is not always sharply drawn. The power of the hero, also, seems to be limited to certain places, such as a tomb, a sanctuary, and effigy. Moreover, in non-philosophical Greek literature, the gods do not appear to have a nature completely other than those possessed by humans; in fact, the difference between men and gods consists essentially in the immortality of the latter. The gods are not supreme, for they are subject to the tyrannical, impersonal and purposeless ordinances of time and fate.

The Greek mysteries, which began as early as the seventh century before Christ, promised their initiates deliverance from the cosmic slavery through freedom from the irrationality of the passions and the efficacy of magical rites. After death the soul ascends to another world. Hermetism promised salvation (i.e., immortality of

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[96] La Divinisation du Chrétien d'apres les Péres Grecs, p. 5.

the soul) through a special knowledge, gnōsis. This knowledge emancipates the soul from the body, from the subjugation of time in which the body is caught. When the soul is released from its prison, it ascends to another world where it loses the vices acquired by its initial descent into body. Above, the soul enters the Ogdoás, the realm between the planetary spheres and the supreme god eventually to become a power, dynameis genomeni, and becoming a god, en theo ginontai, finding everlasting happiness. The gnostic is now the child of the supreme god and the adopted brother of the demiurge.[97]

The idea of deification in Plato is not much different from that taught in the Greek mysteries and Hermetism. His conception is a grand synthesis of the mythical, "mystical" and rational elements found in the religious and philosophical traditions of his people, especially Orphism. For Plato, deification is "a mystical voyage" which results in the transformation of the soul through its dialectical ascension towards god and its subsequent assimilation of the soul in god by the vision of the divine reality.[98] The preparation of the soul for this experience is the purification, katharsis, of the body from the passions. Unfortunately, deification in Plato is not available to the masses and is based on an idea of an abstract divinity and an exaggerated optimism concerning

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[97]Gross, p. 32.

[98]Gross, pp. 47ff.

the power of the nous, reason, which is the unique agent of salvation.[99] Not unlike most Greeks, too, Plato had little respect for the body. He accepted the traditional notion of the Great Year and metempsychosis. Neither Plato nor any other Greek had any understanding of sin, grace, nor the love of a personal God.

After Plato,[100] the Stoics taught that the human soul emanated from divinity--which accounted for the kinship of the soul with the cosmic Logos. Fellowship with god was effected by submission to the dictates of universal

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[99]Gross, p. 49.

[100]We find it difficult to understand that attitude which leaves Plato almost master of the Greek Fathers. Thus, Gross says that Plato's influence on them was the relationship which the philosopher established between "l'assimilation divine ou la déification d'une part et la salut ou beatitude de l'autre s'imposeront desormais à la speculation theologique"; and "La contemplation platonicienne, qui élève vers le Beau, identique au Bien, dans un élan d'amour de beinveillance allant jusqu'à l'extase fournira par l'entremise de Plotin, à la mystique chrétienne sa terminologie et ses cadres intellectuels" (p. 49). Gross errs in several respects: the church and its Scriptures are the source of the Christian doctrine of deification and, as Jaeger says, modern research has not confirmed any Greek influence on these Scriptures (Early Christianity and the Greek Paideia, p. 106); and we should add, no "influence" may be confirmed on the church; the argument for patristic "hellenizing" ignores the christological framework of the patristic witness; there is a deliberate confusing of the form of patristic doctrine and its content; the eros of Plato is not the agape of the Fathers; the God of the Fathers transcends being, good, beauty, etc. (St. Dionysius the Areopagite, De Myst. Theol. V, PG 3 1045D-1048B); the Christian soteriology involves essentially different concepts of time, creation, man and destiny; and the Greek Fathers reject the idea of "the beatific vision" which Scholasticism will later inherit from the Greeks (See V. Lossky, The Vision of God, trans. by A. Moorhouse. Clayton (Wisc.), 1963).

reason, consonance with the divine order of things and the destruction of the bodily passions. With the death of the body, they taught, the soul was released to return to the divine fire from which it was originally emitted.[101] Next, Plotinus conceived the cosmos as eternal and dual, sensible and intelligible. At the summit of the cosmic hierarchyexists the One, the Being, the Principle, the Sovereign God "above being and thought." A man can be united to it only after kathársis and éros which brings him both "the intellectual vision of the One" and absorption into it, that is, the loss of personal identity in the great immensity of the One. The most obvious objections to the philosophy of Plotinus, says Gross, are his belief that man is self-sufficient, completely able to accomplish the task delineated by the Enneads. He calls Neoplatonism "un naturalisme integral" which is not only unmitigated rationalism, but unresponsive to the needs and abilities of the masses while being, also, patently pantheistic.[102]

In the philosophy of Plotinus and the Greeks there is another anti-typification of the Christian revelation--curiously, pagan cyclism. We have seen that the pre-existent Christ, the Logos, was the beginning of history while, as the Author of the new Life, He is the deified Christ. He is the end of history, that is, He is the

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[101]Gross, p. 57.

[102]Gross, p. 67

alpha and the omega, "who is and who was and who is to come, the Almighty." (Rev. i, 8). Thus, as Hans Urs von Balthasar writes, there is a sense in which the Christian idea of history is "cyclical", for "the course to the end can be nothing other than the regaining of lost origins."[103] Although time and history move in a straight line from an absolute beginning to an absolute end, they are paradoxically a circle--"cyclical time is a vertically directed circle: from God to the world, from the world to God."[104] And, to be sure, Christ is the mid-point of history, because He is the beginning and the end: the beginning as the Creator of the cosmos, the end of history as the end of the cosmos; and the mid-point as the end of the first creation and the beginning of the new creation. Christ is that from which to which all history is destined to move. He is "the economy of history", the Savior of Adam, for Adam was made to share His Life and Adam was remade to share the new Life in Christ.

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[103]"Der Gang auf das Ende zu kann nichts anderes sein als der Wiedergewinnung des verlorenen Ursprungs" ("Vom Sinn der Geschichte in der Bibel", in Der Sinn der Geschichte, hrsg. von L. Reinisch. Munich, 1961, p. 119;) and Rogerio Leys writes that because of sin, Christ came and "il permet le retour aux origenes" (L'Image de Dieu chez Saint Grégoire de Nyssa. Louvain, 1951, p. 85).

[104]" . . . zyklische Zeit ist ein vertikal stehender Kreis: von Gott und die Welt herab, von der Welt wieder zu Gott" (Balthasar, p. 119). Cf. St. John Chrysostom, Comm. I Thess. IX, 2 PG 62 447; and St. Maximus the Confessor, De Ambig. PG 91 1073BD.

CHAPTER VI

THE CHURCH AND THE COSMOS: THE HISTORY OF SALVATION

In the previous chapter we saw that the history of mankind is the history of two races: "the race of Adam" and "the race of Christ". The former is the history of enslavement to Satan, sin, corruption and death whereas the latter is the process of liberation from their power, the process of deification. Deification is the télos of the cosmos in Christ, an end that will find the cosmos purified from all evil and death. It will be a cosmos transfigured by its participation in the Life of God. The end of history is the beginning of an eternal "age" of which Christ is the first-fruit. In this connection, the church, as the Body of Christ, is also the adumbration of the future age, for the members of the church are the members of Christ. In "economic" terms, ecclesiology is but an aspect of christology even as eschatology is but an aspect of it and, therefore, the three form but a single understanding of "the economy of history". The present chapter on the church might very well be nothing more than an epilogue to the preceding one, the single difference being that now we focus on the unique organ of salvation which perpetuates

the life of Christ on earth.

The church, like its divine Founder, is both divine and human, although, in another sense, it is only divine having become human when it was introduced into the course of history. The origin of the church is unknown, issuing from the unfathomable depths of the eternal Mind. It is the "mystery" which from "the beginning of the cosmos has been hid in God" (Eph. iii, 9). As divine, the church is pre-temporal, pre-historical, but, as human, it is something created and human. Saint Clement of Rome says that the church was made before the sun and the moon.[1] Hermas affirms that it is "older" than the physical world, created prior to all things and "the cosmos was made for it."[2] "The heavens were made for the church," declares Saint John Chrysostom, "not the church for the heavens."[3] It entered the world through the creation of the cosmos, for Adam and was renewed and is being perfected in Christ; thus, passing from "glory to glory".[4] It was paradise for the "first man" and was revealed as the Body of Christ in the "second man." The church is eternal life and the consumation of

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[1]II Clem. xiv, 2-4.

[2]Shep. of Hermas, in The Apostolic Fathers, (vol. II), trans. by K. Lake. London, 1925, Vis. I, 3-4. Cf. Clement of Alexandria, Ad Theod., 41 PG 9 677A.

[3]Hom. Gen. I, 2 PG 52 429. Cf. St. Gregory of Nyssa, kósmou gàr ktísis éstín he tēs Ekklesías kataskeuē (Cant. Cantic. XIII, PG 44 1049B).

[4]St. Gregory of Nazianzus, Ora. XXXI, 26 PG 35 161D.

all things.[5] In Adam, man was expelled from it and in Christ he is returned.

The plan of salvation--the church is salvation--for the creation was ordained, Saint Paul says, "before the foundation of the cosmos" when men were "destined in love to be His sons through Jesus Christ and according to the purpose of His Will." (Eph. i, 4-5). God knew before anything existed who would be members of His church.[6] Thus, according to plan, the church descended to earth and was planted in the cosmos as paradise--plantata est enim Ecclesia paradisus in hoc Mundo.[7] The "church"

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[5]St. Clement of Rome, II, xiv, 4.

[6]As we have already seen, the predestination of the Greek Fathers is not the Augustinian-Thomist-Calvinist version which states that "God has chosen certain persons to constitute the elect" and has caused this election "to be efficacious so that they will infallibly get to heaven . . . . God's choice of the elect was entirely gratuitous and previous to any forseen merits . . . ." (R. Garrigous-Lagrange, Predestination, pp. 6-7). The Greek Fathers never presumed to place the question of salvation on a rational plane. They simply maintained a divine-human "synergism" true to their christological presuppositions. This synergism is "a harmony in which grace bears ever more and more fruit, and is appropriated--'acquired'--by the human person. Grace is a presence of God within us which demands constant effort on our part; these efforts, however, in no where determine grace, nor does grace act upon our liberty as if it were external or foreign to it. This doctrine, faithful to the apophatic spirit of the Eastern tradition, expresses the mystery of the coincidence of grace and human freedom in good works, without recourse to positive or rational terms." Moreover, there is no question of merits, because salvation is the interaction of the divine and human will (V. Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church, pp. 197ff). See St. Cyril of Alexandria, Ep. ad Rom. VIII, PG 74 828A; St. John Chrysostom, Ep. ad Rom. XIV, 1 PG 605; and St. John of Damascus, Dial. c. Mani, 79 PG 94 1577A.

[7]St. Irenaeus, Contra Haer. V, 20 PG 7 1178A.

of Adam, paradise, was both sensible and invisible, both dimensions united without confusion--peri tas diaphoros ton onton ousias asygchyton henosin.[8] Adam and Eve lived in fellowship with God, walking in paradise and conversing with Him and His angels. Adam writes Saint Basil, was "protected by God and enjoying His blessings . . . Who created him to live with archangels and hear the divine voice."[9] Although sinless, he was "a child and needed to grow so as to come to full perfection."[10] Adam dwelt in grace and lived innocently, free from all wickedness and passion.[11]

Seduced by Satan, Adam and Eve alienated themselves from God. The human race was plunged into sin, corruption and death, separated from God and "scattered" by Satan. There continued to exist, however, the promise of mercy, the promise of a Savior.[12] Hence, the "economy of the Old Testament": God's favor upon Abel, the Ark of Noah, the call of Abraham, the formation of old Israel; and "the economy for the Gentiles". "This broadly-understood

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[8]St. Maximus the Confessor, Mysta., 24 PG 91 705B; 6, 684AB, 684D-685A, 688AB.

[9]Hom. Quod Deus non est Auct. Mal., 7 PG 31 344CD.

[10]St. Irenaeus, Proof of the Apos. Preach., 3.

[11]St. John Chrysostom, Hom. Gen, V, 6 PG 53 53.

[12]The famous proto-evangelion: "And God said to the serpent, I will set enmity between you and the woman, between your offspring and hers; she is to crush your head while you will lie at ambush at her heel" (Gen. iii, 15).

Church," writes Professor Karmiris, "having thereafter followed the course of history of divine Revelation and the order and unfolding plan of God concerning the salvation of the fallen human race . . . included the faithful and just of the Old Testament from Abel and Noe and Abraham down, as well as the faithful and just of the Gentiles 'who were destined for salvation' (Basil the Great, On the Psalms, 28, 3 PG 29 288), and who were regarded by the early Church Fathers and writers and by the three Hierarchs [Basil the Great, Gregory the Theologian and John Chrysostom] as belonging to one people, 'the people of God', to one 'city', to one 'kingdom', to one 'body', that is, the Church whose head and leader is Christ."[13]

The continued presence of the church was confirmed by the special election of Israel, through the promise to Abraham that he would be "the father of many nations" in whom "all nations of the earth will be blessed." The Greek Fathers, adhering to the same tradition as Saint Paul (Gal. iii, 6-9; Rom. ix, 16f), confessed Abraham as the prototype of them that would believe in Christ. Abraham and his descendants, the seed of Jacob, because they rejoiced to see the day of Christ (John viii, 56), shared in "the adoption of sons" and salvation in Christ.

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[13]J. Karmiris, "The Ecclesiology of the Three Hierarchs", The Greek Orthodox Theological Review, VI, 2 (1960-1961), pp. 150-151.

In addition, the first Christian writers included as members of the pre-Christian church, albeit not visibly, those Gentiles who pleased God. "We have been taught that Christ is the first-begotten of God," writes Saint Justin Martyr, "and we have declared above that He is the Logos of whom the entire human race were partakers; and those who lived by means of reason (metà logoū) are Christians, even though they have been thought atheists. We number among the Greeks, such men as Socrates and Heraclitus and others; and among the barbarians, Abraham, Ananias, Azarias, Misel, and Elias . . . ."[14] In general, the Greek Fathers taught that anyone who lived according to the moral law and right reason (i.e., according to the Law of God put into the hearts of all men and in harmony with the enlightening power of the Logos) were embued with grace and given salvation.[15] Nevertheless, the Gentiles, ethnoi, as a people, never lived in the same intimacy with God as did the Hebrews.

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[14] I Apol., 46 PG 6 397C. Cf. St. John Chrysostom, Ep. ad Eph. X, 1 PG 62 75.

[15] The idea of "general revelation" is found in Rom. i, 18ff; ii, 14ff; John i, 4-9; Acts xiv, 17; xvii, 26-27. It is important, if only incidental, to keep in mind that the word "revelation" in the Scriptures and the Fathers has very little in common with the idea which has been prevalent in the West since the rise of Scholasticism. The words used by the Scriptures and the Fathers to describe "revelation" are: "to make clear" (dēloūn), "to know" (gnōrízein), "to speak to" (laleīn), "to enlighten" (photizeín), "to manifest" (phaneroūn), "to unveil" (apokalýptein) and such nouns as lógos, phos, aletheia. See E. Brunner, Revelation and Reason, p. 21. Revelation did not mean the rational knowledge of divine things, then, but

The Fathers never recognized a spiritual continuum between the Gentiles as a people and the church. After the Deluge, Saint Methodius tells us, the Gentiles became increasingly remote from God through idolatry, whereas the Law and the Prophets received "the divine seed" and proclaimed the marriage of the Logos and His Bride.[16] Old Israel, as we know, foretold the advent of the new covenant. "Receiving the rays of the truth through the windows of the Prophets and the metal-work of the Law," explains Saint Gregory of Nyssa, "the church of the Logos yet encountered them as a wall of typical teachings. I say the Law--which stood behind the truth possessing the type--did not demonstrate in itself the image of those things to come, even though it was their shadow. At first, the church of the Logos received the truth through the Prophets, but with the appearance (phanrosei) of the Gospel the shadowy substance of the type was abolished and the intervening wall was demolished. Consequently, the air in the house was infused with ethereal light, no longer requiring the medium of windows. The True Light Himself, the evangelical splendor, enlightened everything within. Thus, the Logos cries through the illumined church to the fallen creation to be restored, saying, Indeed, arise from the fall, arise you have fallen

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"the living history of God in His dealings with the human race" (Brunner, p. 8).

[16]Conviv. dec. Virg. VII, 6 PG 18 133A.

into the disgrace of sin . . . ."[17]

The role of Israel "according to the flesh" was the preservation of true worship and the bringing forth of the Savior. With the Incarnation, however, the synagogue must close its doors, for "worship in spirit and truth" is present in the Son of Man. "So the Jews are trifling, and the time in question, which they refer to the future is come. For it is a sign and an important proof of the coming of the Logos that Jerusalem no longer stands. For another proof, no prophet has been raised nor any vision has been revealed to the Jews. For when He that was signified [by the Old Testament] was come, what need was there for anything more to signify Him?" inquires Saint Athanasius. "When the truth was there, what need of the shadow? For this was the reason for their prophesying, namely, declaring the coming of true righteousness: Him that was to ransom the sins of all. And this was why Jerusalem stood until then, that is, that there might be exercized in the types as a preparation for the reality. So when the Holy of Holies was present, vision and prophecy were sealed, of course, and the kingdom of Jerusalem ceased."[18] Although old Israel was established by God, it was never meant to be an absolute religion; its task was entirely preparatory.[19]

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[17]Cant. Cantic. V, PG 44 868A. Cf. St. Basil, De Spirit. Sanct., 14 PG 32 125D-127A.

[18]Ora de Incarn. Verb. Dei, 40 PG 25 165AB.

[19]Karmiris, p. 167f.

In other words, the history of the Gentiles and old Israel was never intended to offer absolute value. The Greek and the Jew were "tutors unto Christ." Quite naturally, then, the Greek Fathers always examined any extant religious reality in terms of its history in order to understand what led to the reality of Christ. History is "the economy of God", the history of revelation, the education of mankind. Thus, Saint Gregory of Nyssa wrote, "If nothing in the world happens without God, but all is linked to the divine Will, to the divine Wisdom and Prudence, then, everything follows according to this design which bears the mark of His Wisdom and providential care. A blind and reasonless occurrence can never be the work of God; for it is the property of God, as the Scriptures say, to 'make all things in Wisdom'."[20] In a very appropriate passage Saint Irenaeus makes a similar observation: "It is by the education of man, generated and created, that man conforms himself gradually to the Image and Likeness of the ungenerated God. The Father chooses and orders, the Son works and creates, the Spirit feeds and augments, and man gently progresses and ascends toward perfection, that is, comes near to the ungenerated God; for he who is not generated is perfect, and this is God. It was necessary that man should first be created and grow, then become a complete man by multiplying and developing his powers; and then, he arrives at glory and

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[20] De Infant. q. Praem. Abrip. PG 46 168A.

in glory sees his Master. For it is God that he will see, and the sight of God makes him incorruptible and incorruptibility makes one like God."[21]

The "growth" of man the Fathers found everywhere; in particular, the Old Testament with its "types" gave them a knowledge of the "progress"from shadow to reality or, in this instance, the church. The first and obvious "type" is "Paradise". The church is the renewal of those conditions which existed in Paradise, Eden. Not that the physical circumstances of Paradise are reconstituted, but rather the church returns man to communion with the angels and God. The church is a new beginning or, as Saint Methodius of Olympus says, "The church is the new age."[22] The church is already what it is to become, concurs Saint Maximus the Confessor; it is the very restlessness

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[21]Contra Haer. IV, 38 PG 7 1107A-1108D. Cf. St. John Chrysostom, In Joan. Evang. XIX, 1 PG 59 119. We have already noted that the Greek Fathers deny any possibility of the visio beata, that is, God in His Essence--a teaching clearly espoused by Thomas Aquinas (e.g., Summa Contra Gent. III, q. 51). Vladimir Lossky has traced the idea from the beginning of the patristic tradition to St. Gregory Palamas (fourteenth century) and found not one instance in which they taught a direct vision of the Essence of God. According to the Greek Fathers "the vision face to face" refers only to the deified humanity Christ. The saved will see the "face" of the glorious and transfigured Christ. That "vision", moreover, is related to soteriology, because the saved are the deified; therefore, it is because the members of Christ--here is introduced christology and ecclesiology--are "partakers of the divine nature" that they may "see" God. See The Vision of God; and St. Irenaeus, in particular, pp. 30-37.

[22]Conviv. dec. Virg. VIII, 2 PG 18 180C.

of the cosmos--for the destiny of one is the destiny of the other--striving towards the original unity with God that the cosmos had lost.[23] To be sure, Paradise was the original condition of the cosmos, so Saint John Chrysostom says, "The cosmos is becoming the church of God."[24]

The "types" concerning Paradise and the church, as one might suspect, are innumerable, but we shall mention only a few. The Greek Fathers often compared the church to Eve. For "just as Eve came from the rib of Adam, so we have come from the side of Christ," Saint John Chrysostom tells his friend, Maximus. " . . . And just as woman was formed while Adam slept, so the Church was fashioned from the side of Christ when He died."[25] It was only natural to associate Eve with the church when Adam was taken as the type of Christ. Saint Irenaeus, drawing on the concept of recapitulation, uses Eve for another type. In accordance with the divine economy,

"Mary, the Virgin, is found obedient,

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[23]Ambig. PG 91 1200B. For Maximus, as well as the other Greek Fathers, Paradise had no interest except as the place in which the world-process began and, the place of the Fall, the conditions to which man will return. This view, says Hans Urs von Balthasar, is "nie von einer Rueckschau" (Die Kosmische Liturgie, p. 177); and Daniélou says, "That the question is not of return (Wiederkehr), but a new creation has been well shown . . ." (From Shadows to Reality, p. 12).

[24]Acta Apost. XXII, 4 PG 60 176.

[25]Qual. Ducend. s. Uxor. III, 3 PG 51 229. Cf. St. Methodius of Olympus, Conviv. dec. Virg. IV, 9 PG 18 76B; and St. Augustine, In Joan. CXX, 2 PL 35 1953.

> saying, 'Behold, the handmaid of the Lord; be it unto me according to thy word' (Luke, i, 38). But Eve was disobedient; for she did not obey even though a virgin. And even as she, having a husband, Adam, but being nevertheless a virgin . . . was made the cause of death, both to herself and the entire human race; so also did Mary, having a man betrothed to her, and also a virgin, by her obedience, became the cause of salvation both to herself and the entire human race. And on this account does the law term a woman betrothed to a man, the wife of him who has promised to marry her . . . thus indicating the typification between Mary and Eve . . . and the former ties are annulled by Mary that she might release Eve from bondage. And it has, in fact, happened that the first tie looses from the second tie, but the latter takes the position of the former which had been annulled. For this reason did the Lord declare that the first should be the last and the last first. And the prophet, too, indicates the same, saying, 'Instead of fathers, children have been born of thee' (Ps. xlv, 17). For the Lord, having been born 'the first born from the dead' (Rev. i, 5) and receiving into His bosom the ancient fathers, has regenerated them into the life of God and made Himself the beginning of those that live, as Adam became the beginning of those who die . . . . And thus also it was that the knot of Eve's disobedience was loosed by the obedience of Mary. For what the virgin Eve had bound by unbelief, the Virgin Mary set free through faith."[26]

Eve was the mother of the first church, the first mankind, even as Mary is the mother of the renewed church, the Body of Christ, the new mankind recapitulated in Christ.

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[26]Contra Haer. XXII, 4 PG 7 958B-959C.

There are other analogies between Paradise and the church, such as those actions by which salvation was gained for its members. "In the first creation," Saint Gregory of Nyssa maintains, "He took dust from the earth and formed man, but in the second creation, He took dust from the Virgin and did not merely form man, but formed him about Himself . . . in the first creation, the Logos created flesh, but for the church, the Logos became flesh that He might change our flesh and spirit by making us partakers with us in flesh and blood. Of this new creation in Christ, therefore, of which He is the beginning, He was called the first-born, the first-fruits of all, both of those begotten into life and those quickened by the resurrection from the dead 'that He might be Lord both of the dead and the living' (Rom. xiv, 9) and might sanctify the whole lump by means of its first-fruits in Himself."[27] And he repeats in De Hominis opificio, "Now the grace of the resurrection promises us nothing else than the restoration (ápokatástasin) of the fallen man to his ancient state; for the grace we look for is a certain return to the first life, to Paradise from which man was expelled."[28]

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[27]Contra Eun., 3 PG 45 637B. Cf. St. Cyril of Alexandria, Commen. in Joan. Evang. I, PG 73 153B.

[28]De Hom. opif., 17 PG 44 188C. The idea of "the restoration of all things" which was advocated by St. Gregory is not the common teaching of the Greek Fathers. It was taught by the Stoics and Origen and it was from them that some scholars claim that he took this view of

Saint Irenaeus compares the "tree" of Paradise to the Cross. "So by the obedience whereby He obeyed even unto death, hanging on the tree, Christ undid the old disobedience wrought in the tree."[29] And Saint Gregory of Nazianzus similarly declares, " . . . tree set against tree, hands against hands, the one pair stretched out greedily, the other nobly; the one without restraint, the other fixed by nails, the one expelling Adam, the other reconciling the ends of the earth."[30] In a sermon, Saint Hippolytus of Rome enumerates the deeds of Christ for the sake of Eve: "He who is hungry nourishes the multitude; who is weary gives rest to the weary; who has nowhere to lay His Head bears all things in His Hands; who suffers heals passions; who has scourged yet confers freedom to the cosmos; who is pierced in the side while healing the side of Adam."[31] Eve is no longer deceived,

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"recapitulation". He was accused by St. Anastasius Sinaita of teaching Apocatastasis; yet, when the idea was condemned by the ecumenical council of Constantinople (553) Gregory was not censured; and the council of Chalcedon called him, "Father of Fathers". See R. Leys, L'Image de Dieu chez Saint Grégoire de Nysse, pp. 88-92. Neither did St. Barasnuphius believe that Gregory taught Apocatastasis as Origen explained it (Doctrina, PG 86 900A). Gregory himself, says Daniélou, "did in fact formally condemn the idea of apocatasis as it was distorted by Origen", i.e., "the return of the soul to the purely spiritual state . . . the idea of successive lives and the theory of permanent instability. He did not in any way reject the dictrine of the re-establishment of all things in Christ" (Origen, trans. by W. Mitchel. New York, 1955, p. 289).

[29] Proof of the Apostolic Preaching, 34.

[30] Ora. II, 25 PG 35 433C.

[31] Sermo in Sanct. Theoph., 7 PG 10 857D-860A.

writes the anonymous author of the letter to Diognetus, but is "trusted as a virgin. Salvation is set forth and the Apostles are given understanding, the Cross of the Lord continues . . . ."[32]

The Greek Fathers draw other analogies between the church and old Israel which further illustrates the place of the former in history. For example, Noah and the Ark are types of Christ and the church. Saint Clement of Rome equates the Ark with salvation which floated over the waters of destruction, the waters which are also a type of baptism that destroys Satan and his demons; thus, he says, "Noah announced to the cosmos the second birth."[33] And Saint Irenaeus says the same: "They say that the economy of the ark in the Flood clearly signifies the saving eighth day."[34] Saint John Chrysostom follows the traditional typology: "The story of the flood is a mystery and the details are types of the future: the ark is the church, Noah is Christ; the dove the Holy Spirit, the olive branch the divine compassion. As the ark in the midst of the waters protected those inside the vessel, so does the church protect those who have strayed. But while the ark took in brute animals and kept them, the church takes man who is without purpose and does more than merely keep

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[32]Ep. ad Diogn., XII, 5.

[33]I Clem. VIII, 12; IX, 3; Cf. St. Justin Martyr, Dial. cum Tryp., 138 PG 6 798AB.

[34]Contra Haer. I, 18 PG 7 645B.

them; it transforms them."[35]

Another type which seems to be a favorite with the Greek Fathers is the sojourn of the Jews in the land of Egypt. In his commentary on the book of Exodus, Saint Cyril of Alexandria designates Israel the type of the church, Pharoah Satan, his warriors "the impure spirits", Egypt "the world", "the land of idolatry". Moses is the type of Christ. He was found in a basket (typifying the virginal birth of Christ) by Pharoah's daughter (the Gentiles of the church) who rescued Moses from the river (a type of baptism). The bondage of the Jews, says Saint Cyril, is the tyranny of Satan while the eating of the Passover anticipates the Eucharist which protects us from the destruction which that tyranny has caused. The anointing of the doorposts is a type of Calvary, for as "the angel of death passed over the homes of those with the blood of the Lamb, so the blood of the Cross overcame the death brought by Satan." The flight from Egypt is "a type of freedom from the world."[36] In his In Baptismus Christi, Saint Gregory of Nyssa continues the typology of this narrative. The Jews "crossing the Red Sea was an action which foretold the sacrament of baptism; hence, whenever anyone enters the waters of regeneration, he is fleeing the land of Egypt, that is, the cruel mastery of

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[35]Hom. Laz., 6 PG 48 1037-1038. Cf. St. Augustine, De Civ. Dei, XV, 26.

[36]Glaphy. in Exod. I, 3-8 PG 69 392B-425A.

sin and is delivered from Satan who with all his minions are overwhelmed by the water . . . ."[37]

In all the types concerning Christ and Adam, the church and Eve, the Jews, the world, etc., there is a single persistent theme, salvation; but there is also another theme, something counterpoised, even though intrinsic to the Christian soteriology, that is, the role of Satan: salvation is not accomplished unless he is overcome. He is no comic figure and history is inconceivable without him. The defeat of Satan is central to the economy of Christ's redemption, for he and his demons are "the enemies of the truth and man's salvation."[38] He is man's adversary, antikeímenos.[39] God frees man from "the bitter and tyrannizing servitude to Satan."[40] In the church, he is the cause of heresy.[41] In fact, the history of salvation is the history of Satan's opposition to God. It was at Calvary that Christ defeated him and "life was introduced into the house of death, and light shone in the darkness . . . ."[42] It was Satan who spoiled the first

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[37]Bapt. Christ. PG 46 589D. Cf. St. Basil, De Spirit. Sanct., 14 PG 32 88C-89B.

[38]St. John of Damascus, De Imag. II, 4 PG 94 1285C.

[39]St. Cyril of Jerusalem, Catech. II, 4 PG 33 388A.

[40]St. Maximus the Confessor, Cap. Theol. et Oecon. I, 15 PG 90 1088D.

[41]St. Gregory of Nazianzus, Ora. XXI, 32 PG 35 1120C.

[42]St. Gregory of Nyssa, Ora. Catech., 24 PG 45 65A.

creation[43] and who seeks now to destroy the new creation even though he has been vanquished by the Cross. The "unseen warfare" continues despite the fact that the decisive battle has been fought.

The great bulwark against Satan, according to the Greek Fathers, is grace.[44] Grace, writes Saint Basil, is the means by which God established everything that exists.[45] Without grace men would be "like dry and sterile ground which has no humidity," asserts Saint Irenaeus.[46] Grace was responsible for "our very creation out of nothing," says Saint John Chrysostom, ". . . and not only our creation . . . but also what we were taught to do and not to do immediately after our formation, and that we had this law deposited in our nature; and our Maker placed in us the immovable judgment of conscience--all this was the work of the greatest grace and His unspeakable love towards man. It was also the work of grace when, after the perversion of this law, He restored it in the Commandments."[47]

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[43]St. Irenaeus, Proof of the Apostolic Preaching, 16.

[44]In Scholastic theology grace is created, infused, "habitual and actual" and involves the idea of "the supernatural order" to which it elevates the subject. For the Greek Fathers, there is no classification of graces. It is not created, but "a divine energy ineffably distinct from the essence of God", explains Vladimir Lossky. Grace "is a natural procession, the energies of God, shining forth eternally from the divine essence" (The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church, p. 88).

[45]Ep. XXXVIII, 4 PG 32 329B.

[46]Contra Haer. III, 17 PG 7 939A.

[47]In Joan. Evang. XIV, 2 PG 59 94.

After the Fall, the grace of God continued to operate, encouraging men "to be cured by those means at their disposal . . . ."[48] Grace acted upon the Gentiles and the Prophets.[49] Grace effected "our return to the first grace from which we were alienated through the power of sin."[50] To grace the church owes its unity and the deification of its members, "for by the grace of the economy, Christ disseminates Himself in every believer through that flesh whose substance comes from bread and wine," states Saint Gregory of Nyssa, "blending Himself with the bodies of believers, to secure for men by this union with the Immortal their share in incorruption."[51] Furthermore, it is the grace of the Holy Spirit which gives life to the church--even as He did in the first creation--and by His Wisdom preserves it from error.[52]

Nevertheless, grace is not irresistable.[53] Man cannot be saved without grace, but not all men are saved. He who perseveres in the grace of Christ, in the church,

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[48]Origen, De Princ., in Ante-Nicene Fathers, (vol. IV), edited by A. Roberts and J. Donaldson. Grand Rapids, 1951, II, ix, 7.

[49]St. Justin Martyr, II Apol., 13 PG 6 468A; and St. Ignatius of Antioch, Ep. ad Magn., 8.

[50]St. Basil, Sermo Ascet., 2 PG 31 872D. Cf. St. Gregory of Nyssa, Ora Catech. VIII, PG 45 37C.

[51]Ora. Catech. XXXVII, PG 45 97B.

[52]St. Irenaeus, Contra Haer. III, 24 PG 7 966BC.

[53]St. Gregory of Nyssa, De Instit. Christ. PG 46 289C. See above, p. 166, note 6.

however, will be raised by "the grace of resurrection". Then will come the Judgment and the end of history as we know it. The church will be joined to the Bridegroom forever. Satan, his demons and the damned will be cast into "the eternal fire" while the faithful will "inherit the kingdom prepared . . . from the foundation of the cosmos." (Matt. xxv, 34). The church will be what it is now becoming, the kingdom of God, and will encompass the heavens and the earth.[54] God "will be all in all", the cosmos will be deified and completely transformed.

This is the destiny of the cosmos which has already begun in the church, the church of sinners. Saint Paul called "the beloved in Rome" those "who are called to be saints . . ." (Rom. i, 17), but "to the church of God which is at Corinth", refers to its members as "the saints" (II Cor. i, 1). The "saints" are tà hágia, "holy ones", the "saved", the "elect". To the Ephesians, he declared that "even when we were dead through our trespasses [God] made us alive together with Christ (synezōopoiēsen tō christō) . . . and raised us up with him (kai synērgeisen) and made us sit in heavenly places in Jesus Christ . . . ." (Eph. ii, 5-6). And later, Paul says to them, "So then you are no longer strangers or sojourners, but co-citizens (sympolitai) with the saints . . . ." (Eph. ii, 20). As members of the church, he writes in the epistle to the

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[54]St. Basil, Psal. XLV, 4 PG 29 421f; and Matt. xxv, 34; Eph. v, 5; Ga. v, 21; Rev. xxii, 15; I Cor. xi, 3; Col. i, 18; ii, 10.

Hebrews, we are partakers of the Holy Spirit "and have tasted the goodness of the word of God and the powers of the age to come" (Heb. vi, 5).

In other words, the "age to come" is now, the church of sinners is already the church of the saints. Thus, Barnabas writes to the church, "For the Lord has made known to us through the prophets the things past and things present and has given us the first-fruits of the things to come . . . ."[55] He states further in his epistle that the promise of God is manifest "in the resurrection from the dead, because Christ must prove in the flesh that which He endured that He might fulfill the promise made to the fathers, and Himself prepare for Himself the new people and show while on earth that He Himself will raise the dead and judge the risen."[56] All the things of the future are now present, says Barnabas, for the "end" has come. "In the last days, He made a second creation, the Lord saying, 'Behold I make the last things as the first' (tà éschata ōs tà prōta).[57] Wherefore Christ has inaugurated "the eighth day", "the beginning of another cosmos and we also celebrate with gladness the eighth day in which Jesus rose from the dead manifestly (phanerōtheis) and ascended into heaven."[58]

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[55]Barnabas, I, 7.

[56]Barnabas, V, 6-7.

[57]Barnabas, V, 13.

[58]Barnabas, XV, 9.

With the use of typology, Saint Justin Martyr confirms the witness of Barnabas. "The command of circumcision, requiring always to circumcize children on the eighth day, was a type of the true circumcision, that is, we are circumcized from deceit and iniquity through our Lord, Jesus Christ, who rose from the dead on the first day, the day after the Sabbath. For the first day after the Sabbath is in fact the first of all days while yet the eighth--for the days of the week follow a circle--and is also the first day of the week".[59] That Christ is the "eighth day" and "the head of God's new people" was typified by "the righteous Noah" who "along with his wife, his three sons and their wives--a total of eight--were a type of the eighth day, wherein Christ appeared when he rose from the dead, forever the first in power. For Christ, the first-born of the new creation, became the head of another race regenerated in Himself through water, faith and wood--the latter containing the mystery of the cross--even as Noah was saved by wood the Ark with his household."[60] Christ was also typified by Jacob, "for Christ is the Israel and the Jacob, even so we, who have been quarried out from the bowels of Christ and are the true race of Israel".[61]

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[59]Dial. cum Tryp., 41 PG 6 724C-725B. Cf. Eusebius of Caesarea, Ps. XCI, PG 23 1168D.

[60]St. Justin Martyr, 138 793AB.

[61]St. Justin Martyr, 135 788D.

The church of sinners is the "new Israel". It is, as "old Israel", both "one" and "many", Jacob and Christ. Moreover, the Sabbath of "old Israel" is fulfilled in Christ who, by that very fulfillment, opened to history "the age to come", the "last day", "the eighth day". In the words of Saint Ignatius of Antioch, "Those who once lived according to the ancient order of things have come to the new hope, observing no longer the Sabbath but the Lord's Day, the Day in which our life was raised up in Christ through His death."[62] Again, the Sabbath is "the seventh day", the number which signifies the totality of the present course of history; but Sunday is "the day after", the "day" of the Resurrection. "The number eight, which contains the power of the Resurrection", exclaimed Origen, "is the type of the future age."[63]

The ages of "the first creation", symbolized by the seven days of Genesis, are consumated with the epiphany of Christ. He is, therefore, the "end" of the "old creation" and the beginning of the "new age".[64] But what is true of Christ is applicable to the church.[65] The two are one (Eph. v, 31). The church of sinners is "kneaded" to Him, proclaimed Saint John Chrysostom, "that

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[62] Ad Magn. IX, 1.

[63] Sel. Psa. PG 12 1624BC.

[64] St. Athanasius, De Sab. et circum. PG 28 137C.

[65] "But these eschatological times are not only those of the life of Jesus", says Daniélou, "but of the Church as well" (The Bible and the Liturgy, p. 5).

we might become one entity, like a body to a head."[66] Similarly, Saint Athanasius said, "Therefore for love of . . . that man of the first creation, Christ, as the beginning of the new creation, is 'the beginning of its ways' . . . 'He is the head of the body, the church, the beginning of the first-born from the dead, that in all things He might have preeminence'".[67]

Consequently, "the church is the preparation for creation of the new cosmos".[68] The church is the inchoate "eighth day"; it initiates the return to God. As Christ Himself is "the economy of God", likewise the church. This is the "realized eschatology" of the Greek Fathers. The "history of salvation" is already begun in Christ through His Incarnation; the church is that "history". Perhaps, it appears that He has not conquered sin, corruption and death. The "history of salvation" is surely the story of a sinful race. The church, nevertheless, as His body is evidence of His victory. "I have been crucified with Christ", exhalts Saint Paul, "but it is no longer I who live. Christ lives in me and the life I now live in the flesh, I live by faith in the Son of God who loved me and gave Himself for me" (Gal. ii, 20). The church of history is already, even if imperfectly, the church of glory. This is the coincidentia oppositorum of the Christian economy.

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[66]Hom. Ep. ad Col., VI, 2 PG 59 260.

[67]Contra Ar. II, 65 PG 26 285C.

[68]St. Gregory of Nyssa, Cant. Can. XIII, PG 44 1049B.

CHAPTER VII

THE CHURCH AND THE STATE: THE POLITICAL THEOLOGY OF HISTORY

In our study, we have seen what the Greek Fathers taught concerning time and eternity, the duality of the human race, Christ and Adam, and the unique place of the church in history. Our course has taken us from the broadest and most inclusive matters and have gradually brought our attention to more specific questions. In this chapter, we will attenuate the scope of our interest even more--the church and the state. Such a chapter is necessary, because the state is history's most important human institution. We must ask whether the Greek Fathers recognized any relationship between the church and the state; whether the state can have any part in the mission of the church, that is, does the state, if it is Christian, have any soteriological duty? Did the Fathers believe that the church and the state could unite to create a societas christiana? How would Chalcedonian christology apply to this relationship, since that christology is the basic presupposition of "the philosophy of history" according to the Greek Fathers? In other words, what place did the Fathers assign to the state in "the economy of God"?

The Greek Fathers understood the idea of government in terms completely foreign to the modern secular conception of the state. Since Machiavelli the fundamental principle of political action in the West has been raison d'etat. In the words of Professor William Stark, "the modern state must create for itself its own imaginary right and necessity for existence, because there does not exist any directive and arbitrative state-authority over all states."[1] The history of political thought in our era has been the struggle to find some unshakeable first principle of political life--whether "divine right" or "social contract" or "the idealist myth"--but modernity has been unable to uncover anything but its dependence on the Greeks for the philosophical foundations of the idea and history for its justification of the state.[2] Indeed, with the disappearance of the sense of the transcendent,[3] there is nothing to which we may turn save humanity's past experience, hardly a source of universal agreement. Nevertheless, the state has become the dominant fact of modern life.

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[1]In F. Meinecke, Machiavellism: the Doctrine of Raison d'Etat and Its Place in Modern History, trans. by D. Scott. New Haven, 1957, intro., p. 15.

[2]See E. Cassirer, The Myth of the State. Garden City, 1955.

[3]"The most characteristic element of the present age, and that which distinguishes it from earlier periods of history," writes Emil Brunner, "is the almost complete disappearance of the sense of transcendence and the consciousness of revelation" (Revelation and Reason, p. 4).

On the other hand, the Greek Fathers believed the church to be the central reality of history. "The Church is called catholic because She covers the entire world (oikouménēs), from one end to the other," says Saint Cyril of Jerusalem, "and because She teaches universally and completely the same and all doctrines (dogmata) which are necessary for men to know: concerning things both visible and invisible, heavenly and earthly; and because She subjects the whole race of men, governors and governed, learned and unlearned, to piety . . . ."[4] Although there was no dissent about the church, the patristic attitude towards the state was always the same. The politico-ontological presuppositions of the Fathers in no way differed, of course, but they were not always in accord about the value of the state, or more specifically, the romanum imperium. They could not recognize the pagan Empire's claim to eternity nor its pretension to ultimacy, the final solution to "the human predicament", "peace" and "freedom" through political action. No human enterprise could be hypostasized, but it could have cruciality.

It was precisely because history was not "cyclical" or "fated", but possessing an absolute arche and telos, that the state could not be viewed as the fulfillment of human aspiration. The Fathers and the church revolted against classical naturalism, against "the picture of nature constructed by the classical scientia . . . . And what

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[4]Catech. XVIII, 23 PG 33 1044AB.

they demanded was a radical revision of first principles as the presuppositions to an adequate cosmology and anthropology. The basis for such a revision they held to lie in the logos of Christ, conceived as a revelation, not of 'new' truth which was as old as the hills and as everlasting."[5] Thus, the disagreement between the Fathers was not the fact of the state but its place in the divine economy. Moreover, it was not the idea of government, not even caesarism, but whether the church could offer the state any allegiance. In other words, the problem reduced itself to the relationship between the activity of unregenerate reason, Adamic reason, and revelation, in the case of the pagan Empire, and, in the case of the Christian Empire, whether the state could share in the evangelization of the world.[6]

These ideas, however, were not systematically delineated by the Greek Fathers. They have left us no treatises on political philosophy.[7] The explication of their "political theology" can be understood only from their response to circumstances. The most pronounced change in attitude took place with the transformation of the Empire from pagan to Christian. Of great significance here was

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[5]C. N. Cochrane, Christianity and Classical Culture. vi.

[6]See G. Tellenbach, Church, State and Christian Society at the Time of the Investiture Controversy, trans. by H. F. Bennett. Oxford, 1949, intro. and chap. 1 passim.

[7]Eusebius' Vita Constantini and De Laudibus Constantini are not exceptions, because the bishop of Caesarea is not a Father of the Church. His opinions, nevertheless, will be considered in the pages that follow. We do not take seriously the idea that an Arian can be the church's great political theologian.

the application of Christian ecclesiology to the new posture of the Empire, that is, the experience of the church drew out the implications and possibilities of Christian doctrine. We will see, however, the continuity of the patristic witness despite the political vicissitudes and that the varying application of doctrine in no way suggests the mutability of either. The prominence of certain aspects of that witness to doctrine by the Fathers may prove deceptive to historians if they confound the nature of the response to circumstance with innovation. The uniqueness of the Christian economy is always the foremost consideration of the Greek Fathers.

The history of Greek patristic political thought has its origin with the so-called Apostolic Fathers and continues well into the ninth century.[8] Their reflections upon the relation of the church to the Empire were provoked by the encounter of one with the other. The Biblical texts upon which the Fathers could rely were suggestive, but provided no solutions. The Gospels of Saints Matthew

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[8]"In the East . . . in Psuedo-Dionysius and John of Damascus, the question of human government becomes peripheral to Christian thought," writes F. E. Cranz, and "Eusebius has no successor as a 'political theologian'" ("Kingdom and Polity in Eusebius of Caesarea," Harvard Theological Review, XLV (1952), 47). These remarks are misleading not only because Eusebius never spoke for the church, but because the place of the state in the Christian economy was debated until the ninth century. See St. Theodore of Studion, Ep. CXXIX, PG 99 1417BC. It is noteworthy too, that from the remarks made by Nicetas Choniates (eleventh century) and Zonaras, last of the great Byzantine canonists (twelvth century), that the relation of sacerdotium to imperium was in question even to the end of the

(xxii, 20-21) and Mark (xii, 16-17) had recorded Our Lord's famous dictum, "Render unto Caesar what is Caesar's . . . "; and the Acts of the Apostles (ix, 15; xxvi, 27-29) appear to counsel the conversion of the Empire, but other political matters are not considered. The epistles of Saint Paul (Rom. xiii, 1f; and Tit. iii, 1) and Saint Peter (ii, 13-14, 17) give little in the way of political theory save that government is instituted by God and that Christians are obliged to obey its legitimate demands, support it with taxes and respect and offer prayers for the execution of justice. Yet, since the church is not "of the world" and the state cannot exist without social cohesion, Christians are often led to resist civil authority when the state requires obedience to laws which conflict with the Christian Faith.

The problem, then, for the Greek Fathers and the New Testament alike "is a corollary to the eschatological attitude of Christianity."[9] The church is the politeuma of "the eighth day". (Phil. iii, 20), but it is "in the world" and must define its attitude towards the state. The Christian ideal of "the denial of the world" does not imply the abolition of the state. Eschatology only means that the "end" is "now", but, too, that the consumation of this "age" is still in the future and, consequently, the

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Roman Empire (1204). The debate was not heated, but it evidently persisted.

[9]Oscar Cullmann, The State in the New Testament. New York, 1956, pp. 3-4.

realities of history persist; but the further implication is that the church is the only politeuma in that future and the state will disappear then, that is, the latter has only a provisional nature.[10] Nowhere in the New Testament or the writings of the Fathers do we find a renunciation of the state in itself, but neither is there, whether in form or substance, an uncritical acceptance of it. Thus, the New Testament can call the state both "the servant of God" (Rom. xiii, 4) and "the beast rising from the abyss". (Rev. xiii, 1).

Although the state cannot be eternal, there is nothing in the Christian tradition which forbids it from becoming Christian as in fact the Roman Empire did under Constantine. Oscar Cullman contends, however, that "the Jewish theocratic ideal"--which proved to be the model for the medieval empires--is expressly rejected by Christianity as satanic which is obvious from the description of "the temptation of Christ" in the Gospel. Satan offers Christ the kingdoms of the world, but He refuses them.[11] Cullmann certainly would have received support from the monastic movement in the fourth century which understood the union of the church and the Empire as "economically" untenable.[12] Yet, the argument from Christ's rejection of

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[10]Cullmann, The State in the New Testament, p. 4.

[11]O. Cullmann, The State in the New Testament, p. 9.

[12]See Father Georges Florovsky's excellent article, "Empire and Desert: Antinomies of Christian History," The Greek Orthodox Theological Review, III, 2 (1957), pp. 146ff.

"the kingdoms of the world" is tenuous, because Satan promised them on condition that the Lord worship him (Matt. iv, 8-11); and Professor Cullmann cannot reconcile the implications of Matthew xxviii, 19--"Go, therefore, and make disciples of all nations . . . teaching them to observe all that I have commanded you; and lo, I am with you always, even to the close of the age."--with his position. In the words of Father Florovsky, the idea of "the Christian commonwealth" was that "the Church could not evade her responsibility to the world, or surrender her missionary task. Indeed, the Church was concerned not only with individuals, but with society, even with the whole of mankind . . . kingdoms of the world had to be brought ultimately into obedience to Christ."[13]

The pre-Constantinian church, however, did not face the questions raised by the Imperium Romanum Christianum. The antithesis between the church and the Empire (i.e., the world) was sharp with Christians being called odium generis humani and the state bearing the opprobium, "Babylon", "the Beast", "the Antichrist". Nevertheless, as the epistle to Diognetus informs us, Christians lived in the world without being a part of it, and they obeyed the state without giving it unambiguous allegiance:

> "Christians are not different from the rest of men in nationality, speech and customs; they do not live

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[13]"Empire and Desert: Antinomies of Christian History," pp. 138-139.

> in states of their own, nor do they use a special language, nor adopt an unconventional way of life . . . they follow the local mores in the matter of dress, food and routine of living; yet the character of their politeias is wondrous and unusual, for they live, each in his own land, but as though they were not really at home there. They share all the duties of citizenship while suffering all the hardships of strangers. Every foreign land is for them a fatherland and every fatherland a foreign land . . . . They dwell on earth, but they are citizens of heaven. They obey the laws made by men, but are yet persecuted in all . . . . In a word, what the soul is to the body Christians are to the world. The soul is distributed in every member of the body, and Christians are scattered in every city of the world . . . . The soul is locked up in the body while holding it together. And so Christians are held in the world as in a prison; but it is they who hold the world together . . . . Such is the role to which God has called them . . . ."[14]

The opposition to the state is in fact opposition to the fallen world, illustrating the conflict between Christ and Satan, a society within a society, a separate people for whom God preserves that which has alienated itself from Him.

In the same century, Milito, bishop of Sardis, addressed an apology to Antoninus Pius. Quoted partially by Eusebius in his Historia Ecclesiastica, the letter respectfully protests the persecutions of the church and

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[14] Ep. ad Diogn., 5-6. Cf. Shep. of Hermas, Vis. IV, ii, 3, 5; and II Cor. vi, 14f, "Do not be mismated with unbelievers. For what partnership have righteousness and iniquity? Or what fellowship has light with darkness . . . ."

calls the Emperor's attention to the historical importance of Christianity to the state:

> "The philosophy which we profess, first flourished among the barbarians, but afterwards, when it matured, also among other nations under your government; under the glorious reign of Augustus, your ancestor, it became, especially to your reign, an auspicious blessing. For since that time, the Roman power has grown to greatness and splendour. Whose desired successor you have become, and will be, together with your son, if you preserve that philosophy which has been nutured with the empire, which commenced its existence with Augustus, and which also your ancestors did honor, with other religions; and one of the greatest evidences that our doctrine flourished to the advantage of a reign happily begun in this: that there has nothing disasterous occurred to the empire, since the reign of Augustus; on the contrary, all things have proceeded splendidly and gloriously according to the wishes of all. Nero and Dormitian alone stimulated by certain malicious persons showed a disposition to slander our faith . . . ."[15]

Towards the end of the second and the beginning of the third centuries, the Christian Apologists, conscious of the increased hostility of the Empire towards the church, directed numerous apologia to the Roman Emperor and Senate characterized by a rhetoric which never hides the ambivalence of Christian view of the state. The boast of Saint Milito is repeated.

In his First Apology, addressed to Antoninus Pius

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[15]Eusebius, Hist. Ecc., trans. by C. F. Cruse. Grand Rapids, 1962, IV, 26.

and his "adopted" son, Marcus Aurelius, Saint Justin Martyr argues that Christians are "your helpers and allies in the promotion of peace, for we believe that it is impossible for the wicked, the covetous, the conspirator, to escape the notice of God and that each man goes to everlasting punishment or salvation according to the nature of his deeds."[16] Social order and justice depend upon morality, Christians exercize a morality based on convictions which involve the destiny of their souls; therefore, they are the Emperor's most trustworthy citizens. It is true, Justin concedes, that their ultimate loyalty is to God, but they confess the Emperor as "the ruler of men" and Christians pray that "with your kingly power you be found to possess also sound judgment."[17] History, he writes to the Roman Senate, proves that Christianity is the true philosophy, because it worships the Logos of God whose Incarnation was foretold by the Prophets and hoped for by the righteous among the Gentiles. "Wherefore God preserves the entire cosmos from anarchy and destruction . . . for the sake of the Christian race who knows itself to be the cause of nature's preservation."[18]

In Legatio pro Christianis, Saint Athenagoras of Athens informs the co-Emperors, Marcus Aurelius and Lucius

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[16] I Apol., 12 PG 6 341C.

[17] St. Justin Martyr, 17 353D. Cf. St. Polycarp of Smyrna, Ad Phil., in The Apostolic Fathers, (vol. I), trans. by K. Lake. London, 1925, XII, 3.

[18] II Apol., 7 PG 6 456A.

Aurelius Commodus, "that Christians are most piously and righteously disposed towards the Empire."[19] They wish nothing but justice from the government, a request which the church "rightly deserves", because it "prays for your rule (pro imperio vestro) in order that from father to son you may most justly receive the rule with increase and addition, all men becoming subject to your imperium."[20] Explaining the Christian attitude towards the Empire to the pagan, Autolycum, Saint Theophilus of Antioch tells him that, although Christians worship God alone, God has commanded that honor be given to the Emperor, the imperial authority bearing the sanction of God and, consequently, rightly expecting that the church obey him and supplicate its God for the Empire.[21]

According to Origen, the Christian deference for the Empire reaches deeper than God's command to obey government. The ecclesiastical writer relates the Empire to the Christian economy:

> "For 'by righteousness rose in his days and abundance of peace' (Ps. lxxxi, 7) began with his birth; God was preparing the nations for his teaching, that they might be under one Roman emperor, so that the unfriendly attitude of the nations to one another, caused by the existence

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[19] Leg. pro Christ., 1 PG 6 892B; and 18, 925B.

[20] St. Athenagoras, Leg. pro Christ., 37 PG 6 972C. Cf. St. Theophilus of Antioch, Ad Autol. III, 27 PG 6 1161B.

[21] St. Theophilus of Antioch, I, 2 1041A.

> of a large number of kingdoms, might not make it more difficult for Jesus' apostles to do what he commanded when he said, 'God and teach all nations' (Matt. xxviii, 19). It is quite clear that Jesus was born during the reign of Augustus, the one who reduced to uniformity, so to speak, the many kingdoms of the earth so that there might be one empire. It would have hindered Jesus' teaching from being spread through the whole world if there had been many kingdoms, not only for the reasons just stated, but because also men in the world everywhere would have been compelled to do military service and to fight in defense of their own land. This used to happen before the time of Augustus and even earlier still when war was necessary . . . . Accordingly, how could this teaching [of the Gospel], which preaches peace and does not allow men to take vengence upon their enemies, have had any success unless the internal situation had everywhere been changed and a milder spirit prevailed at the advent of Jesus?"[22]

It does not follow, however, that Christians are to become servile to the Empire, swearing by the genius of the Emperor, for "the so-called genius of the emperor is a wicked and faithless demon which commits sin with the man to whom it is assigned, or even sins more than he does."[23]

To the allegation of Celsus that Christians ought to serve in the army if they believe in the providential existence of the Empire and the divine origin of the state, Origen replies:

> "Christians do more good to their countries than the rest of mankind,

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[22]Contra Cel. II, 30.

[23]Origen, VIII, 65.

> since they educate the citizen and teach them to be devoted to God, the guardian of their city; and they take those who lived good lives in the most insignificant cities upto a divine and holy city. To them it could be said: You were faithful in a very insignificant city, come also to the great city where 'God stands in the congregation of the gods and judges between gods in the midst' and numbers you even with them, if you no longer 'die like a man' and do not 'fall like one of the princes'."[24]

And when Celsus condemned Christians for not taking public office, Origen answers:

> "But we know of the existence in each city of another sort of country, created by the Logos of God. And we call upon those who are competent to take office, who are sound in doctrine and life, to rule over the churches. We do not accept those who love power. But we put pressure on those who on account of their great humility are reluctant hastily to take upon themselves the common responsibility of the church of God. And those who rule us well are those who have had to be forced to take office, being constrained by the great King who, we are convinced, is the Son of God, the divine Logos. And if those who are chosen are rulers in the church rule well over God's country (I mean the church), or if they rule in accordance with the commands of God, they do not on this account defile any of the appointed civic laws . . . . If Christians avoid these responsibilities, it is not with the motive of shirking the public services of life. But they keep themselves for a more divine and necessary service in the church of God for the sake of the salvation of men. Here it is both necessary and right for them to be leaders and to be concerned

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[24]Origen, Contra Cel. VIII, 74.

> about all men, both those who are within the church, that they may live better every day, and to those who appear to be outside it, that they may become familiar with the sacred words and worship and that, offering a true worship to God in this way and instructing as many as possible, they may become absorbed in the word of God and divine law, and so be united to the supreme God through the Son of God, Wisdom, Truth, Righteousness, who unites to Him everyone who has been persuaded to live according to God's will in all things."[25]

Origen maintains, then, the traditional dichotomy between church and Empire, a position which many Greek Fathers will find increasingly difficult to support when the Empire becomes Christian. But before the fourth century the necessity for that dualism was still vital and the attitudes formulated by Origen still valid.

At the same time, however, questions were being asked about the nature of the state. These inquiries were occasioned by the persecution of the church. The members of the church wanted to know why the church should suffer at the hands of a government for whom they had been nothing but good. How, too, could God require obedience to that which, according to Saint Hippolytus of Rome, was guided

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[25]Origen, Contra Cel., VIII, 75. Contrast the attitude of Tatian who contends that the whole of humanity should be under a single uniform code of laws (Adv. Graec., 28 PG 6 865BC). C. J. Cadoux says his failure to maintain the dualism between the world and the church gives support to the claim that Tatian was "the first herald of the Holy Roman Empire" (The Early Church and the World. Edinburgh, 1955, p. 268). Also, H. M. Gwatkin, Early Christian History to A. D. 313, (vol. I). London, 1909, p. 180.

by the Antichrist?[26] In order to explain the existence of the Empire, he turned to the seventh chapter of the book of Daniel, "the vision of the four kingdoms"--Babylon, the Persians, the Greeks and the Romans. "As Daniel says, 'I considered the beast [Rome] and lo, there were ten horns behind and among which shall come another little horn . . . and he shall set up the kingdom of Judah.' And in saying that 'three horns were plucked up by the roots', he indicates the three kings of Egypt, Libya and Ethiopia, whom this one will slay in the array of war. And when he has conquered all, he will prove himself a terrible and savage tyrant, and will cause tribulation and persecution to the saints, exhalting himself against them. And after him, it remains that 'the stone' shall come from heaven which 'smote the image' and shook it, and subverted the kingdoms and gave the kingdom to the saints of the Most High." This "stone" which "smote the image", says Hippolytus confidently, "is Christ who comes from heaven and brings judgment to the cosmos."[27]

The belief that Rome, like "all the earthly kingdoms",

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[26] Christ. de Antichr., 49 PG 10 768AB.

[27] Frag.: Dan. Comm., 1-3 PG 10 641B-644A. Cf. Barn., IV, 4-5; St. Irenaeus, Contra Haer., V, 25 PG 7 1188C-1192A; and St. Cyril of Jerusalem, Catech. XV, 12 PG 33 885AB. St. Augustine, however, rejects the idea of the four kingdoms, because "there are not ten kings living in the Roman world" and the ten horns of the beast might well signify "the whole number of kings who precede the coming of Christ, as a totality is symbolized by a thousand, or a hundred, or even . . . ." (De Civ. Dei, XX, 23).

would "flourish a little while and straightway wither"[28] was to prove a great comfort to the suffering church, especially that Christ would "overcome" them. Yet, a knowledge of the course of history did not completely answer the question about the necessity for the existence of the state. According to Saint Irenaeus, God required it "since man, falling away from Him, came to such a savage condition that he even considered his kinsmen enemies and lived without fear, whether in upheavel, murder, avarice, so God placed fear on him--for he did not even fear God--subjecting him to the power of men and their laws and thereby making it possible for him to acquire some justice and moderation towards on another. Thus, the Apostle says, 'Not in vain does he bear the sword; for he is the minister of God, an avenger to execute wrath upon the evil doer.'"[29] Later, Saint John Chrysostom will agree that "from human depravity it was necessary to have government."[30] The "preservation of the species" by social order and justice, says Saint Basil, is the reason for the state.[31]

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[28]Clement of Alexandria, Paedagogus, in The Ante-Nicene Fathers, (vol. II), edited by J. Donaldson and A. Roberts. Grand Rapids, 1951, II, 3.

[29]Contra Haer. V, 24 PG 7 1187AB.

[30]Hom. Gen. IV, 2 PG 53 596. Cf. Origen, Ep. ad Rom. IX, 25 PG 14 1227A; St. Maximus the Confessor, Ep. X, PG 91 452A; and St. Augustine, De Civ. Dei, XIX, 15.

[31]Hexaem. VIII, 4 PG 29 173AB. St. Basil adds, too, that he who is placed in "the highest position of power"

Although the state is necessary for the preservation of life, no particular form of government nor any specific ruler may be considered as possessing divine sanction. "What are you saying? That every ruler is elected by God? This is not what Saint Paul said," declares Saint John Chrysostom in his Commentarius in Epistolam ad Romanum. "Nor am I now speaking about individual rulers, but about the idea of government. For that there should be rulers, rule and ruled and that all things should not simply be done in confusion, the people swaying like waves in any direction . . . . Hence, Paul does not say, 'for there is no ruler but from God', but rather it is the fact of government of which he speaks and says, 'there is no power but from God'."[32] In another place, John says that no ruler governs "his fellowservants by any natural authority and, therefore, he often loses the imperium. In a word, things which do not inhere naturally must admit readily to change and transpositon."[33]

The state has a definite purpose within history--within "the economy of God"--which means that rule and ruler depends for their existence and duration wholly upon

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has the right to destroy him who disturbs the order and harmony of society (173B).

[32]Ep. ad Rom. XXIII, 1 PG 60 615.

[33]Hom. de Stat. VII, 2 PG 49 93. This is the common opinion of the earliest Fathers as well. See R. E. Carter, "Saint John Chrysostom's Rhetorical Use of the Socratic Distinction Between Kingship and Tyranny," Traditio, XIV, (1958), 369.

their value to the divine plan. Thus, although the domination of Rome, like all the states of the past arose and ruled by force, the Empire has a designed role to play in history. It is the last of "the four Empires" after which comes that pseudo-Messiah, the Antichrist. Saint John Chrysostom tells us that the Roman Empire exists to "withhold" (katéchein) the Antichrist:

> "What then is it that withholds, that is, hinders him [Antichrist] from being revealed? Some say that it is the grace of the Holy Spirit while others insist that it is the Roman Empire. This is an opinion with which I most concur. Why? Because if Paul meant the Holy Spirit, he would not have spoken obscurely, that is, he would have said that it is the gifts of the Holy Spirit that withhold the Antichrist. Since the gifts have ceased, the latter would have come already. But because Paul spoke concerning the Roman Empire, he naturally scrutinized the matter covertly and darkly. He did not wish to bring upon himself senseless and unnecessary enmity. For if he had said the Roman Empire will fall, he would have been taken immediately for a subverter by the authorities and would also have become hostile to the faithful. Neither did he say that what will transpire will happen quickly, but 'that he may be revealed at the right moment (kairó)'. And Paul says, 'For the mystery of lawlessness is already at work'. He speaks here of Nero, as if he were the type of the Antichrist, for he also wished to be thought a god. So rightly did Paul say, 'the mystery', because it does not work openly . . . . He continues, 'Only one is there that restrains him now, but when the Roman Empire is removed, then, the Antichrist will come; and, likewise, so long as the fear of this Empire endures, no one will prematurely exhalt himself; but when it is destroyed, there will come one who seeks to usurp the government of God and man. Just as the

> kingdoms before were destroyed--the Medes by the Babylonians, the Babylonians by the Persians, the Persians by the Macedonians, and the Macedonians by the Romans--so will the latter be destroyed by the Antichrist and he by Christ . . . . All these things Daniel has told us with the greatest clarity . . . . But why, you will ask, did God permit this? What kind of economy is this? Of what advantage to Christ's return if our race already has perished? Fear not, beloved, but hear the Lord say, 'In them that are perishing', He is made strong who (even if He did not come) would not believe Christ. What then is the advantage? . . . To convict them who do not believe. And in order that they will not say that, since Christ said He was God . . . and those who followed Him proclaimed it, yet we have not believed. This pretext the Antichrist will expose, for when he comes and comes commanding, things unlawful through false wonders, he will stop their mouths. For if you believe not in Christ much more ought you to disbelieve the Antichrist."[34]

Saint John's exegesis of the New Testamental declaration concerning the place of the Roman Empire in the divine economy--the vindication of God in the face of unbelief--was not intended to contribute to the so-called "Christian-Rome ideology", but simply to reaffirm the consolation of Christ.[35] In addition, he was certain that the Constantinian Renovatio--especially after Julian's apostasy--did not inaugurate the millennial kingdom.[36]

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[34]Ep. ad II Thess. IV, 1-2 PG 62 485-487.

[35]See S. Verosta, Johannes Chrysostomus: Staatsphilosoph und Geschichtstheologie, p. 189f.

[36]See G. H. Williams, "Christology and Church-State Relations in the Fourth Century," Church History, XX (Sept., 1951), 3-33.

When Saint John Chrysostom delivered the twenty-third homily on the epistle of Saint Paul to the Romans, the fourth homily on the second epistle to the Thessalonians by the Apostle and the Comparatio et regis et Monarchi, his great political expositions, the Empire had already adopted Christianity as the new principle of stability and reintegration. He did not, however, concern himself as profoundly as many other Fathers with "the Imperial problem". He accepted the Imperium Romanum Christianum as fait accompli. Consequently, he defended the Emperor's right to rule as providential, but demanded, too, that Caesar be devoted to Christ which meant that he govern himself by "self-control" and "temperance" while he commanded others by persuasion, law and for the common good. In matters of religion, Saint John Chrysostom insisted, the Emperor must be subject to the sacerdotium.[37] Moreover, he defined the competence of the imperium as rule of cities and armies in comparison to the power of the sacerdotium and monks over doctrine and the inward man. Chrysostom believed that civil authority was utterly incapable of correcting the social evils of his time, because, like a sick physician, the government cannot cure in others what it cannot cure in itself. As Carter says, the "implication was that the Roman Empire was a tyranny and the Church a true kingdom."[38]

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[37]See Compar. reg. et. Monar. PG 47 388; Ep. ad II Cor. XV, 5 PG 61 509-510.

[38]R. E. Carter, "Saint John Chrysostom's Rhetorical Use of the Socratic Distinction Between Kingship and Tyranny," 369.

Not unlike Chrysostom, Saint Basil the Great looked upon the Christian commonwealth with less than intense pleasure; in fact, he went further than the Patriarch of Constantinople and openly repudiated the union of church and state in the name of Christian eschatology. He was a central figure in the monastic resistance. To be sure, he was desperately concerned with the question of social reconstruction, seeking through monastic communities to rekindle the spirit of religious mutuality in a world which seemed ever more in the hands of moral compromise and political expediency. He naturally opposed the pagan idea of Empire, the Hellenistic monarchy, and also opposed the new status of the Empire as a Christian kingdom, as a vehicle of salvation. The church, not the Empire, was the οἰκουμένη, for ecumenicity is a spiritual concept, an eschatological concept.[39] Thus, Basil would not allow the Christian religion to substitute for the bankrupt culture of Graeco-Roman civilization. The church, he said, is the only "country" for the disciples of Christ. Under the present circumstances, withdrawal from the world is the only means to avoid contamination. The contemporary picture of society proves that it was built on the wrong foundations and any accommodation to it, Saint Basil asserts, seems to lead only to a loss of faith.

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[39] Ps. XLVIII, 1 PG 29 433B; and Ep. LXVI, 2 PG 32 425B. See S. Giet, Les idées et l'action sociales de Saint Basile le Grand. Paris, 1955, p. 166f, and G. Florovsky, "Empire and Desert: Antinomies of Christian History," 146ff.

The separation from the world which Basil advocated did not imply "civil disobedience", particularly not to Christian rulers. All authority is from God[40] and Christians must, whenever possible, "render unto Caesar". The state exists for the common interest and none ought willfully pervert or negate the legitimate ends of society. Again, separation, he said, did not always mean exile in the desert. On the occasion of the feast of the Forty Martyrs of Sebaste, he exhorted his listeners, "There is but one country for the saints. They eagerly exchanged their earthly home for another. What was it? They were cityless or rather became citizens of the oikoumene. Just as each contributed to the common good, they share it equally. This common homeland is their common blessedness. What was borne by all was given to all."[41] Writing to Amphiliochus after his consecration to the See of Inconium, Basil reminds him that he is no longer a Cappadocian, but a Christian bishop and that "all believers in Christ are one people; all peoples were called by God from many regions to be one in the church; and so our former country and rejoices at the economy of the Lord . . . ."[42]

Not only homeland but the ordinary life must be rejected. Saint Basil did not despise marriage and children or the routine of the home, but these imply anxieties

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[40] Ps. XXXII, 9 PG 29 344C.

[41] Hom. XIX, in quad. Martyr., 2 PG 31 509B.

[42] Ep. CLXI, 1 PG 32 629B.

which must prove a hindrance to complete disengagement from the world. That life brings a "thousand worldly cares" which makes it enormously difficult to gain "detachment of the soul from the sympathies of the body" and certainly inhibits our becoming "cityless, homeless, vagabond, asocial, without property . . . ."[43] His severity, his uncompromising demand for unconditional fidelity to Christ, then, was based on his belief that the world, especially now that it had entered the church, had become a horrendous threat to the salvation of God's People. Their perfection was being limited by the new situation of the church; therefore, Basil urged withdrawal in order that by this action a new society could be created and "counterbalance the disruptive forces of the age."[44] Consequently, Basil declared that monks alone proved to be "the true and authentic Christians".[45] Not that they alone could be, but since they had alone repudiated the "world" and its institutions and formed a permanent resistence column, they alone may be said to have realized their membership in the church.

Saint Basil's attitude, moreover, was not, as we have already said, simply a question of personal salvation, nor even public morality, but penetrated to the very depths

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[43] Ep. II, 2 PG 32 225B.

[44] G. Florovsky, "Desert and Empire: Antinomies of Christian History," p. 148.

[45] Reg. fus. Tract. XXXV, 3 PG 31 1008A.

of the Christian vision of history. The entire monastic movement was a reaffirmation of that eschatological vision, but it was only one response to "the Imperial problem", a response which was not nor could be the universal answer. That "problem" was being worked out at another level, at the "theological" level, a level which necessarily involved the church "in the world" as well as its members who sought the solution "in the desert", "outside the gates". The immediate occasion for that resolution of the "problem", the crisis in the life of the church which brought vividly into question the Christian economy, was the Arian controversy. The Arians had not merely subordinated the Son to the Father, they had not simply reduced the Logos of God to a creature and rejected the Niceo-Constantinoplean symbol and the authority of an ecumenical council, but they had related their heresy directly to "the Imperial problem".

In fact, it was the Arian, Eusebius of Caesarea, who "formulated the theory of the Christian Empire."[46] Not unlike Origen, Eusebius placed the Empire within "the economy of God," but not in the same way.[47] Using the coincidence of the triumph of Augustus and the birth of Christ, he argues that "the two roots of blessing, the Roman Empire and the doctrine of Christian piety, spring up

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[46]N. Baynes, "The Byzantine State," in Byzantine Studies and Other Essays. London, 1955, 44-66.

[47]F. E. Cranz, "Kingdom and Polity in Eusebius of Caesarea," 48.

together for the benefit of mankind."[48] But providence delayed their union until the accession of God's "good and faithful servant", Constantine, who was rewarded with victory "to such a degree that he alone of all the rulers pursued a continual course of conquest, unsubdued and invincible", a ruler greater than Cyrus or Alexander, "who perished ignominiously because of his greed and brutality."[49] It was the great Constantine who covered the world with the shadow of the Cross. He received the Empire from the Logos of God, "receiving as it were, a transcript of the Divine sovereignty," directing "the administration of the world's affairs" in "imitation of God Himself." In fact, "our emperor" acts as the interpreter of the Logos "seeking to recall the whole human race to the knowledge of God; proclaiming clearly in the ears of all, and declaring with powerful voice the laws of truth and godliness to all who dwell on the earth." "Our emperor" emulates "his Divine example" by "the Divine philanthropy of his own imperial acts."[50]

In other terms, the kingdom of Constantine corresponds to the kingdom of God, for the Empire is framed "according to the pattern of that divine original, feeling

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[48]De Laud. Const., Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, (vol. I), edited by P. Schaff and H. Wace. Grand Rapids, 1955, XVI, 5.

[49]Vita Const., Nicene Post-Nicene Fathers, (vol. I), I, 6-7.

[50]De Laud. Const. I, 1-6.

strength in its conformity to the monarchy of God."[51] In addition, since the Emperor is the human analogy of God, he is the single fountain of authority on earth even as there is but one authority in heaven. So there can be but one Emperor as there is but one God, "for to assert a plurality of gods is plainly to deny the being of God . . . . There is one Sovereign; and his Logos and royal Law is one . . . ."[52] In the words of Cochrane, Eusebian "political theology" proclaimed Constantine nothing else less than "a realization of the secular hope of men, the dream of universal and perpetual peace which classical Rome had made her own, but of which the Pax Romana was merely a faint and imperfect anticipation; and it is important to note the grounds of his convictions. These lie in the fact that Christianity provides the basis, hitherto lacking, for human solidarity. With something less than justice to the syncretistic movements of the Hellenistic and Graeco-Roman world, Eusebius ascribes the persistence of competition among peoples to their belief in the existence of national and local deities . . . . But, through the revelation in Christ of the one true God . . . the many deities of paganism are overthrown and the supremacy of Jehovah is proclaimed to all, both rude and civilized, to the ends of the habitable earth."[53]

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[51] De Laud. Const. III, 5.

[52] De Laud. Const. III, 6.

[53] Christianity and Classical Culture, p. 185.

Cochrane is certainly correct, but he does not carry his evaluation far enough; he does not relate his astute observation to the christological source of Eusebian ideology, that is, to the Origenistic tradition which had, if not by intent, at least by its results, fostered a revival of paganism.[54] Prestige tells us that Arius (Eusebius' master), following Origen, regarded Christ as a demi-god and thereby reintroduced Hellenism into Christianity, that is, that mentality which seeks to discover "the mystery of the universe in scientific unity; not, like the Hebrews, in a heart beat, but in a passionless and possibly souless monad to be reached by stripping off the affections and reducing all variety to uniformity."[55]

In his superb Der Monotheismus als politisches Problem: Ein Beitrag zur Geshichte der politischen Theologie im Imperium Romanum (Leipzig, 1935), Erik Peterson traces the Eusebian ideology to the principles to the Aristotelan tradition, specifically to two representative quotations: Homer's remark, ouk agathon polykoirnie, eis koirantos estō (in Aristotle's Metaphysics XII, 10 107a) which Alexander of Aphrodisias transposed to read, eis koiranos, mia archē eis theos esti.[56] Together they read,

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[54]G. L. Prestige, Fathers and Heretics. London, 1948, chapter IV, his excellent essay on "Athanasius: or the Unity of God," pp. 67-93.

[55]Prestige, p. 79.

[56]Peterson, p. 101.

"The rule of man is not good, let there be one ruler; therefore, one lord, one source, one god." This is the argument for one world-ruler: if there is an ultimate source of power in heaven, there must be a single source of power on earth. Although one may recognize many subordinate deities or, in political terms, many subordinate or client states, there can be only one supreme lord of earth even as there is one unique ruler of heaven. This is the meaning of the phrase, "Monarch is not one who is alone, but rules alone."[57] Now, when the Arians applied this politico-theological idea to the Christian Roman Empire, they contended that absolute monotheism implied that there could be one Empire on earth even as there was but one kingdom of heaven. The Arians could no more admit the divinity of Christ than they were willing to concede there was more than one ruling force on earth, that is, more than one of equal dominion. In other words, they taught: one God, one Empire, one Emperor, one church, one faith--ecumenical peace.[58]

The orthodox or Nicene Fathers, Greek and Latin, saw immediately the implications of the Eusebian-Arian ideology. This heresy had reached into the past to place at its side the most prestigious names of Christian and pagan antiquity along with Virgilian faith in the Empire,

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[57]Peterson, p. 128.

[58]As Peterson says, "Die drei Begriffe, Imperium Romanum, Friede und Monotheismus sind also aufloeslich miteinander verknuepft" (p. 81).

the Hebrew concept of God and various texts from the Scriptures, to fortify its position. Thus, the Nicenes found themselves not only defending the sacerdotium against the imperium (in particular, the symbol of Nicea), but the entire "economy of salvation" was at stake. At one level of discourse, this meant a conflict in terms of the Christian revelatio and the classical ratio; and, at another level, Arianism challenged the christology of the church. In the language of Professor Williams, "two christologies gave rise to, or are at least associated with, two main views of the Empire and the relationship of the Church to it . . . ."[59] This controversy--and the christological debates in the seventh and eighth centuries--will define the Christian conception of history for the Greek Church to the present day.

The two christologies were sharply divided on the word, homoousios, or as the Nicene symbol says, homoousios tō patri, "equal to the Father"; but the Arians wanted to designate the Logos, homoiousios tō patri, "like the Father". In other words, the Nicenes asserted the equality of the sacerdotium and imperium, because they had asserted the equality of the Father and the Son while the Arians, subordinating the Logos to the Father, at the same time, subordinated the sacerdotium to the imperium.[60] Again,

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[59]Williams, p. 9.

[60]Williams, p. 28f; and Peterson says that Arianism is "ein politische Forderung, ein Stueck der Reichpolitik" (p. 95).

if the Emperor was the analogy of the Father and the sacerdotal priesthood was compared to the created Logos, then, not only was pagan Caesaropapism revived, but the entire Christian economy, as it was traditionally conceived, was radically altered, for then salvation is not the task of the church, he ecclesia, but the Empire with the former simply the instrument of the latter. Even more, if the Emperor is the head of the Empire, the church and the world, as the type of God the Father; if he is caput imperii, caput ecclesia, caput mundi, then, the Roman Empire is in fact the kingdom of God; that is, the Arians had revived the idea of aeterna Roma which meant, too, at the most profound level of discourse, the subordination of revelatio to ratio, since Christ is not God and the church is not the deifying agent of God. Moreover, God has not entered time and reason is still the principal arbiter of reality. That existential problem, that intellectual dilemma which the classical scientia could not resolve--which, indeed, traditional christology had given the ultimate solution--now returned.[61]

Eusebius and the Arians, in other words, were unable to make either the Incarnation or the Crucifixion the center of their "economy". They were philosophically unprepared to construe history as the primary vehicle of

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[61]See Williams, p. 12; and Cochrane, p. 42; and G. Ladner, "Origen and the Significance of the Iconoclastic Controversy," Medieval Studies, II (1940), p. 15f.

eternal truth. History was for them rather a symbol of eternity. Hence, any discussion about the church as "the new age", "the eschatological community" was inconceivable; and, too, the church could be no more than a human institution albeit with divine purposes. The Arian return to Hellenism, then, was eminently manifest. Its christology tacitly confessed that, as a creature in time, the Logos was theoretically subject to change, without substantial divinity, that is, the Logos "was the typical 'intermediate being' of Neoplatonic theology, neither 'very God' nor 'very man', but through the Spirit which in turn he was believed to engender, a 'link' between the two".[62] Arianism, consequently, denied to the church its deifying powers, for how could man become God, if God had not become man? How could man share in the nature of God? How could the Eucharist redeem? How is baptism the initiation into "the new age"? In a word, Arian christology was the unmitigated devestation of the οἰκονομία θεοῦ and man was yet the slave of time.

The rejoinder of the Greek Fathers to "the Rome ideology" included philosophical concepts which could express the orthodox christology upon which the Nicenes took their stand. For example, in the dispute over the proper reverence owed the statue or image, εἰκών, of the Emperor, the equality of the Father and the Son was demonstrated

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[62]C. N. Cochrane, p. 233.

by the fact that the reverence payed the image of the Emperor passed necessarily to the Emperor himself. In the words of Saint Athanasius, "for in the image is the idea and form (to eidos kai he morphe) of that which is in that image. The likeness of the Emperor in the image is unalterable; therefore, the one who looks at the image sees the Emperor in it; and he who sees the Emperor recognizes that it is he who is in the image . . . . Accordingly, he who reverences the image reverences the Emperor which it represents. Since the Son is the Image of the Father (Heb. i, 3), it must be understood that the divinity and property of the Father is the existence of the Son."[63] Philosophical argument was employed, but it was not crucial; it was employed in the service of the church or, as in the case of Athanasius' statement, the Holy Scriptures.

Although this matter of the union of church and empire was worked out at various levels,[64] the Greek Fathers accepted the Christian Commonwealth only in terms

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[63]St. Athanasius, Contra Ar. III, 5 PG 25 332B. See St. Basil, De Spirit. Sanct., 45 PG 32 149C; St. Cyril of Jerusalem, Catech. XII, 5 PG 33 732A; St. Gregory of Nyssa, De Hom. Opif., 4 PG 44 136C; St. Gregory Nazianzus, Ora. IV, 96 PG 35 629B; and St. John of Damascus, De Imag. III, 2 PG 94 1405C.

[64]For example, on Arianism and epistemology, see St. John Chrysostom's De Incomprehensibili Dei and St. Gregory of Nyssa's Contra Eunomi Secundum Orationem. By insisting upon the incomprehensibility of God, the Fathers undercut the Arian analogy between Him and the Emperor.

of the two natures of Christ.[65] He is true man and true God. Applied to the relationship between the church and the Empire, the former represents His divinity and the latter His humanity, two functions of the same organism. But since the divinity of Christ was superior to His humanity, moral and spiritual primacy belonged to the sacerdotium and the earthly needs of the organism were the responsibility of the imperium. Consequently, the Nicenes did everything to personalize, historicize and biblicize royal authority, contriving "to hold the emperor under specifically Christian judgment".[66] In part, this explains the vascillating addresses and replies to him. Sometimes he is sacratissimus, sanctissimus, pietas, beatissimus, invictus, maximus, nobilissimus, dominus, etc.; but often he is antichristus, christomachia, profanus, etc.; that is, when he is orthodox, the Emperor is the one, when heretical, the other.[67]

The ultimate concern of the Fathers was not the

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[65]See the discussion of this principle in the article by A. Bogolepov, "The Church in Byzantium and in Democratic Countries", St. Vladimir's Seminary Quarterly, I, 2 (1957), 8-17.

[66]G. H. Williams, "Christology and Church-State Relations in the Fourth Century", Church History, II (Dec. 1951), 16.

[67]K. M. Setton cautions about the rhetoric of the Greek Fathers: "There was abundant flattery of the Emperors among ecclesiastics in the West as well as the East . . . . Western defiance and Eastern servility as characteristic of episcopal attitude towards the Emperor, in the fourth century, at any rate, are rhetorical unrealities" (Christian Attitude Towards the Emperor in the Fourth. New York, 1941, p. 216).

union of the church and the Empire, but the value of the Empire to the church. Thus, the Emperor who was heretical obviously hindered the mission of the church while the Emperor who was orthodox was appreciated for the advantage he gave the church in the accomplishment of that mission. Because his role was subservient to that mission, his authority could not be what it had been with his pagan predecessors. The Emperor Gratian (367-383) recognized this fact when he discarded the title pontifex maximus. In addition, he was held "under specifically Christian judgment", because he was a member of the church and must likewise be saved.[68] He must not meddle in the affairs of the sacerdotium. "For if a judgment has been passed by bishops of what concern is that of the Emperor? . . . . When was such a thing heard before, even from the beginning of the world? When did the judgment of the church receive its validity from the Emperor? There have been many councils held hitherto and many judgments passed by the church, but the Fathers never sought the consent of the Emperor, nor did the Emperor busy himself with the affairs of the church."[69]

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[68]St. Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eun. I, PG 45 293A.

[69]St. Athanasius, Histo. Arian., 52 PG 25 756C. Cf. St. John Chrysostom, De Stat. ad Pop. III, 2 PG 49 50; St. Maximus the Confessor, Rel. Mot., 4 PG 90 117B; St. John of Damascus, De Imag. II, 12 PG 94 1296C. On the canonical restrictions of imperial authority, see The Rudder: Of the Metaphorical Ship of the One Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church of the Orthodox Christians or All the Sacred and Divine Canons, trans. by D. Cummings. Chicago, 1957, pp. 142-145, especially Quinisext, canon LXIX.

The power of the Emperor was limited to the "humanity" of the Commonwealth. A confusion of his authority and ecclesiastical authority was not possible any more than a confusion between the divine and human in Christ. The unity of the two natures which tolerated no fusion or change in their relationship was not defined until the council of Chalcedon, but this council only formulated what was implicit in the christology of the church from the beginning. The "Imperial problem" had lost its intensity with the defeat of Arianism and the accession of Theodosius the Great (379-395), but the subsequent christological heresies of the fourth and fifth centuries perpetuated "the Imperial problem". The Nestorians, the followers of Nestorius, Patriarch of Constantinople, utterly severed the human and divine natures of Christ; and the Monophysites, followers of Dioscorus, Patriarch of Alexandria, confessed but a single (divine) nature in Christ after His Incarnation. The implications for the spectrum of Christian doctrine and "political theology" were as enormous as the Arian heresy. Thus, Nestorianism separated absolutely _imperium_ and _sacerdotium_, the church and the Empire--_a fortiori_, time and eternity--whereas Monophysticism amalgamated them and, by strict logic, the imperial authority absorbing the sacerdotal order, which could lead either to Caesaropapism or Papocaesarism.[70] In soteriological

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[70]The key to all the questions concerning church-state relationship, Bogolepov asserts, lies in the doctrine of "symphony", promulgated by Justinian. The "dogmatical" justification of "symphony"--the equality of _sacerdotium_ and

terms, Nestorianism negated any possibility of deification, for it is only "our unity with Christ that saved man";[71] and Monophysticism destroyed the humanity of the church, leading ultimately to pantheism. These heresies, therefore, reduced history either to spiritualism or materialism.

After Chalcedon two more heresies--Monotheletism and Iconoclasm--appear to challenge the church and required further exposition of Christian doctrine. Monotheletism, in order to safeguard the sinless human will of Christ and to insure against any conflict between the human and divine in Christ, declared that He possessed but one will, mono-thelesis. This heresy, akin to Monophysticism, abolished the human dimension of the church, because it denied to Christ, to the church, to its members, a human will, free to obey, free to disobey God, and to receive praise or blame for the act of choice. This opposition to Chalcedon meant the abrogation to Christian ethics and axiology. As Saint John of Damascus will point out: virtue issues from freedom and freedom from rationality.[72] Manifestly, monotheletism threatened to strike freedom from history. According to Saint John, this heresy denied that Christ assumed the human will, having only a divine will, thus, "He either condemned His own workmanship

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imperium "is found in the Chalcedonian dogma of the unity of the Divine and human nature in Christ" (p. 8).

[71]St. Cyril of Alexandria, Adv. Nest. 4 PG 76 193.

[72]De Fid. Orth. III, 14 PG 94 1033B-1045B, the entire chapter, De Domini nostri Jesu Christi duplici voluntate arbitriique libertate.

as not good, or begrudged us the comfort it brought, and, consequently, deprived us of the full benefit of freedom, and showed that He was Himself subject to passion since He was not willing or not able to devise our salvation perfectly."[73]

Behind the heresy of Monotheletism, Saint Maximus the Confessor, its great opponent, saw the mighty spectre of Greek philosophy. Monotheletism renewed the old "political theology" with its belief in a single, pervasive, descending power, the power of the caesaro-papistic Emperor. Even more horrendous was the danger to the Christian economy, for if there was but a single will in Christ, the divine will, then, the order of spirit and the order of matter in the cosmos were either utterly disparate or utterly confused, that is, either history was a passive receptacle of the divine will and/or history was completely overwhelmed by it. Thus, Saint Maximus insisted that in Christ there were two wills, dyo-theletism, even as there were two natures in Him, each maintaining their integrity despite the union. In other words, the cosmos--which is the image of the church--shares in two worlds.[74] Matter and spirit, the seen and the unseen, are not only connected, but "phenomena leads to what is not phenomena."[75] Monotheletism was eventually condemned by

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[73]St. John of Damascus, 1045B.

[74]Mystag., 3 PG 91 672A; 8, 688CD.

[75]horāta dià tōn phainoménōn tà mḕ phainómena (2, 669C).

the sixth ecumenical council (691) less than thirty years after the death of Maximus.

Monotheletism, as a major christological issue, was gone in the eighth century, but the spirit which gave it birth, the spirit of Hellenism, of rationalism, retained its vitality. This spirit occasioned the heresy of Iconoclasm. Customarily taken as "a semitic objection" to the "hellenistic paganization" of Christianity,[76] Iconoclasm was nothing else but Greek rationalism. The principal source of Iconoclastic authority was the letter of Eusebius of Caesarea, an Origenist, to Augusta, sister of Constantine the Great,[77] and a few verses purported to be from Saint Epiphanius--more curious since he was a deadly enemy of Origen, that is, hellenized Christianity.[78]

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[76]"It has behind it, not the explicit doctrines of a theological school," says Christopher Dawson about Iconoclasm, "but the vague and formless spirit of an oriental sectarianism which rejected the whole system of Hellenic dogma" (The Making of Europe. New York, 1956, pp. 154-155); and George Every, "The Iconolastic schisms of 730-86 and 815-43 were not the schisms between East and West, but between an Asiatic party at Constantinople and the Greek and Latin party in Italy and Rome" (The Byzantine Patriarchate: 451-1204. London, 1946, p. 105). Dawson and Every are both in error. Iconodulism was a refutation of Hellenism, or more precisely, "an indirect refutation of Origenism, a new act in the story of the 'Origenistic controversies'" (G. Florovsky, "Origen, Eusebius and the Iconoclastic Controversy," 87); Cf. G. Ladner, "Origen and Significance of the Iconoclastic Controversy," 13-20' and St. Necophorus, Antir. tres. adv. Const. Coryph., PG 100 206-534.

[77]Ep. ad Aug. PG 20 1549-1549.

[78]Panarium, PG 42.

The letter of Eusebius is palpably composed in an Origenist idiom. In it Eusebius tells Augusta that the icon is pagan, that it is unworthy of the divinity to be depicted in the fashion of beasts.[79] That is, it is unworthy for God to be rendered in a "perishable frame" which could never be taken as the "true image".[80] The attitude of Eusebius (and Origen) was clearly that the historical was transitory and accidental, even the Incarnation being regarded as only a moment in the continuous story of divine theophanies. History had no unique meaning for them, it was allegory, a mirror of the "real world". The "main issue" in the Iconoclastic controversy, Father Florovsky writes, "is between symbolism and history, between the Christianization of Hellenism and the hellenization of Christianity."[81]

Father Alexander Schmemann puts the argument in christological terms:

> "The icon is also a fruit of this 'making new' of art, and its appearance in the Church is connected, of course, with the unveiling in the Church's consciousness of the meaning of the Godmanhood: the fullness of the Godhead which dwells in Christ corporeally. No one has seen God, but the Man Christ reveals Him in full. In Him God becomes visible. But this means that He also becomes portrayable.

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[79]Eusebius of Caesarea, 1548B.

[80]Eusebius of Caesarea, 1548B.

[81]"Origen, Eusebius and the Iconoclastic Controversy," 96.

> An image of the man Jesus is an image of God, because Christ is God-Man. But if the world itself and its matter can be sanctified by the grace of the Holy Spirit and, feeding our bodies, also feeds our souls, or, more certainly, the 'whole' man, in God's full conception of him as an incarnate spirit; if the water of Baptism grants us forgiveness of sins; if the bread and wine of the Eucharist gives us in Holy Communion the Body and Blood of Christ, then, a portrayal of Christ--the product of human art--may also be filled with the grace of His presence and power; may become not an 'image', but also a spiritual reality. In the icon there is at once a further revelation of the profundity of the dogma of Chalcedon and the gift of a new dimension in human art, because Christ has given a new dimension to man himself."[82]

Iconodulism, then, is a reaffirmation of traditional christology, the Chalcedonian christology which places in very inadequate terms the "mystery" of the Incarnation, the "mystery" of the divine economy.

Iconoclasm will reappear in the days of Patriarch Photius (ninth century) and sporadically in the eleventh and twelvth centuries, but its meaning had been well understood already by the Greek Fathers in the days of its apogee. With it the church became fully conscious of its vision of history. Along with the other heresies, Iconoclasm became the anvil upon which the faith of the ecclesia was forged, fixed in the shape that we now have it. The occasion for the formulations was the church's

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[82]"Byzantium, Iconoclasm and the Monks," St. Vladimir's Seminary Quarterly, III, 3 (1959), 21.

experience with the state. That experience consistently stressed that nothing contingent can be everlasting, that created being is always in process, becoming, whereas the uncreated is eternal, permanent; but, too, that these two realities are related without confusion. The Incarnation brought these opposites together without hypostasizing the contingent or enervating the absolute. In addition, history possessed two dimensions, the seen and unseen, human volition and divine volition, both united without change. Precisely, in terms of the relationship between the ecclesia and the state, that relationship which illustrated the Christian vision of history, the relationship which proved the moment for the statement of that vision (which necessarily implied the status of the state within it), the Greek Fathers insisted upon a tension between the "present age" and the "age to come"--which is already present in Christ. The "secular state" was necessarily, then, antithetical to the ecclesia, as Satan to God; but when the state became Christian the ends of the state were conceived as always subordinate to the ends of the church, just as the spirit was superior to the flesh and grace to power. Even here, however, none of the Fathers advocated the union of church and state, but when it occurred, they demanded, by virtue of orthodox christology, that the tension of "this age" and "the age to come" be maintained; they demanded that the theandric process of history be made manifest.

CHAPTER VIII

CHRIST AND CULTURE: REASON IN HISTORY

Culture, human intellectual achievement, was not without its place in the mind of the Fathers. They lived during a time in the life of the Church in which they were obliged to define the relationship between the Christian revelation and the classical scientia. Before the fourth century, the church was tenaciously opposed to Graeco-Roman civilization, but when the Empire became Christian, believers had to determine just how deeply their involvement with civilization must be. Moved by the logic of the new circumstances, the Fathers, Greek and Latin, undertook to appraise the worth of human ideas, to test them against the absolute claims of the Christian religion. In other words, they were confronted with the problem of evaluating the fact of salvation vis-a-vis the necessity of human creativity. As serious witnesses to the Christian tradition, they could not offer solutions to that problem which would compromise the faith of the church through innovation or accommodation to "the persuasive words of men".

When trying to ascertain the attitude of the Greek Fathers towards "secular culture", the historian almost

always discovers that the evidence is often ambiguous. When reading the Fathers, he finds that they have a good knowledge of Thucydides, Aeschylus, Hesiod, Aristotle, Plato,[1] etc., while, in the next breath, castigating them for "pernicious sophistry",[2] "cunning",[3] "cult of impiety",[4] and "intellectual anarchy".[5] DuManoir mentions that Saint Cyril of Alexandria had an expert knowledge of the greatest men of antiquity, but accuses heretics of perverting the faith with such attention.[6] The Greek Fathers believed pagan learning to be perishable and vain, but found eternal verities in it. Must we say, then, that the Greek Fathers contradicted themselves? Or are we to accept some kind of "antinomy" in their thinking? May we suspect that their attitude reveals their vision of history?

The Christian appraisal of "secular culture" begins with Saint Paul. In him, too, is found the ambivalence,

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[1]For example, H. Musurillo says that the writings of St. Methodius of Olympus are "a veritable cento of Platonic vocabulary and language", but this Father had little interest in the doctrines of Plato (in his introduction to Symposium, in Ancient Christian Writers (vol. XXVII), Westminister, 1958, p. 17).

[2]Origen, Contra Celsum, III, 39.

[3]St. Cyril of Alexandria, Thesaur., PG 75 148.

[4]St. Gregory of Nazianzus, Ora XXI, 13 PG 35 1096B.

[5]St. John Chrysostom, Comm. Act. Apost. III, 13 PG 60 441. Cf. his Comm. Joan. IX, 1 PG 50 70.

[6]Dogme et Spiritualité chez Saint Cyrille d'Alexandre, pp. 448-453.

for he quotes Epimenedes, Aratus, Menander, Cleasthenes and very often shows familiarity with Stoic teachings. Yet, in the first epistle to the church at Corinth he writes:

> "But Christ did not send me to baptize but to preach the gospel, and not with eloquent wisdom, lest the cross of Christ be emptied of power. For the word of the cross is folly to those who are perishing, but to us who are being saved, it is the power of God. As it is written, 'I will destroy the wisdom of the wise and the cleverness of the clever I will thwart.' Where is the wise man? Where is the scribe? Where is the debater of this age? Has not God made foolish the wisdom of world? For since, in the wisdom of God, the world knew not God through wisdom, it pleased God through the folly of what we preach to save those who believe. For the Jews demand a sign and the Greeks seek wisdom, but we preach Christ crucified, a stumbling-block to the Jews and folly to the Gentiles, but to those who are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ is the power of God and the wisdom of God. For the foolishness of God is wiser than the wisdom of men, and the weakness of God is stronger than men." (I Cor. i, 17-25)

And he tells the Colossians (ii, 8), "See to it that no one makes a prey of you by philosophy and empty deceit, according to human tradition, according to the elemental spirits of the cosmos, and not according to Christ." For Paul the world lay under the power of Satan, in darkness, the mind of unbelievers blinded by "the god of the age". (II Cor. iv, 4). But to the church at Rome, he writes, "I am under obligation to Greeks and barbarians, both to the wise and the foolish." (i, 14).

Throughout the New Testament the same theme recurs: man is a sinner in need of redemption, including his mind and its activities (e.g., John xii, 40; II Pet. iii, 5); but, nevertheless, humanity can come to some truth, Greek culture, paideia, is not entirely useless. Thus, the New Testament writers utilized that culture as a vehicle of expression. For example, the Logia, a collection of the sayings of Jesus, is not unlike that collection made by the disciples of the philosophers; and the epistola is also a Greek literary form; and the form of the Acts of the Apostles imitates the Greek praxeis, the deeds and teachings of wise or famous men related by their followers. Such Greek aphorisms as "the wheel of birth" (James iii, 6) is an expression common in Orphic and Pythagorean doctrine. The immediate successors of the New Testament writers also borrowed Greek literary forms. The Didache used the diatribe or dialexis most popular with the Cynics, Stoics and Epicureans; and it adapted the idea of "the two ways" already found in Hesiod and the Pinax of Cebes. The martyrologia was taken from the Egyptian Greeks. In other words, the primitive church, already developing its own paideia, used pagan learning to advantage. Classicism was the world they were addressing.[7]

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[7]In his interesting book on the subject of the relation between the church of the first three centuries and Graeco-Roman culture, Werner Jaeger writes that "the classical paideia is being superseded by making Christ the

The earliest Christian literature, however, was intended primarily for Christians. Although employing the available pagan literary forms, the admonition to remain separate from the world was constantly taught and generally respected.[8] When the church came into conflict with the Roman state, the former was compelled to formulate its attitudes towards the world not only to the world but for the Christians. The formulation began with the Apologists.[9] With precedent established by earlier Christian literature, Saint Justin Martyr could address the Roman senate in terms he was certain it would understand. Justin could announce that he was, as a Christian, "a true philosopher", for Christianity is the truth, that all truth is in fact Christian truth, since "whatever has

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center of a new culture. The ancient paideia thereby becomes its instrument" (Early Christianity and the Greek Paideia, p. 12). We cannot entirely agree, because, as we hope to show, it is the Greek paideia which the church recognized as its enemy; it always opposed sapientia Dei to the sapientia mundi which was nothing other than the classical paideia. See Eph. vi, 4; Heb. xii, 5; II Tim. iii, 16; St. Clement of Rome, I Ep. ad Cor. LIX, 3; LXII, 3.

[8]E.g., II Cor. vi, 14f; and St. Ignatius of Antioch, Ep. ad Phil. VI, 2.

[9]Harnack believes that the gradual "hellenization of Christianity" commenced with the Apologists. His argument is that in order to win respectability for the church, "sie das Christenthum rational gemacht haben" (Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte, bd. I, p. 498). He means that they referred to Christianity as a philosophy, "weil es einen rationalen Inhalt hat" (Harnack, p. 505). Unfortunately, his Teuebingen "theological liberalism" makes it very difficult for Harnack to conceive Christianity as anything but "pneumatic" and "pistical" and, consequently, that the slightest rationality must corrupt the "purity" of the Christian revelation.

been rightly spoken among all men does really belong to Christians."[10]

Saint Justin's claim is based on his belief that the Logos already declared in the gospel of Saint John "was and is the being in all things."[11] Before His Incarnation, the Logos "which is our Christ" was the principle of intelligibility for the cosmos.[12] Solon, Hesiod, Homer, Aristotle, Plato, all the wise men of all nations, were enlightened by the Logos. Yet, Clement of Alexandria says, "the whole of Hellenic philosophy is not

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[10] II Apol., 13 PG 6 465B. Jaeger says that Justin calls himself "a true philosopher" and Christianity "the true philosophy", because, according to the current conception of the word "philosophy", it meant to hold certain views about the unity of the divine principle in the cosmos. Thus, Hecataeus of Abdera, Menasthenes and Clearchus of Soli, the pupil of Theophrastus, invariably spoke of the Jews as "a philosophical race", just as Philo frequently referred to "the ancestral philosophy of Moses" and Josephus called the Pharisees, Saducees and the Essenes "philosophical schools". By the first century before Christ, Jaeger adds, philosophy in the ancient world had taken on for the Greeks themselves the function of a natural theology, that is, "the first philosophy". Therefore, Justin presented Christianity as a "philosophy" even if a revealed rather than a speculative one (Jaeger, pp. 29-32).

[11] St. Justin Martyr, 10 461B. On the immanence of the Logos (and the Holy Spirit), see St. Athenagoras, Sup. pro Christ., 6 PG 6 904A; St. Athanasius of Alexandria, Ora. de Incarn. Verbi Dei, 8 PG 25 109A; St. Gregory of Nyssa, Ora Catech., 25 PG 45 65D; St. Cyril of Jerusalem, Catech. VI, 6 PG 33 548A; St. Gregory of Nazianzus, Ora. XXXI, 29 PG 36 168A; St. Maximus the Confessor, Ad Thal., 15 PG 90 297B. Cf. Tatian, Adv. Graec., 12 PG 6 832C; and Augustine, Ep. CLXXXVII, 4 PL 33 849f.

[12] St. Justin Martyr, 10 460C. Cf. Col. i, 17; Heb. i, 3; and Origen, Contra Cel. IV, 43.

eatable."[13] It is necessary "to dig out the truth" from the words of the Greeks, hidden "in enigmas, symbols, allegories, metaphors and such like tropes (Prov. i, 6)."[14] It is from the Logos that the Greeks received their "partial truth", like "a ray from the sun".[15] Although they are idolatrous and immoral, the Greeks have not been denied the truth altogether. The Logos had filled all things with "holy powers, creation, salvation, beneficence, lawgiving, prophecy, teaching", and those who have achieved a modicum of morality and searched beyond idolatry have attained some truth.[16] Since the Greek paideia, then, contains truths which derive from the Logos of God, since those truths were given to the Greeks in order to prepare them for "the whole Logos", Clement advocates the use of pagan learning for Christians that they might guard "the faith against assault".[17]

Clement of Alexandria was unafraid to propose the utilization of Greek thought in the construction of the Christian paideia, for, as he said in the Stromata (I, 5), the truth discovered by the Gentiles was prepartio evangelica. His successor at the school of Alexandria, Origen,

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[13] Strom. I, 1.

[14] Clement of Alexandria, V, 4.

[15] Clement of Alexandria, VI, 10.

[16] Clement of Alexandria, Exhortation to the Greeks, trans. by G. W. Butterworth. London, 1960, XI.

[17] Strom. I, 9.

showed even more sympathy for and less fear of the classical paideia. He distinguished pagan and Christian culture, but he tended, like his Gnostic contemporaries and the Scholastics of the Latin Middle Ages, to equate the Christian revelation with a special kind of rational knowledge. Daniélou says in his defense that Origen was not unaware of the dangers of Hellenism and that he always referred to the Christian paideia as "the real paideia", that is to say, that "the real paideia is not the sort of education the world can give."[18] And Origen himself said, "There is a kind of human wisdom which we call worldly, a thing which in God's eyes is folly. There is also the wisdom of God. That is not a worldly wisdom . . . . God gives it through His grace, and it comes to those who fit themselves [spiritually] to receive it . . . ."[19] The fundamental difference between the two paideia, he tells Celsus, is that the one "depends on persuasive language devised by human wisdom" while the other offers as the proof of its validity "the spiritual power of God."[20]

In other terms, the Christian opposition to the Greek paideia lay in its source and, consequently, in its aim. Glanville Downey illustrates this matter through "the famous question of the lawyer Tertullian who had a

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[18]J. Daniélou, Origen, p. 102.

[19]Contra Celsum, VI, 13-14. A good description of Origen's Christian paideia may be found in St. Gregory Thaumatourgos' In Origenem Oratione Panegyricum which will be discussed later.

[20]Origen, VI, 2.

thorough pagan education", but was later converted to Christianity. For him the separation of the church from the world was necessary and it was only natural to ask, "What has Athens to do with Jerusalem? What agreement can there be between the Academy of Plato and the Church?" The issue here, says Downey, "is that he [Tertullian] chose cities to serve as the representatives of the two cultures; he did not, for example, choose for his question Socrates and Christ, as he might have done."[21] The hostility to paganism, then, was the polis, the end of the paideia: the classical polis was designed to form man into the rational man, the man formed by law and justice. According to Plato, the good city is the image of the man ruled by reason, by justice, or the right order of powers and abilities, all dominated by reason.[22] In other words, paideia is the supreme expression of "natural" reason, the polis the perfect secularism, but Christian paideia intends to prepare man for his citizenship in "the heavenly city".[23] The pagan culture contained some truth, to be sure, but its orientation, its aim, was utterly wrong. The "pagan city" belonged to the world and the education which made it possible and created its citizens was also "of the world."[24]

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[21]"From the Pagan City to the Christian City," The Greek Orthodox Theological Review, X, 1 (1964), 125.

[22]See C. M. Bowra, The Greek Experience. New York, 1959, pp. 77-114.

[23]G. Downey, 125. See also A. J. Festugière, Antioche Païenne et Chrétienne. Paris, 1959, pp. 211-240.

[24]The attitude of the church continued throughout

The Greek Fathers were well aware of the aims of pagan education and, unlike Clement and Origen of Alexandria, who allowed their students to read everything without fear,[25] were extremely suspicious of it. Saint Hippolytus of Rome showed uncommon animosity towards the learning of all peoples. After describing the "true doctrine regarding the divine nature", he exclaims in his Philosophumena that the "Greeks and the barbarians, Chaldaeans and Assyrians, Egyptians and Libyans, Indians, Ethiopians, Celts and you Latins, who lead armies, and to all that inhabit Europe, and Asia, and Libya, to you I have become adviser, since I am a disciple of the benevolent Logos . . . . Do not devote yourselves to the fallacies of artificial discourses, nor to the vain promises of plagarizing heretics, but to the venerable simplicity of unassuming truth . . . ."[26] For Hippolytus the purpose of

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its association with the Roman Empire. In the ninth century, for example, St. Photius declared his contempt for "the Greek system" (Ep. VIII, 8 PG 102 633C); and later, in eleventh century, John Italus will lose the chair of philosophy at the University of Constantinople for teaching "Hellenism". He will be condemned under the seventh Heading of the Synodicon, the list of heresies publically abjured by the Eastern Church on the first Sunday of Lent. "Anathema", it reads, "to those who devote themselves to Greek studies, and instead of merely employing them as a part of their education, adopt the foolish doctrines of the ancients and accept them as truth! Anathema to those who firmly believe such doctrines that they unhesitatingly teach them and commend them to others, both secretly and openly" (Quoted in J. M. Hussey, Church and Learning in the Byzantine Empire. London, 1963, p. 95).

[25]St. Gregory Thaumatourgus, In Origen. ora Paneg., 8 PG 10 1076A.

[26]Philos. X, 30 PG 16 3454AB.

any knowledge is simply the attainment of salvation. He does not study "secular culture" in order to enjoy it, but to discover its errors and the manner in which it influenced the heretics. The Philosophumena makes it clear that Hippolytus blamed the learning of the Greeks for heresy.

In his Convivium decem virginum, the de Libero Arbitrio and De resurrectione, Saint Methodius of Olympus was likewise very critical of Greek thought, especially its numerology, astrology and cyclism, and refused to mingle the gospel and philosophy, but he concedes that the Greeks are not completely devoid of truth. "Wherefore those who have come to know Christ truly," he says, "do not remain children, like the Greeks who hid the truth in myth and fiction . . . ."[27] Methodius, like all the Fathers, maintained a firm opposition to the classical paideia. That opposition was not always that Hellenism would compromise the Christian doctrine, however, but they were ever conscious of the eschatological nature of the church: its eternity in time, its becoming the kingdom of God. Nevertheless, the attitude of the Greek Fathers towards the classical paideia was not uniform. The differences are mentioned by Saint Gregory of Nazianzus:

> "Men of intelligence admit that the first advantage we have is culture (paideusin), that is, not only the more noble form of it, that which ignores rhetorical ornamentation and pomp and holds to salvation (including

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[27]Conviv. dec. Virg. VIII, 13-16 PG 18 161A-168C.

> the contemplation which leads to it), but even pagan culture upon which so many Christians spit, as treacherous and dangerous, keeping us far from God. Thus, although it is true that many have studied the heavens and the earth and the air and by wrong apprehension of these been drawn to honor the creation rather than the Creator Himself, it does not follow that we must therefore neglect such things. There is much advantage to gain for our lives and enjoyment while, at the same time, avoiding that danger which, as foolish men do, bring the creation to revolt against the Creator; but rather to come to a knowledge of Him and, as the divine Apostle says, subjecting every thought to Christ; and again, as we know that neither fire, nor food, nor iron, nor any other element, is of itself either most useful or most harmful, except according to the will of him who uses it . . . so from secular literature we have received principles of inquiry and contemplation while rejecting their idolatry, terror and abysmal destruction. Indeed, the study of that literature has aided us in our religion, by discerning in it the difference between what is worse and better, by gaining strength for our doctrine what is weakness in their opinions . . . ."[28]

Gregory distinguishes between Greek and Christian paideia, but what is most noteworthy is that he does not seek to "harmonize" the one with the other. He says "pagan literature" is valuable for the pleasure it gives and for the "principles" it offers for an understanding of the cosmos created by God. Yet, the Theologian is alert to the dangers inherent in a study of "pagan literature".

In Ad Adolescentes de Legendis Gentilium, Saint

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[28] In Laud. Basil. Magn., 11 PG 36 508B-509C.

Basil--who attended the University of Athens with Saint Gregory of Nazianzus--gave the following advice to his audience of monks concerning "worldly study": God has always left some knowledge of Himself everywhere. Thus, it is that even "Moses that illustrious man whose name for wisdom is greatest among all mankind, first trained his mind in the learning of the Egyptians and then proceeded to the contemplation of Him Who Is; and like him, although later, the wise Daniel in Babylonia, initially learned the wisdom of the Chaldaens and then applied himself to the divine teachings." Nevertheless, he tells them, "We, my children, in no way conceive this human life to be an object of concern, nor do we consider anything good at all, or so designate it, if it contributes only to this life."[29] For Basil, then, pagan learning has no value in itself, no value save that it disciplines the mind, prepares it for the reception of a higher knowledge, knowledge which prepares men for another life. Anything he tells his listeners that "contribute to that other life, we must love and pursue with all our strength, but what does not conduce to that end must be ignored as vain."[30]

And Saint Gregory of Nyssa--often viewed as a Christian-Greek philosopher--gives his estimation of Greek culture: "Truly, the foreign culture (he exothen paideusis)

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[29]Ad Adol. Leg. Gent. PG 31 174B.

[30]St. Basil, 174BC. On St. Basil and the Greek paideia, see S. Giet, Les idées et l'action Sociales de Saint Basile le Grand, pp. 217-232.

is unfruitful, always in the anguish of childbirth and never delivered. What, therefore, is the fruit of this extended anguish of philosophy, what is the fruit of this painful labor? Is it that all the products of human sagacity are similar to the foetus which miscarries, like the premature foetus, that is to say, in a state short of the knowledge of God? Indeed, although able to conceive yet it continually aborts in the womb of sterile wisdom."[31] In the same treatise, he says that, although "foreign" learning is "carnal and uncircumcized", the truth it bears is useful if it is rescued from the untruth and "circumcized".[32] It is necessary to transform what is taken, because "the truth of the human arts always seems to attract untruth", for example, the Greek idea of immortality is always related to its idea of transmigration. Also, we take from them "ethics and physical philosophy, geometry, astronomy, practical logic and whatsoever riches "the land of Egypt" offers which are of such a nature as to be demonstrably useful to the mind, fitting to the occasion, and when they are truly necessary to ornament the divine temple of mystery . . . ."[33]

Evidently, the Cappadocians, although cautiously, advocate the utilization of pagan culture. Other Greek

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[31] Vita Moys. PG 44 329B.

[32] St. Gregory of Nyssa, 336D-337B.

[33] St. Gregory of Nyssa, 360C.

Fathers were less congenial to pagan culture. Saint Gregory Nazianzus tells us that Saint Athansius made "a brief study of literature and philosophy so that he might not be utterly unskilled in such matters or that he might not be ignorant of those subjects which he was determined to despise."[34] In the Oratione de Incarnatione Verbi Dei, Saint Athanasius writes: "Concerning Greek wisdom and the great noises of its philosophers, I think no one needs to be persuaded by our word . . . that the wise among them have written so much and convinced so few . . . about immortality and the virtuous life . . . ."[35] And Saint Cyril of Jerusalem simply is not interested in pagan learning except to use it to reach the Greeks who do not accept the Holy Scriptures.[36] Again, Saint John Chrysostom was particularly harsh toward the Greek philosophers. He directs the attention of Christians to the Apostles of Christ, their humility, good works and wisdom and contrasts them to the magicians, seducers, sophists, and rhetors of the Academy and Lyceum, saying, "Where is the pride of Hellas now? Where is the glory of Athens? Where is the inept drivel of her philosophers? . . . Why did Christ not operate in Plato and Pythagoras? There souls were much less 'philosophical' than Saint Peter's. They will always be infants and all their actions will be

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[34]Ora. XXI, 6 PG 35 1088B.

[35]Ora de Incarn. Verbi Dei, 47 PG 25 181A.

[36]Catech. XVIII, 10 PG 33 1028C.

vainglorius rather than instructive . . . ."[37]

In Fons Scientia, Saint John of Damascus not only gives his own opinion, but summarizes the thinking of his patristic predecessors about pagan and Christian knowledge. "Nothing is to be more esteemed than knowledge," he asserts, "for knowledge is the light of the rational soul. The opposite, ignorance, is darkness . . . . By knowledge (gnōsis) I mean the true knowledge of things which are, because being in the object of knowledge. False knowledge, insofar as it is, is the apprehension of that which is not; it is, so to speak, ignorance rather than knowledge." But the mind, he continues, "does not have knowledge and understanding in itself, but has someone to teach it; so let us approach that Teacher Who is Truth and in Whom there is no falsehood. Christ is the subsistent Wisdom and Truth and in Him are all the treasures of knowledge hidden." "And since the divine Apostle says, 'But test all things, hold fast that which is good' (I Thess. v, 21), let us also find something in them (the Gentiles) worthy of carrying away and reap some fruit that will feed our souls . . . . So let us receive only that which serves the Truth, but reject the impiety which exercizes evil tyranny over them. Let us not scorn what is good . . . . On the other hand, although Christian Truth requires no assistance from subtle reasonings, we may definitely use them to refute both those who fight dishonestly

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[37] Comm. Act Apost. IV, 3-4 PG 60 47.

and that which is falsely called knowledge (I Tim. vi, 20). And, so, having invoked Christ as our God, the hypostatic Logos of God by Whom 'every good and perfect gift' (Jas. i, 17) is given, let us make our beginning . . . ."[38]

We observe, then, the various attitudes of the Greek Fathers towards the Greek paideia. The externa sapientia reprobatur is common, but the degree of intimacy with classical education is not. They all repudiate the aim and spirit of the Greeks. Saint Athanasius writes, "We Christians therefore hold the mystery of the Faith not in the wisdom of Greek arguments, but in the power of faith richly supplied by God through Christ Jesus . . . we believe in God, knowing through His economy the care He has for all things. And to show that our Faith is effectual, we are supported by faith in Christ, but those outside the church only by sophistical logomachies."[39] Saint Cyril of Alexandria blames the spirit of Greek philosophy for heresy and, therefore, he reproaches the perverters of the Faith for putting Aristotle before Christ, as they "spew the Aristotelian cunning (téchne) from their mouth and are attracted more by the philosopher's doctrine than by the knowledge of the Holy Scriptures while pompously extoling their professed knowledge of them."[40] And Saint Gregory

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[38]Fons Scien., pt. I (Dialectica), 1 PG 94 529A-532B.

[39]Vita S. Antoni, 78 PG 26 952B.

[40]Thesaurus, PG 75 148A.

Nazianzus says that the Fathers "philosophized dogmatically but not illogically; spiritually, not mischeviously; and in order to know with one and the same mind, to speak openly with the same tongue, for they have but one inspiration and one intellectual life. They were not, like the famished, babbling about details of knowledge and expressing themselves in blundering language . . . while yet in extreme misery and without certitude concerning their own strength which in fact was in decay."[41]

Again and again, the Greek Fathers returned to the same theme: Greek paideia, the classical scientia, is wrong in purpose and orientation, but every idea or principle of that learning is not bad. Its truths are incomplete, approximations, analogies, therefore, useful even out of their pagan context, or better, despite that context, because those truths it possesses are out of their genuine context. The attitude of particular Fathers to that learning varied according to circumstance, but they

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[41] Ora. XXIII, 12 PG 35 1164C-1165C. It is of no little importance to remember that the word "philosophy" as used by the Greek Fathers is not to be confused with the modern understanding. "Chez les Pére de l'Eglise, philosophia, prend une acception nouvelle," Dom Amand observes. "Il signifie principalement ou bien, en doctrine chretienne, le christianisme, ou bien . . . un vie austere et ascetique, un d'effort vers perfection et l'ideal evangelique" (L'Ascese monastique de Saint Basile de Cesaree. Maredsous, 1948, p. 195n). There is no evidence that the Fathers, Greek or Latin, ever associated themselves with any school of pagan philosophy. See L. Duheim, Le Systéme du Monde, (vol. II) p. 408. Those historians who classify the Fathers as "Platonist", "Aristotelian", etc. fail to grasp the fact that the church opposed the Greek paideia not any single proposition, principle or idea of pagan writers.

all took, fundamentally, the same view as Saint Basil the Great when he wrote in Exsultate juste in Domino, "Do you not see the teachings of the nations, this empty philosophy, how subtle and artificial they are concerning the inventions of their opinions, and in certain natural sciences and other so-called esoteric teachings? How all things have been scattered and rendered vain and how the truths of the Gospels alone are enfranchized in the oikoumene."[42] The church was developing its own paideia, its own education unto salvation, and in comparison all classical learning was vanity--it could not morally change men and it could give them no certainty of knowledge or salvation.

Because there was an essential disparity between the Greek and Christian paideia, the attempts of modern scholarship to prove that the Fathers sought to reconcile pagan philosophy and the Christian revelation in the manner of medieval Thomists and Scotists cannot be taken seriously[43]

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[42] Ps. XXXIII, 7 PG 29 341A.

[43] For example, these remarks by Amand about Saint Basil: "Il ne s'agit pas d'un simple revetement extérieur, de cadres ou de 'moules' de pensée. Non, Basile à choise, a voulu choiser des principes ou des doctrines philosophiques des idées platoniciennes, stoïciennes ou néoplatoniciennes en harmonies avec la revelation chrétienne et destinées á éclairer, illustrer, approfondir le message évangelique ou les dogmes de l'"Eglise" (L'Ascèse monastique de Saint Basile de Cesarée, p. 15). Several objections may be made about Amand's insinuations. Firstly, let Clement of Alexandria speak to them: Hellenic philosophy, he says, "does not by its approach make the truth more powerful; but renders powerless the assault of sophistry against it . . . . And the truth which is according to faith is

and we must look to something other than the facts for that scholarships pontifications concerning the relation of the church to the world in "the patristic era". So long as it insists that the Christian economy--a term Western scholars have generally not examined with much perspicacity if at all--is no more than a Christian reconstruction of Graeco-Hebraic ideas, they will never comprehend the Christian attitude towards the world and the impossibility of any kind of reconciliation with it. The Greek Fathers knew only theología and oikonomía--the Christian paideia being an exposition of the latter--united to each other as the humanity and divinity of Christ. This meant, as we have so often said, that the church was irrevocably antithetical to the world even though the church made use of pagan language and ideas in its formulations of the Christian experience. We repeat, also, that the patristic didascalia is not a Christian form of Greek philosophy.[44] Any other position must result in the disfigurement of the Christian Weltanschauung, ignoring both Chalcedonian christology and the eschatological dogma that the church is "the new age".

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necessary for life as bread while the preparatory discipline is like sauce and sweetmeats" (Strom. I, 20); secondly, "revelation", as understood by the Greek Fathers, cannot be harmonized with Greek philosophy; such a synthesis is an eschatological and christological impossibility.

[44]Basile Tatakis seeks to prove in his work on Byzantine philosophy that the history of patristic thought comes to precisely the conclusion we have rejected. See La Philosophie Byzantine. Paris, 1949, p. 2.

Père Gustave Thils and Père Jean Danielou have debated on exactly this matter. Danielou contends that the Christian understanding of history is that Christianity is in history and history is in Christianity while not being identified with any forms of culture in which the church finds itself "incarnated".[45] The forms taken are always structural and transitory and no dress is necessary for the church. Eternal realities are nowhere confused with the particular expressions of them. Thus, if Christ had been born in China instead of Palestine, he would have worn a kimono instead of a Rabbi's shawl. The Christian religion cannot be identified with history, for it escapes both the caducity of civilizations and the historical law of aging.[46] On the other hand, Thils argues that Danielou's interpretation of the church's relationship to its environment, christologically, leads to docetism.[47] He means that if the relation between the church and the civilization in which it is "incarnated" is not organic, not real, but only apparent, then Danielou is espousing the heresy which believes the "body" of Christ was phantasmagorical--dokei, "it seems"--something other than flesh and blood. Docetism is a rejection of the Incarnation, a denial of the authentic union of the very God

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[45]"Christianisme et histoire," Etudes CCLIV, (Sept., 1947), 177.

[46]Danielou, 178.

[47]Théologie des Realities Terrestres, (vol. II), p. 44f.

with very man. Daniélou replies that he is neither pessimistic about history (i.e., by his contention that Christianity is the terminus of history to which all else is peripheral) nor docetist (i.e., because the presence of the church in any culture or civilization is not permanent), since the church, as the anticipation of the age to come, transfigures all that it touches, converts and sanctifies all those things to which it relates on its way towards the telos of history.[48]

Daniélou's position appears to be an attempt to offer a patristic consensus. It is akin, in many respects, to the posture taken by Saint Basil the Great, who, in his evaluation of the conjunction between the church and the Roman Empire, was so highly sceptical of any benefits ensuing from it, so fearful that the church might, as it had been by many, be confounded with human institutions and customs that he became a leader of the monastic resistence.[49] Of course, like all the Fathers, he opposed the pagan idea of Empire, but he also claimed that the church, not the Christian Commonwealth, was the oikoumene.[50] The church alone is messianic, the church alone is "the City" which has God in its midst.[51] In other words,

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[48]Daniélou, 182-183.

[49]See S. Giet, Les idées et l'action Sociales de Saint Basile, p. 166.

[50]Ps. XLVIII, 1, PG 29 433B, Hoí en tē Ekklesía ésin, hoí katoikoûtes tēn oikouménēn.

[51]Basil, like Augustine, considered the church to be

he believed the Constantinian renovatio to have brought the church and the state into a proximity of undesireable proportions. Consequently, the distinction between Hellenism and Christianity was losing its sharpness, making it ever more difficult to choose those elements in the former that in fact would be conducive to salvation.[52]

Nevertheless, Saint Basil, like so many other Greek Fathers, was not afraid to attend pagan schools nor to acquaint himself with the learning of the ancients. As we have seen, he encouraged many Christians to do the same with the single reservation that their knowledge benefit them in their struggle for salvation. In that quest, too, many of the Fathers contributed to the development of a Christian paideia, a Christian culture or system of education. To be sure, this included the learning of the ancients transformed to suit the demands of the Christian religion. The extent to which pagan learning was used by Christians varied and some declined to use it altogether. Those who desired to examine the sky or the sea or the things beneath the earth availed themselves of Greek speculations and observations. The science of the pagans may not have always been correct, but Christians did not expect

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a nation permeating all nations without being equated with any of them. Neither identifies the civitas Dei with any human order. See De Civ. Dei, XIX, 20f.

[52]Fr. John-Baptist Reeves calls Basil's attitude "definitive" for the Greek Church ("Saint Augustine and Humanism", in Saint Augustine: His Age, Life and Thought, New York, 1957, p. 132).

certitude from men. Nor did they enjoy human knowledge in order to enhance the Christian truth, for as, Clement of Alexandria said, "Hellenism does not, by its approach, make the truth more powerful, but only renders powerless the assault upon the truth".[53] Christians wanted to know God through what He had created and what He had done for His creatures and they used every available means to satisfy that desire.

The church began to construct a paideia, culture, very early in its history. Saint Paul had made some suggestions in his advice to Christians about the rearing of children (Eph. v, 4; Col. iii, 21). At the end of the first century, Saint Clement of Rome used the expression, en christō paideia, as if it had some currency.[54] The catechumen system, for the instruction of converts, developed gradually and achieved final form in Rome about 180 A.D. Instruction was undertaken by teachers, didaskáloi, who were appointed by the bishops and "received a special charism" of teaching.[55] In Graeco-Roman times, however, the church established no Christian universities or colleges. The didaskaleîon or centers of "higher theology" appeared in Rome with Saints Justin Martyr and Hippolytus and at Alexandria with Clement and Origen, but these were "schools"

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[53] Strom. I, 20.

[54] I Ep. ad Cor., XI, 8.

[55] H. I. Marrou, A History of Education in Antiquity, trans. by G. Lamb. New York, 1956, p. 315.

attached to pagan universities. A Christian "system of culture" was evolving, but until the time of Justinian the Greek Fathers "made no attempt to turn it into a real system of education. They themselves had been brought up in classical schools", says Marrou, "they knew all about their dangers and deficiencies, and they found it natural to make the best of them."[56]

In the third century, the Christian didaskaleia at the universities of Alexandria and Antioch were centers of Christian intellectual ferment in the East. "The school of Alexandria is the oldest centre of sacred science in the history of Christianity", wrotes Johannes Quasten.[57] The first known rector of this school was Pantaenus, a convert to Christianity from Stoicism. According to Eusebius, Pantaenus was appointed to head the "school of sacred learning established there from ancient times, which has continued down to our times, and which we have understood was held by men able in eloquence, and the study of divine things".[58] To Pantaenus came many Christians, including his most famous student, Titus Flavius Clement (c. 150-c. 212). Of his teacher, Clement remarked, "When

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[56]Marrou, p. 329.

[57]Patrology (vol. II), p. 2.

[58]Eccl. Hist., V, 10. The Christian school at Alexandria, says Quasten, was originally "a school for catechumens" (loc. cit.). Whether that school began with Pantaenus "is impossible to determine" (W. Walker, A History of the Christian Church. New York, 1952, p. 77).

I came upon this last teacher . . . having tracked him out concealed in Egypt, I found rest. He, the true, the Sicilian bee gathering the spoil of the flowers of prophetic and apostolic meadow, engendered in the souls of his hearers a deathless element of knowledge",[59]

The most important teacher at Alexandria, the most reknowned in the ante-Nicene church, was neither Pantaenus nor Clement, but Origen (c. 185-c. 254), martyred during the persecutions of the Emperor Decius. Like them, however, Origen had been "trained" in "the study of the Holy Scriptures" by his father who, "carefully stored his mind" with the knowledge "of the liberal sciences".[60] Origen offered his lectures in a private didaskaleion, like the one maintained by Saint Justin Martyr at Rome. He taught all manner of subjects at Alexandria and later at Caesarea, but at the beginning of his main theological work, Origen states, "That alone is to be accepted as truth which differs in no respect from ecclesiastical and apostolic tradition".[61] With this principle he admonished his pupils--some of them now recognized as Fathers of the church--and instructed them with his faith unconcealed before them.

According to his most devoted pupil, Saint Gregory the Wonderworker, Origen "set his heart ablaze with love

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[59]Strom. I, 11.

[60]Eusebius, Eccl. Hist., VI, 2.

[61]De Princi., praef. 2.

for the beloved Word". From him, also, Gregory learned the value of rhetoric as well as "physics, holy mathematics, incontrovertible geometry, astronomy that set a ladder to the things of heaven".[62] These "branches of scientific knowledge" prepared him for the study of philosophy. When teaching Christians, Origen insisted that all systems of philosophy be given an equal hearing. "He told us to approach philosophy by examining all the extant writings of the ancient philosophers and poets . . . and not to reject any . . . save the works of the atheists (i.e., the Epicureans) . . . who deny the existence of Providence . . . ."[63] They must read everything, but give allegiance to none. To pick out "what was true and useful" while "what was erroneous he rejected". No matter if the philosopher were "universally acclaimed as perfect in wisdom, cleave to God and His prophets alone."[64]

With regard to scriptural exegesis, Origen was famous for his allegorism. Allegory was first used by the Greeks in the interpretation of their ancient mythology. Plato and the Stoics and many Hellenized Jews, such as Philo, employed allegory to reduce narratives and stories to mere figures for spiritual and moral ideas. The literal sense was merely a covering beneath which was hidden the truth. Thus, too, whatever appeared to Philo to be

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[62] Ora. Paneg., 8 PG 10 1077BC.

[63] St. Gregory Thaumatourgos, 13 1088A.

[64] St. Gregory Thaumatourgos, 10 1092C-1093B.

"unworthy of God' in the Old Testament, he rendered it palatable to reason. There is no doubt that Origen used "the allegorical method", but his manner differed from Philo's.[65] The former claimed to extract from the Old Testament only those truths in accord with the Christian tradition.

Origen asserted that he never resorted "to the wisdom of men", but that he discovered the meaning of Scriptures "from the Scriptures themselves". Following the advice of Solomon, he portrayed them "in a threefold manner": the "fleshly" or literal sense (for the simple); the "moral" (for the mature) and the "mystical" (for Christian gnostics). These corresponded to the three parts of man, the body, soul and spirit. "For as man consists of body, soul and spirit, so in the same way does Scripture which has been arranged to be given for the salvation of men".[66] Unlike Philo, then, Origen does not ignore the literal or historical sense. In an important passage, Origen not only affirms the literal sense but relates it to the non-literal senses:

> "But if in every part of Scripture the superhuman element of thought does not seem present itself to the uninstructed, that is not at all strange; for with respect to the works of providence which embraces the whole world, some things show with the utmost clearness that they

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[65] Daniélou concedes that Origen "had first-hand knowledge of Philo's works", but it is another question whether he imitated the Jews (Origen, p. 178).

[66] De Princ., 4, 1.

> are the works of Providence, while others are concealed as to appear to furnish ground for unbelief with respect to God who orders all things with unspeakable skill and power . . . . But the doctrine of Providence is not weakened on account of those things which are not understood in the eyes of those who have honestly accepted it, so neither is the divinity of Scripture, which extends to the whole of it, or lost on account of the inability of our weakness to discover the hidden splendor of the doctrine which are veiled in common and unattractive phraseology. For we have the treasure in earthen vessels, that the excellence of the power of God may shine forth and that it may not be deemed to proceed from us who are human beings."[67]

Even as Providence permeats the visible order of things, so the literal is permeated by the non-literal sense. The one leads to the other, even if not everyone is capable of apprehending the unity of the Scriptures--or, indeed, the presence of God in the cosmos.

Although Origen cannot be called a "father of the church", nevertheless, he did attempt to build a Christian paideia or, at least, contribute to the formation of a Christian culture. No better proof can be found than in his treatment of the Scriptures[68] and the curriculum of

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[67] De Princ., IV, 4.

[68] E. R. Redpenning makes this observation about Origen's "christology" of Scriptures: "Und wie der Logos, ein und derselbe in Worte und in menchlicher Natur ward, so hat auch die heilige Schrift neben dem auessern Wortsinne einen innern Sinn, und muss, fast ueberall, allegorisch gedeutend werden. Diese laesst sich schon vorlaeufig aus der Nothwendikeit die Geheimlehre unter der Huelle des Buchstabens zu vergebens, aus der Unmoeglichkeit das

his *didaskaleion* described by Saint Gregory Thaumatourgos. Caesarea, also, where he taught during his exile from Egypt (232), was heavy laden with his works and formed the basis of a library which the presbyter, Pamphilus, enlarged into a center of scholarship. Origen instructed here, as he had in Alexandria, that education in literature and science was but a preparation for philosophy and philosophy the preparation for the study of the Scriptures and the contemplation of divine things. This method suggests an ascent from things human to things divine, from history to eternity, from *oikonomía* to *theología*.[69]

To contemplate spiritual things, Origen believed, it was necessary to live a life of austerity and self-denial without which it was impossible to find them.[70] Saint Gregory of Nazianzus, his famous pupil, declared that although one might approach "rhetoric" and "dialectics" without "moral purity", ascetic discipline was required for the knowledge of "divine things". One might "attack the silence of Pythagoras" or "the ideas of Plato" or "philosophize about matter" and other historical and philosophical matters without great spirituality, but not

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unausprechliche klar Worte zu fassen, wie aus dem Unstande Schleissen, das auch die besten philosophen nicht umhin konnten eben dieser Vortragweise sich zu Bediene, wobei sie die Schrift nachahmten" (*Origenes: Eines Darstellung seines Lebens und Seiner Lehre* (vol. I), Bonn, 1841, p. 137).

[69]J. Daniélou, *Origen*, p. 153.

[70]Eusebius of Caesarea, *Hist. Eccl.*, VI, 3.

everyone is permitted to "philosophize about God . . . because it is permitted only to those who have been examined, and are past masters in meditation, and who have been previously purified. For the impure to touch the pure is, we may safely say, not safe, just as it is unsafe to fix weak eyes upon the rays of the sun".[71] The Christian may study what he wishes, but when he seeks the knowledge of "holy things", he must be holy. Excellence in learning is not sufficient.[72]

For the Christian school at Alexandria (and Caesarea), secular learning was a prologue to Christian knowledge, for its study and defense. Some Christians, however, prefered not to include within the scope of the Christian paideia all that the "Alexandrians" had conceived as necessary to its "curruculum". The Christians at the school of Antioch, founded by Lucian of Samosata, diligently eschewed the allegorical excesses of Origen and some of his followers. All study was directed to the examination of the Scriptures, giving to the literal sense greater emphasis while understanding the non-literal sense typologically. The subjects taught at Antioch were often similar to those offered at Alexandria, but the Fathers attending the former examined the Scriptures with a simpler, more grammatical and historical method. It is

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[71] The Theological Orations, in Christology of the Later Fathers (volume III of The Library of Christian Classics), Philadelphia, 1954, I, 3.

[72] Theol. Ora., I, 4.

interesting, too, that at Antioch as well as Alexandria, the Latin language and literature were not part of the curriculum, for the Greeks never ceased looking upon the Romans as "barbarians".[73]

Antioch and Alexandria were not the only schools Christians attended, but these set the tone for Christian learning in general. The East possessed several other excellent schools: in Athens, Berytus, Caesarea and Constantinople. Christians had their own didaskaleîon, but also heard the lectures of pagans, such as Libanius. On the other hand, some Christians refused to attend pagan schools and opened their own. The students were instructed in reading, writing, arithmetic and the Holy Scriptures. All "secular learning" was deemed not only unnecessary to salvation but positively harmful to it. Catechists and monks admonished their listeners to learn history from the book of Kings, poetry from the Psalms, cosmology from Genesis and law from the Gospels.[74]

Some Christians, however, took positions on "secular learning" which mediated "rigorism" and "liberalism". The ancients should be studied in order to confirm the Christian faith through their error and tragedy. Saint

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[73]A. H. M. Jones, The Later Roman Empire: 284-602 (vol. II), Norman (Okla.), 1964, p. 988.

[74]A. H. M. Jones, p. 1002. Monks in Antioch called all pagan learning, hellenikè deisdaimonia, "hellenic superstition" (A. J. Festugière, Antioche Païenne et Chrétienne, p. 240). Cf. Apostolic Const., in The Ante-Nicene Fathers, (vol. III), I, 6.

John Chrysostom exclaimed, "I will not dissuade you from reading the writings of the pagans if your interest does not result from apathy towards our own . . . . The tales of their philosophers, poets, rhetors, sophists and historians will teach you about the disasters of old. Everywhere you will find proofs."[75] By the fifth century, then, the Christian paideia always included Holy Scriptures, commonly contained pagan philosophy and literature and usually the classical sciences. The disciplines of trivium and quadrivium were missing.[76] By the time of Justinian, the Christian paideia was completed.[77] The closing of the school at Athens symbolized the end of the pagan paideia and the beginning of a new era.

Hellenism was transformed. The pagan paideia had for its purpose the creation the polis, the controlled and rational atmosphere which would produce "the good life" for "the rational man". Christianity replaced this ideal

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[75] Hom. Stat. Pop. XI, PG 491128.

[76] Caesar Bardas, uncle of the East Roman Emperor, Michael III (842-867), organized a school at Constantinople whose curriculum included the septem artes liberales or the trivium and quadrivium. These had not been part of Byzantine schools until the ninth century. A Latin legacy, they passed very early into the Western system of education (See A. A. Vesiliev, History of the Byzantine Empire (vol. I), Madison, 1964, p. 296.

[77] "We can watch the development of this culture beginning with the work of the Church Fathers", writes Glanville Downey, "and culminating in the new unity of faith and culture which the Emperor Justinian (527-565) made one of the urgent aims of his administration" (From Pagan City to Christian City", p. 134.

with the attempt to realize the heavenly polis through the Christian paideia. The "good life" of the Greeks was an earthly life of "the rational man", the ideal man of inner harmony and order, harmonía kaì táxis. The classical polis was homocentric, seeking to master the visible world through rational ends and by rationally discerned means. On the other hand, the Christian polis was a city uncompromisingly committed to Christ. In one sense, this meant the making of the Roman Empire into a "holy Empire", but, in another and more perfect sense, it meant perfecting "citizenship" in the church which anticipated "citizenship" in heaven.[78]

The Christian paideia, like the ekklesia, expressed the christological principle of divine-human unity. On the "divine side" was the Holy Scriptures, the very center of the Christian educational system.[79] On the "human side" were arithmetic, medicine, astronomy, literature, rhetoric, philosophy.[80] They were united in that system without confusion, for the Christian polis was not homocentric but christocentric. Christian education had no other aim than the initiation of the individual ever more

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[78]"In the place of citizenship in the classica polis," writes Downey, "the citizenship of the new Christian city was primarily citizenship in the heavenly city and the heavenly Jerusalem, that is, a dual citizenship of the city of God and the city of man on earth" ("From Pagan City to Christian City", 133-134).

[79]Downey, 126. Cf. St. Basil, De Spir. Sanct. X, 25 PG 32 125C; and Apostolic Canon, XIX.

[80]St. Gregory Nazianzus, Ora VII, 7 PG 35 764C.

fully into the Body of Christ; and "while the branches of the education might be described as 'secular' and 'religious', they both looked toward a common end".[81] In other terms, even though some Fathers and monks would have taken exception with the idea, the Christian paideia existed for the polis and the polis for the salvation of men.

Other forces in the Christian polis, intrinsic to its conception and related necessarily to its paideia, were the Sacraments, the canon law and sacred art. The Sacraments, especially the Eucharist, was the very substance of unity. Canon law did not simply govern the relationship between the citizens of the polis, but was designed to forge the Christian man. Sacred art was the creation of men conscious that history was the vehicle of salvation: art was "the economy of salvation" in color. Finally, all the components of the Christian polis were grounded in Christian love, agape. Pagan thinkers, such as Plato, had espoused justice, dike, as the sovereign good of the classical polis, but Christianity made "love", selfless love for God and man as the vivifying principle of the Christian city.

Thus, the Christian community "lived on the basis of what the secular world would have called an interpretation of history, whereas the classical Greeks in their cities had viewed the course of history as a spectacle

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[81]Downey, 135.

manipulated by Fate or the mercy of Chance; and while in the pagan view man was sometimes the victim of divine wrath even though he was innocent, history to the Christian was a purposeful and meaningful record of the dealings of God with man. It was in the light of this record that man understood his own history and the history of the community of which he was a part."[82] This was the "revealed" assumption of the Christian _polis_ and its _paideia_, that is, the faith that God lovingly intervened into the history of man. It was not a capricious intervention, such as the Greeks knew in their intercourse with the gods, but the actual participation of the transcendent in the life of man. He participated in the history of His creatures that they might partake of His divine nature. This was the destiny of man which was anticipated in the sinful church and which informed and inspired the Christian _polis_. Not all the Fathers considered the mating of the Empire and the church desireable, but none questioned the equation of the church with the true _polis_ to which the Christian _paideia_ applied and for which it was created.

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[82]Downey, 128.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION

According to the Greek Fathers, the "economy of God" is history of revelation culminating in Jesus Christ. The Incarnation was a historical fact, transpiring during the principate of Augustus Caesar. He was "crucified under Pontius Pilate", the Roman governor of Palestine, during the reign of Tiberius Caesar. God had become man, the eternal Logos was a fact of history. He came to recover what was lost; He was "born in the fullness of time" to restore to the Father the cosmos that had become subject to Satan through the sin of "the first man", Adam. In Himself, "the second Adam" will "recapitulate all things". He is the Man of "the new creation" as Adam was the Man of "the old creation". The work of Christ had begun with the church, His Body, His "new people", the beginning of the "new mankind". The church of sinners is "the new race". Christianity, therefore, is a historical religion. It is the historical solution to the "human predicament", the answer to all the questions posed concerning human nature and destiny.

Pagan antiquity had its answers, the answers of "the natural man", the "man" whose determinations issued from false faith. Caesar was the most conspicuous example of

what "secular faith" may accomplish with power. Hellenism, with which the Greek Fathers were primarily concerned, had taken reason to the outposts of heaven with that faith. Practical and speculative genius schemed together to establish, infallibly and forever, the kingdom of Adamic man. Yet, the single obstacle to success was man himself. For only if man could conquer himself, said the ancients, could reason and power establish the eternal polis. Man must overcome his fear of fate and chance--and time; then, he would become l'animal rationale and the unending Pax would dawn.

But reason and power had not produced glory, said the Fathers, only doubt and tyranny. The fault lay, they said, with the faith, pistis, fides, of paganism, with the failure of paganism to discover the Creator in the creation. The result was a false anthropology and cosmology which left man the slave of his passions and the deathless, impersonal turning of time his destiny. With Christ, however, the very Logos who had given man whatever true wisdom and true justice he had attained, the empty striving of man had come to an end. The Incarnation was the beginning of new life and inexhaustable power. Salvation had come. The "god" man wanted to become through his own ingenuity, he would become through grace. Jesus Christ was "the way, the life and the truth", the fulfillment of every human aspiration.

The ancients had "slight glimmerings of the truth",

said Clement of Alexandria, they adumbrated the truth without knowing it. Their wisdom, no matter how impotent, their "superstition" and "mythology", were anti-types of the True Wisdom. Their "folly" was a preparation for the Gospel, just as the prophecy of the Hebrew people tutored men unto Christ. The Hebrews possessed types and allegories of the Lord and His "new covenant" with mankind. The existence of the Chosen People was a sign to all nations that Jehovah God would give them a Savior, a king whose "kingdom would have no end". The "kingdom of God" would rule not by force, but through faith in Christ. Man would become God, as God had become man. In this promise, lay the key to the true nature and destiny of man.

The history of this promise began, however, long before the call of the Hebrew children. In the beginning, God created the heavens and the earth. He planted a garden in which He placed a man, Adam, and a woman, Eve. They were created in "the likeness and image of God". Adam, however, was not only one man, but many, for in his person, he "recapitulated" all his progeny. Through disobedience, through aspiring to divinity, Adam lost his innocence and thereby subjected "the creation to vanity". As Saint Maximus the Confessor said, "the cosmos became the land of death and corruption through sin"--(ho kósmos outos hos chorían thanáton kai phthoràs dia tēn hamartían)[1]

[1] Quaest. ad Thal., 65 PG 90 740B.

Adam lost his perfectibility and "the image of God" was shattered. The human race lost its unity; it was atomized and iniquity abound. This was the race with which the Romans had hoped to create into an enduring civilization.

Nevertheless, God did not leave His creatures destitute. Through providence and the Hebrew people, mankind was being led to the moment, kairos, when the very Image in which man was made "became flesh" to offer Adamic man the unity lost by his head. The Incarnate Logos would drive out "him who scattereth", Satan, and deliver a "new mankind" to His Father. Through His crucifixion, death and resurrection, Christ would extinguish sin in His Body and "destroy death by His death". Christus victor would conquer Satan. The Redeemer would be the New Man. Even as Adam was one and many, so Christ would be; even as Adam had condemned unborn generations to ignominy, Christ would bring the world great glory. This inheritance the God-Man realized in Himself and will bestow upon the cosmos through His church. The "history of salvation" had been inaugurated when He rose "the first born from the dead". (Rev. i, 5).

The formation of the "new mankind", the community of believers, implied something paradoxical. Not all men have accepted "Christ as Lord", hence, they remained "the children of Adam". In addition, the "unity of man" was the destiny of the cosmos. Therefore, the existence of the church erected a double polarity, a historical dialectic:

and antithesis between Christ and Adam, a tension between the present and the future. If the cosmos is already being deified by virtue of the church in it, then, the end, telos, of history is not only a moment, an event, but a process, an entelechy. The future is present, the present contains its opposite--coincidentia oppositorum: inchoatio est consumatio. The church is in "this world" without belonging to it. Again, if the church is both being and becoming, perfect and imperfect, visible and invisible, divine and human, it is not "the total Christ", pléroma Christoû. The church is "building up the body of Christ until we all attain the unity of the faith and the knowledge of the Son of God, to mature manhood, to the measure of the stature of the pléroma of Christ" (Eph. iv, 13).

But with what will the pléroma be filled? Paradoxically, the world, Adam, the very nature to which Christ is antithetical. Adam will become the "new man". Christ is Adam transformed, for Christ is Adam dead and risen. The church is the synthesis of Christ and Adam. This apparent contradiction is reconciled by the idea of "the new age". The "new age", the "eighth day" stands in the midst of the "seven ages" of Adamic time. Those who become "the portion of Christ" enter "the new age", for He brought it to man ahead of time through His resurrection. As "the portion of Adam", one by one, join themselves to Christ, they share in that life which has already conquered death. The church is the Body of Christ. Thus, history is an instrument

of salvation; but that instrumentality is not merely human, it is divine-human, theandric. Indeed, there can be no salvation outside the church, because the church is salvation or the history of those being saved. As Saint Gregory Nazianzus said, "that which is not assumed by Christ is not healed; that which is not united to God is not saved" (to gar apolypton atherapeuton ho de henōtai tō theō touto kai mē sōzetai).[2]

Nevertheless, as the christology of Chalcedon affirmed, the intercourse between God and the cosmos does not imply pantheism. It is a unity emulating the Incarnation: the unity of the created and the Uncreated which suggests no negation of their peculiar identities. Christ was both the eternal Logos and true man, one Person, two natures, without change, separation or confusion. Likewise, the church is related to the cosmos. At the same time, "the fallen world" stands outside of the church and resists Christ. Yet, the sojourn of Christ in the flesh was "in the world" and "for the world". This antithesis, therefore, asserts two histories in time: the history of Adam and the history of Christ. The history of Christ reflects the destiny of Adam saved. Thus, all history moves towards unity in God, all history, to use the apt phrase of Vladimir Solovyev, is "the history of Godmanhood".

The era in which the "history of Christ" began was the era of power and reason, the Graeco-Roman world. The

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[2] Ep. CL, PG 37 181.

oikonomia theou had been centuries--"ages"--in preparation. The nations had been alerted through types and anti-types, wisdom and prophecy, but "in the fullness of time" (Gal. iv, 4) it was revealed. The ancient world was awaiting delivery. The "age" was the perfect blend of Semitic, Greek and Roman sentiments, traditions and cults. In particular, it was "the age of Caesar", the supreme effort of Adamic man to achieve the unity lost by its father. The "Augustan reconstruction" was the great amalgamation of the political and religious currents which had been evolving from the beginning of ancient world. Augustus was imperator, soter, the personification of jus. The Pax Romana was intended to be the resolution of the "human predicament". It is no wonder that Eusebius of Caesarea viewed the coincidence of the birth of Christ and the formation of the romanum imperium of no little significance.

Christianity entered the historical scene as "the kingdom of God" in opposition to this "kingdom of man". The church was the néa pólis. The early Christians knew themselves to be constituting another social order, something "extraterritorial", for they were "strangers" in the world. Most Christians, however, did not retire from the oikoumene while still adhering to another "system of allegiance". They knew that their detachment could not be permanent, for Christianity was a missionary religion, charged with the command to convert the world to Christ.

What, then, was the relation of the church to the oikoumene to be? Could the civitas dei and the civitas terrena co-exist? Should Christians hope for the conversion of the Empire? Or, in modern terms, Russia, China and America? Had Christ not said, "my kingdom is not of this world"? Some Christians believed that the conversion of the Empire was not only impossible but undesireable; and some, in varying degrees, saw in the command of Christ the necessity for the Empire to become a Christian Empire.

With Constantine, and de jure with Theodosius the Great, the Empire did become a societas christiana. It was a "theocratic kingdom" not unlike the Hebrew kingdom of Saul, David and Solomon. It became, in a real sense, an instrument of God for the salvation of mankind, that is, it took a role in the oikonomìa theoû. Indeed, the state has only a provisional nature and must pass away with the paroúsia, but God does not demand that all His coadjutors be eternal. The principle of coincidentia oppositorum provided a strong argument for the christianum romanum imperium. It was the temporal dimension of the divine-human dialectic, christologically conceived as the humanity of Christ. The imperium was to be united to the ekklesía as the becoming of being, the present to the future, the historical to the eternal.

Who shall govern this "new organism"? What is the relation of imperium to sacerdotium? It is at this point in the life of church-state relations that christological

heresies proved the occasion for the Fathers to verbalize and define the implications of Christian vision of history.

The fourth and fifth centuries were "the golden age" of patristic literature, but they were also the age of the great heresies. The heretics not only perverted doctrine, but the Christian conception of time and history. Even modern historians and philosophers have not been able to improve upon their errors. Arius, Nestorius and Eutyches not only placed reason over revelation, they completely abrogated the oikonomia theoũ. What was at stake during the christological controversies was not so much the authority of the imperium and sacerdotium, but the theandric process of history. In other words, if Christ were not God or if God were not "physically" united to man, then, the pagan dichotomy of time and eternity was reinstituted; and if man did not remain human after his union with God, there was no history at all. On the one hand, the heresies led to secularism and materialism and, on the other, to pantheism and spiritualism. Modern history has given us no better choices.

The state was not the only serious matter to confront the church. There was then, as there is today, the question of Adamic intellectual achievements. What was the church to think of them? How could the enjoyment of them be reconciled to the Christian commitment? Were they necessary for salvation? At first, the church was

withdrawn from Graeco-Roman civilization, but when the church and the Empire were mated, the attitude of many Christians towards "secular learning" changed. To be sure, many Christians had found it useful long before the union, but with the new position of the church in the Empire, the interest in that "learning" was accelerated. The problem had never been the classical paideia; it had been scorned ab initio and without reservation. The principles and aims of classicism had supported the structure of Greek and Roman institutions and, in the case of the latter, had been used to rationalize and justify "the ideology of power"; but now the Empire was Christian and the new relationship required new presuppositions. The "ideology of power" had to be replaced by negating its theological, moral and philosophical premises and the new faith substituted for them.

Some Christians would have no truck with this enterprise. They devoted themselves to Scriptures and to the other available Christian literature. Still other Christians read classical works only to confirm their own beliefs through the errors of the ancients. Although all Christians recognized the perishability of culture, redeemed or pagan, the oikonomia theou gave the principle by which both the "rigorist" and the "liberal" attitude could be justified. If the "end" is now, said the former, any study outside the Scriptures is vain, if not sinful; but replied, the latter, the "end" is not consummate, therefore,

culture yet retains its value. Everyone was in full agreement, however, that "human knowledge" must serve the purposes of Christian existence, salvation.

Although the church condemned the classical paideia, the curriculum of the Christian school included many of the subjects taught by the pagans. What the church took, it transfigured. This process of "transfiguring ancient culture", says Father Florovsky, "has been variously described as 'a Hellenization of Christianity'" when, in fact, it was "the 'Christianization of Hellenism'".[3] Hellenism was put to soteriological use, assisting in the creation of the spiritual man for a religious society. The Fathers, who were mainly responsible for the construction of the Christian paideia, never believed that what they had culled from "pagan wisdom" was, in fact, the property of the Greeks; indeed not, they were reclaiming what the pre-Incarnate Logos had temporarily given the "world". With this position, the Greek Fathers revealed a vital aspect of the Christian conception of history. Truth is divine and despite all the human (and Satanic) accretions, the truth will persevere and return to its source.

The source of truth was the Logos, the inelactable first principle of the new vision of history. By that vision a new society was formed, a "unity of faith in the

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[3]G. Florovsky, "Faith and Culture", St. Vladimir's Seminary Quarterly, IV, 1-2 (1955-1956), 40.

bond of love". This new society was not the occasion for the development of the human personality nor the opportunity for gratifying social service, but a divine-human matrix for intellectual, moral and spiritual perfection. Of course, there would be joy, but the new society was an image of "the kingdom of God" which provided salvation. In the Christian polis the truth was articulated and by the polis disseminated to the world that it might know the mercy and justice of God. The Christian kingdoms of the Middle Ages had conversion to Christ as their ultimate purpose. Culture demonstrated the motivation and designs, the faith of Christian society and thereby reflected the Christian "philosophy of history".

That "philosophy" was the proclamation of human nature and destiny. From God to God, from glory to glory was the promise of the Incarnate Logos. Man moves towards his end attended by His End. History is a theandric process in which the human will and mind play a necessary role. Thus, that process integrates all those truths which humanity has discerned but distorted: the one and the many, being and becoming, the finite and the infinite, freedom and necessity, spirit and matter. The Christian "philosophy" of the Fathers manifested those truths without corrupting them and, consequently, had fallen victim to neither cyclicism, fatalism, pantheism, materialism, atomism, idealism, vitalism or mechanism. Here was a vision which neither hypostacized man nor abolished him,

but united him in a unique relationship with his Creator, the Logos. The vision was christocentric and, therefore, was precisely a "coincidence of opposites", a unity like that of a finite point in space penetrated by an infinite number of lines. So is the "great mystery" of theandric history.

History came from God, is permeated with Him and must return to Him. This is the linear conception of Christian cyclicism. History is paradoxical, for the return has already begun: history moves towards its goal, because its goal has already plunged into it. The future is now, "the eighth and everlasting age" is present in time, in the very movement of time from "age to age". The "last day" has dawned in the church, in the visible, growing society of sinners. The church is "the history of salvation", the destiny of man and the cosmos. Adam is becoming Christ. The unveiling, the revelation of "the economy of God", the <u>magnum mysterium</u>, as Saint Paul (Eph. v, 31) called it, is unfolding in the world of sin, corruption and death. History is being deified before the nations whose wisdom is folly and whose life is death.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

1. Bibliographical Aids

The most important guides to patristic literature are the patrologies. They offer bibliographies, list and analyze patristic works and usually give biographies of the Fathers and ecclesiastical writers. For this study we used: B. Altaner's Patrology (Freiburg, 1960), translated from the German (Patrologie, Freiburg, 1937) by Sister Hilda C. Graff; Johannes Quasten's three volume Patrology (Westminster, Md., 1950-1953); and J. Tixeront's A Handbook of Patrology (Saint Louis, 1951) translated from the fourth French edition by S. A. Raemers. Useful were the somewhat outdated but pioneer efforts of O. Bardenhewer, Patrologie (Freiburg, 1892); and J. Nirschl, Lehrbuch der Patrologie und Patristik (Mainz, 1881-1885) in three volumes.

Other guides to the writings of the Greek Fathers are Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique, published quarterly by the University of Louvain and edited by Robert Aubert. Revue supplies titles by modern authors of theology, church history and patristics from many countries. It also lists new editions of Christian sources and includes book reviews. The Studia Patristica is the result of the International Conference of Patristic Studies. It is

published in Berlin annually and contains essays on history, exegesis, philology, etc. There is appended a bibliography. The Bibliographia Patristica is published annually in Berlin by the same group of patristic scholars, but is completely bibliographical.

Helpful, too, is the theological journal, Traditio, the annual publication of Fordham University (Bronx, New York), edited by Stephen Kuttner and several members of the faculty. It contains, as a regular feature, H. S. Musurillo's "Progress of Patristic Scholarship", and reviews of recent books written about the Fathers. There are, of course, innumerable journals in English and other languages offering similar information as well as important articles about the Fathers and their teachings, such as: Byzantion, published annually in Bruxelles and edited by the famous Byzantologist, Henri Gregoire. Although not primarily a religious journal, Byzantion includes, in many languages, contributions to the patristic science. A similar journal is Byzantinische Zeitschrift, published semi-annually in Munich and edited by Frau St. Hoermann von Stepski. Likewise, the Dumbarton Oaks Papers from the Harvard center of Byzantine Studies in Washington, D.C. Since it was first published in 1941, nineteen volumes have been issued. Church History is the quarterly publication of the American Society of Church history, Oreland, Pennsylvania. The Analecta Bollandiana is the quarterly publication of the Societe des Bollandistes at St. Michel,

Bruxelles, edited by Maurice Coens. This journal has texts in English, French and Latin. The Eastern Churches Quarterly is a publication of the Benedictines, St. Augustine's Abbey, Ramsgate, England, edited by Dom Bede Winslow and Donald Attwater. The Greek Orthodox Theological Review is the semi-annual publication of the Holy Cross Seminary, Brookline, Massachusetts, edited by L. C. Contos. The quarterly publication of Harvard University is the Harvard Theological Review, Cambridge, and edited by K. Stendahl. The Journal of Religion is the quarterly periodical of the University of Chicago, edited by J. C. Rylaarsdam. Ostkirchliche Studien is issued quarterly by various scholars on the Eastern Church; it is published at Wuerzburg and edited by H. M. Biedermann. La Pensée Orthodoxe is the annual publication of the Russian Orthodox Seminary, Saint Sergius, in Paris. It was originally published in Russian, but during and after the Nazi occupation the language has been French. The sister seminary, St. Vladimir's in Scarsdale, New York, publishes the English, St. Vladimir's Seminary Quarterly, edited by Jean Meyendorff. Recherches de Théologie ancienne et médiévale is the semi-annual publication of the Abbey du Mont Caesar, Louvain, edited by O. Lottin. Texts are in French, German and English. The editor of the quarterly, Theology Today, (Princeton, New Jersey), is H. T. Kerr. The Journal of Theological Studies is the semi-annual publication of Oxford University, London, and edited by H. Chadwick

and H. F. D. Sparks. Theological Studies is published quarterly by the Society of Jesus, Woodstock, Maryland, and edited by J. C. Murray. The Theologische Zeitschrift is published bi-monthly by the theological faculty at the University of Basel, Switzerland, and edited by B. Reicke. Zeitschrift fuer Theologie und Kirche is published quarterly by various church historians, Tuebingen, and edited by D. Gerhard Ebeling.

Of the many patrological collections, we relied exclusively on Migne. The Greek Fathers have no single treatise on the nature and meaning of history. Their thought on the matter, like any subject they treated, is scattered throughout their writings. Nevertheless, some of their treatises have much to say about history. Saint Justin Martyr's Dialogus cum Trypho and his two Apologia explain the place of the Greeks and Hebrews within the Christian Economy. His typology is important. Saint Athenagoras, Supplicatio pro Christianum, is relevant for the question of the church and the world. Apologia ad Autolycum by Saint Theophilus of Antioch discusses, among other things, providence. On the historical significance of the Incarnation, there is nothing better than Contra or Adversus Haereses and Proof of the Apostolic Preaching. The second treatise, discovered recently in a literal Armenian translation of the seventh or eighth century, is not completed in Migne. We had recourse to the English translation in the Ancient Christian Writers series (see

below). The remarkable (and anonymous) Letter to Diognetus is concerned with the church, the world and providence. The English translation of Loeb Classical Library uses a critical edition of the Greek text. The Stromata of Clement of Alexandria evinces a view of Hellenism in the divine preparation for the Christian religion. He may not be considered a "father", however, because too many of his opinions are unorthodox. The same may be said for Origen of Alexandria. Nevertheless, his Contra Celsum and De Principiis deal with every conceivable "theological" subject, such as the church and the pagan Roman Empire, typology and allegory, providence, etc. The great opponent of Origen, Saint Methodius of Olympus, wrote the Convivium or Symposium, often translated "On Virginity", which is valuable for its typology, doctrine of morality and the church in the world. Saint Hippolytus' De Antichristo and the Fragmenta contain scriptural exegesis on the Old and New Testament. Most important is his analysis of the rise and fall of kingdoms.

The fourth and fifth centuries were "the golden age" of patristic literature. The Oratio de Incarnatione Verbi Dei by Saint Athanasius the Great is perhaps the closest to a treatise on the nature and meaning of history available to us. It explains the famous patristic maxim, "God became man that man might become God". The commentaries of Saint Cyril of Alexandria on Matthew, Luke and John seek to explain the centrality of Christ in history through

typology and the message of the Gospels. Saint Basil the Great's De Spiritu Sancto, Hexaemeron and his exegesis of the Psalms offer very important insights to Christian ontology, creation and the nature of man. The dogmatic Orationes of Saint Gregory Nazianzus, called "the Theologian", contain an unrivalled witness to "realized eschatology", christology and the value of pagan learning. If one must single out a particular Greek Father for his interest in history, christologically and ontologically analyzed, one must turn to Saint Gregory of Nyssa, especially his De Hominis Opificio, De Octava, Dialogus de Anima et Resurrectione and Contra Fatum. The works of the Arian, Eusebius of Caesarea, are good for two reasons: to contrast his heretical views with the Fathers, i.e., Eusebius' platonism clearly evidenced in his christology and political theology; and a generally orthodox typology. Also, his Historia Ecclesiastica gives us information about men and events in the church upto his own time. Saint Cyril of Jerusalem's Catecheses is important for its dealing with history and typology. Saint John Chrysostom's commentaries on Genesis and the Pauline epistles must certainly compare with the writings of Saint Gregory of Nyssa. Chrysostom is less concerned with ontology, however, and more with history as the moral, political and spiritual realm of divine action. In the sixth century, Saint Maximus the Confessor shows us the clearest application of the christological formula to ecclesiology,

ontology and cosmology in his De Ambiqua, Capita Theologiae et Oeconomiae and Mystagogia. The second book of Fons Scientia, familiarly known as De Fidei Orthodoxia is an excellent summary of Greek patristic thought on every subject, including history. He was an eighth century Father and the last we considered in this study.

With regard to translations: A Select Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church is the work of a number of scholars under the direction of Philip Scaff and Henry Wace. There are two series: the first consists of 14 volumes and the second of 11 volumes. They were originally published in 1898. About the same time, scholars under the direction of Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson produced The Ante-Nicene Fathers, translations of the writings of the Fathers down to 325 A.D. in 10 volumes.

More recent translations are: Ancient Christian Writers: the Works of the Fathers in Translation, in 31 volumes, edited by Johannes Quasten and Joseph C. Plumpe of the Catholic University of America. These editions contain introductions and valuable notes with some bibliography. The Fathers of the Church in 40 volumes is a series translated, annotated and edited by a number of Roman Catholic scholars under the direction of Ludwig Schopp. None of these three libraries distinguishes Fathers and ecclesiastical writers; and none carry us beyond the eighth century. Another series devoted to Christian

literature is The Library of Christian Classics in 26 volumes. It covers the period extending from the sub-Apostolic Fathers (second century) to the Reformation. It is not strictly a patrological library, however, because many of the authors are not Fathers. It is akin to the French Sources Chrétien which is published in Paris and edited by Peres Daniélou and de Lubac. Not unlike these is the library of ancient pagan and Christian authors, the Loeb Classical Library, published in London and Cambridge (Mass.). A critical Greek (and Latin) text is supplied along with a bibliography pertaining to each writer.

2. The Secondary Sources

Books and articles about the Greek Fathers include: Charles Norris Cochrane's superb work, Christianity and Classical Culture: A Study of Thought and Action from Augustus to Augustine (New York, 1957) argues that the Christian Church effected a revolution in thought and action throughout the Roman Empire. The church successfully defended itself against the classical scientia and even found it useful in spreading the Christian gospel. The "revolution" struck at the very heart of the Graeco-Roman spirit, namely, anthropology and cosmology. The fourth edition of Adolph von Harnack's Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschicte (Tuebingen, 1909), of which we used volumes one and two, is dated in many of its conclusions, but its thesis that the Hellenization of Christianity began with the Apologists

(third century) is still maintained by many scholars. Pierre Duheim's Le Système du Monde: Histoire des Doctrines Cosmologiques de Platon à Copernic (Paris, 1914-1931) has 10 volumes. Volume two (1915) describes the attitude of the Hellenistic period towards the physical universe. According to Duheim, the astronomy and physics of the Fathers is to be found generally in their commentaries on Genesis. They accepted the assistance of profane doctrines in their exegesis only if they did not conflict with the teachings of the Christian religion. Early Christianity and the Greek Paideia by Werner Jaeger is a picture of the attitude of the primitive church towards pagan education. The church remained separate from the "world", but its literature, such as the Bible, shows the use Christians made of the Greek paideia. M. L. W. Laistner's Christianity and Pagan Culture in the Later Roman Empire (Ithica, N.Y., 1955) might very well be the sequel to Jaeger's work. Christianity, he says, preserved pagan culture by using it, e.g., adapting Greek literature for use in the instruction of conversts. This book has appended the author's translation of Saint John Chrysostom's Address on Vainglory and the Right Way for Parents to Bring Up Children which illustrates Laistner's thesis. The third edition of H. I. Marrou's A History of Education in Antiquity (new York, 1956) was translated from the French (Histoire de l'Education dans l'Antiquité, Paris, 1948) by George Lamb. The first French edition was 1892. Marrou

describes education as it evolved from Homeric times to the appearance of Christian schools in the medieval West and in Byzantium. He seeks to trace the direct ancestry of the modern educational system through the successive steps of Western civilization. The notes in the rear of the book are excellent. The Philosophy of Plotinus by Emile Bréhier was translated from the French (La Philosophie de Plotin. Paris, 1928) by Joseph French. This book is the reproduction of the lectures given at the Sorbonne during 1921-1922. It does not seek so much to explain the philosophy of Plotinus as to delineate its basic features, the era which helped shape it and the relevance of Plotinus to the Fathers and Western thought. Eduard Zeller's Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy (New York, 1958) is the thirteenth edition, revised by Wilhelm Nestle and translated by L. R. Palmer from the German (Philosophie der Griechen, Heidelberg, 1883). The work covers the period from pre-Socratic times to the fourth century A.D. Zeller(1814-1908) was influenced by Kant and Hegel.

The Meaning of Sacred Scripture (Notre Dame, 1958) by Rev. Louis Bouyer was translated from the French (La Bible et L'Evangile. Paris, 1951) by Mary Perkins Ryan. Bouyer states that the unity of the Scriptures is not simply "promise" and "fulfillment", but the belief in old Israel and the church that "the Word of God" is a living presence among His People. The author makes various allusions to

patristic literature. The eminent New Testament scholar, Edwyn Clement Hoskyns, died before he could complete his The Fourth Gospel (London, 1947). His friend, Francis Noel Davey, collected, edited and amended Hoskyn's notes and published them. The author contends that the gospel according to Saint John demands that the facts recorded in his gospel are historical not mythological or philosophical. This was the faith of the early church and the Fathers. J. S. Stewart's A Man in Christ: The Vital Elements of Saint Paul's Religion (New York, 1949) is a rejection of the common scholarly notion that Saint Paul was the author of metaphysical Christianity. Stewart shows that Saint Paul invented no "Paulinism", but was a faithful witness to the Christian tradition. H. A. A. Kennedy's Saint Paul and the Mystery Religions (New York, 1912) builds on the work of Franz Cumont, contending that Paul took from the mystery religions nothing but its language. Emil Brunner's Revelation and Reason (Philadelphia, 1947) was translated from the German (Offenbarung und Vernunft: Die Lehre von der christlichen Glaubenerkenntnis. Zuerich, 1941) by Olive Wyon. Taking the Scriptures as his basis, Brunner argues that reason must rest upon revelation in the Christian experience. He believes, too, that the Fathers and the Scholastics have obscured the Christian message by the intrusion of Greek philosophy into their witness. Christ and Time: the Primitive Christian Conception of Time and History (Philadelphia, 1950) is the classical work

of Oscar Cullmann. It was translated from the German (Christus und Zeit. Zuerich, 1949) by Floyd V. Filson. Cullmann declares that the Biblical concept of time and history is linear rather than, as it was for the Greeks, circular. Eternity, he says, is not timeless, but a unique extension of time. The work of C. J. Cadoux, The Early Church and the World (Edinburgh, 1955) covers the period from Augustus to Constantine the Great. This book on the primitive Christian attitude towards pagan politics, religion, war, family, economics and slavery shows immense knowledge of the Holy Scriptures, the early Fathers and ecclesiastical writers.

The two books by Dom David Amand, L'Ascése Monastique de Saint Basile (Maredsous, 1948) and Fatalisme et liberté dans l'antiquité grecque (Louvain, 1945) were helpful. In the first book, Amand relates Basil's monastic "phil osophy" to his conception of man, i.e., the importance of asceticism to sinful humanity, especially under those conditions resulting from the union of the church with the Roman Empire; and the second book, discusses the celebrated debate which, in classical and Christian antiquity, surrounded the problem raised by astrological fatalism. Carneades, according to Amand, if he did not invent, at least, popularized the arguments against fatalism which the Fathers used in their assault upon astrology and numerology. Hans Urs von Balthasar's monograph, Kosmische Liturgie: Das Weltbild Maximus des Bekenners (Einsiedeln, 1961) is

a systematic presentation of Maximus' unsystematic writings. He was linked not only to the Fathers before him, especially Saint Dionysius, but the Greek philosophers. In addition, there are German translations of Maximus' Mystagogia and Opusculum de anima and a commentary on Capita Theologiae et Oeconomiae. The bibliography of Kosmische Liturgie is scattered throughout the text and footnotes, the index is poor and the translations do not always bear the spirit of the Greek original. Gustave Bardy offers in his En Lisant les Péres (Paris, 1933) a light sketch of the historical circumstances under which the Fathers lived and wrote. It is not a profound book. The Fathers of the Greek Church (New York, 1959) by Hans von Campenhausen was translated from the German (Griechische Kirchenvater, Stuttgart, 1955) by Stanley Goodman. This book is a selection of quasi-biographies of the Fathers from Justin Martyr to Cyril of Alexandria with whom the author closes the Greek patristic age. His portraits are dull, his observations about their teachings disputable and his thesis (see introduction) without foundation. In addition, the bibliography is inadequate. Yves Courtonne's monograph, Saint Basile et l'hellénisme (Paris, 1934) is a study of the encounter of Christian thought with pagan wisdom in the Hexaemeron. The author says that there is no work of the Greek Fathers which shows more familiarity with pagan learning. Courtonne has scrupulously recorded Basil's pagan sources, but has given us very little

understanding of this Father's thinking. The five books of Jean Daniélou were certainly the most suggestive and useful: The Bible and the Liturgy (Notre Dame, 1956) was translated from the French (Bible et Liturgie, Paris, 1951) by the scholars of the University of Notre Dame's Liturgical Studies; From Shadows to Reality (London, 1960) was translated from the French (Sacramentum Futuri: Études sur les Origènes de la Typologie biblique. (Paris, 1959) by Dom Wulstan Hibberd; The Lord of History: Reflections on the Inner Meaning of History (London, 1958) was also translated from the French (Essai sur le Mystère de l'Histoire. Paris, 1958) by Nigel Abercrombie; Origen (New York, 1955) also from the French (Origènes. Paris, 1955) by Walter Mitchel; and Platonisme et Théologie Mystique: Doctrines Spirituelle de Saint Grégoire de Nysse (Paris, 1944). The last work is the second volume of the Theologie series under the direction of the Faculty of Theology S. J. at Lyon-Fourviere. The first book mentioned above is concerned, as is the second work by Danielou, with typology. The Lord of History shows the components of the Christian vision of history. There is a chapter on Saint Gregory of Nyssa. Origen is an examination of that great ecclesiastical writer's entire theological system, including his scriptural exegesis and the pagan influences on him. Platonisme is a monograph intended to be the first study of "the mystical theology" of Saint Gregory of Nyssa. It is unfortunate that Daniélou proceeds in an otherwise

excellent work on the assumption that "mysticism" for Gregory (and the Greek Fathers) is identical with the Western notion of it, that is, individualistic, exotic and psychedelic. Some of the translations from the Greek could be improved in all Daniélou's books. H. de Juaye DuManoir's Dogme et Spiritualité chez Saint Cyrille d'Alexandrie (Paris, 1944) is a monograph. It is volume two of Études de Théologie et d'Histoire de la Spiritualité of which Etienne Gilson and Andre Combes are directors. The author's principal task is to put in relief the religious thought of Saint Cyril in its simplicity and plentitude, examining his many writings in terms of the diverse problems which they successively pose. A. J. Festugière's Antioche Païenne et Chrétienne (Paris, 1959) is number 194 of the series Bibliothèque de Écoles Francaises d'Athanes et de Rome. This book is the story of fourth century Antioch, a city of pagan and Christian thought. Festugière tries to show the manner in which they co-existed, opposed each other, but especially the hostility of the Christian monks towards the Greek paideia. Christian thought was dominant, but the pagan, Libanius, was the greatest teacher in Antioch. J. N. Figgis' The Political Aspects of S. Augustine's 'City of God' (Glouster, Mass., 1936) is less an analysis of Augustine's famous book than the story of its use in the Middle Ages and the Reformation. The City of God, he says, was sufficiently rich and ambiguous that it could be used for the building of the

Carolingian Empire and the Puritan Revolution in England. S. Giet's Les idées et l'action sociales de Saint Basile le Grand (Paris, 1955) concerns primarily Basil's monasticism. Basil did not simply delineate a monastic way of life, but taught a way of life which was to be adopted by loyal Christians everywhere. Giet offers us a knowledge of Basil's thought through his letters as well as his treatises. The late Etienne Gilson has written two books of interest: The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine (New York, 1960) and The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy (New York, 1940) translated from the French (Le Spirit du philosophie médiéval. Paris, 1932) by A. H. C. Downes. The first book is a comprehensive view of the Saint's philosophy, theology, metaphysics, epistemology, etc. The second book is the result of the Gifford Lectures of 1931-1932 delivered at the University of Aberdeen. It is his magnificent picture of the medieval Weltanschauung. Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange's Predestination (St. Louis, 1953) was translated from the French (La Prédestination des saints et la grace, Bruges, 1939) by Dom Bede Rose. The author traces the doctrine of Predestination from the Scriptures, Augustine and into the early and late Scholastic periods. A large portion of the book is devoted to Augustine. Jules Gross' La Divinisation du Chrétien d'apres les Péres grecs (Paris, 1938) is a complete historical analysis of the idea of deification from sub-Apostolic times to John of Damascus. Initial chapters are devoted to the pagan

Greek notion of deification and to the Old Testamental allusions to this idea of salvation. The genius of the Greek Fathers, Gross says, was to use the analogies in paganism (and Israel) to develop and clarify the Christian doctrine of deification. La Christologie de Saint Irénee (Louvain, 1955) by Albert Houssiau is an investigation of Adversus Haereseus and Proof of the Apostolic Teaching in terms of Irenaeus' literary method as well as his use of the Christian tradition. The aim of the Saint was to place the unity of the Church upon Its faith in the Incarnate Logos. This book is the third in a series of theological works from the Universitas catholica Louvaniensis. J. Lawson's The Biblical Theology of Saint Irenaeus (London, 1948) is an exposition of Irenaeus' theology in terms of its Biblical premises. The central concept of his theology is "recapitulation", a term already found in Ephesians, i, 10. Rogerio Leys' L'Image de Dieu Chez Saint Grégoire de Nysse (Louvain, 1951) is the author's dissertatio ad Lauream in Facultate Theologica, Pontificiae Universitatis Gregorianae. Leys wishes to "rendre" not to "prolonger" his subject: to define the role of the imago in the many domains of Gregory's thought, to indicate the numerous ramifications of it and to analyze the problems of interpretation which those ramifications pose and the solutions comportable with them. Although critical and showing great learning, like so many Roman Catholic thinkers, Professor Leys projects his own

Scholastic bias into the Fathers. Vladimir Lossky's The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church (London, 1957) was translated from the French (Esai sur la Théologie Mystique de l'Eglise d'Orient. Paris, 1944) by a group of members of the Fellowship of Saint Alban and Sergius in Paris. It is the major premise of the author that the Orthodox Church maintains the teachings of the Greek Fathers undefiled and, hence, an exposition of the latter is nothing more than an exposition of the former. This book is well written, sometimes controversial, but not really profound in the sense that it exposes and analyzes the problems faced by the Fathers. Henri de Lubac has written two books of interest: Catholicism (London, 1950) translated from the French (Catholicisme. Paris, 1937) by L. Sheppard; and The Splendour of the Church (New York, 1956) translated from the French (Meditation sur l'Eglise. Paris, 1955) by Michael Mason. They are complementary works both dealing with the nature of the Church according to the Greek and Latin Fathers. The former contains excerpts from the Fathers and the Scholastics. Lubac's translations from the Greek Fathers are totally unreliable, closer to paraphrasing than rendering. Emile Mersch's The Whole Christ: The Historical Development of the Doctrine of the Mystical Body in Scripture and Tradition (London, 1956) was translated from the French (Le Corps Mystique du Christ. Louvain, 1936) by John R. Kelly. The sub-title leaves the book self-explanatory. Erick

Peterson's incomparable Der Monotheismus als politisches Problem: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Politischen Theologie im Imperium Romanum (Leipzig, 1935) clearly shows the relation between religion and political ideology in the pagan and Christian Roman Empire. Using ancient literature and the writings of the Greek and Latin Fathers, Peterson links monarchy with monotheism and political pluralism with polytheism. The monograph Saint Grégoire de Nazianse Théologien (Strasbourg, 1952) by Jean Plagnieux of the University of Strasbourg gives particular attention to the theological orations of this Fathers. In them, the author believes, can be found the central attitude of Saint Gregory towards all the subjects with which he was interested, especially pagan literature. The Bampton Lectures for 1940 were delivered at Oxford University by G. L. Prestige. His six lectures were printed under the title Fathers and Heretics (London, 1948). The point made by the author is that the Fathers adhered to "the scriptural basis of the Christian tradition" while heretics deviated from it. Arius, Nesotrius, etc. dipped into sources other than those considered orthodox by the Church. G. F. Reilly's Imperium and Sacerdotium According to Saint Basil the Great (Washington, 1945) is a doctoral dissertation for the Catholic University of America which was subsequently published by that university's Studies in Christian Antiquity edited by Johannes Quasten. This book is an attempt to extend and correct Setton's thesis

(see below). Reilly says that although Ambrose best exemplifies the defense of the sacerdotium against the imperium, it was Saint Basil's influence on Ambrose that led him to elaborate that defense. This book is interesting but not deep. K. M. Setton's Christian Attitude Towards the Emperor in the Fourth Century (New York, 1941) records the opinions of the Fathers towards the Roman Emperors as is shown especially in addresses to the Emperor and their remarks concerning his images. Ambrose in the West and Chrysostom in the East are representative voices. The Emperor, they said, must care for the Church not rule it and that the sacerdotium was superior to him by virtue of its spiritual competence. The work of Basil Tatakis, La Philosophie Byzantine (Paris, 1949), is the eleventh supplement in Emile Bréhier's Histoire de la Philosophie. Tatakis says that Greek philosophy is the sine qua non of patristic thought. His book is very much like Henry Austryn Wolfson's The Philosophy of the Church Fathers, volume one (Cambridge, Mass., 1956). Wolfson argues that the Fathers did for Christianity what Philo did for Judaism: create a philosophical version of Christianity under the auspices of Greek philosophy. Wolfson handles his sources and materials well, but seems not to understand either Christianity nor the ultimate questions to which the Fathers have ultimate questions to which the Fathers have ultimate answers. S. Verosta's Johannes Chrysostomus: Staatsphilosoph und Geschichtstheologe (Graz, 1960)

claims to be a comprehensive work about John's theory of rights, political theology as well as his social and philosophical history. It is refreshing to find a scholar who does not simply identify patristic "philosophy" with a Christian version of Greek philosophy. Yet, the author has not fully integrated Chrysostom's political and historical philosophy into his christology and soteriology.

T. A. Audet's "Orientations Théologiques chez Saint Irénée" (Traditio, I (1943), 15-54) is an attempt to interpret the major themes of Adversus Haeresus, especially the meaning of the expression gnosis alethes, "the true knowledge", "true gnosis". Audet believes that Irenaeus' idea of gnosis follows from his "apophatic" or "negative theology", i.e., since reason cannot grasp the meaning of "religious truth", the grace of God offers a special avenue to it. Gnosis is for all Christians not just an elite. On Danielou's "Christianisme et histoire" (Études CCLIV, Sept., 1947), 167-184, see chapter eight of our study. There is no more eminent patristic scholar than Father Georges Florovsky, professor Church History at Princeton University. His four articles all take a historical approach to the Fathers: "Eschatology in the Patristic Age: An Introduction" (The Greek Orthodox Theological Review, II, 1 (1956), 27-40) deals with the patristic doctrine of "the last things"; "Empire and Desert: Antinomies of Christian History" (The Greek Orthodox Theological Review, III, 2 (1957), 133-159) deals with the conflict between monasticism

and the Christian Roman world; and "Saint Gregory Palamas and the Tradition of the Fathers " (The Greek Orthodox Theological Review, V, 2 (1959-1960), 119-131) is a lecture delivered in Thessalonica on the occasion of that city's celebration of its saints name day (the second Sunday of Lent). Florovsky shows the continuity of patristic thought to the fourteenth century. "Origen, Eusebius and the Iconoclastic Controversy" (Church History, XIX (1950), 77-96) shows that Iconoclasm was not an "oriental" heresy but a heresy stemming from the thought of Origen through Eusebius. In effect, this article by Florovsky is an argument against the idea that the Fathers opposed their "Hellenism" to oriental influence. His "Faith and Culture" (St. Vladimir's Seminary Quarterly, IV (1955-1956), 29-44) is an examination of the various attitudes towards culture in the Christian community throughout its history. Either Christians have despised, rejected or used secular learning. Father Alexander Schmemann is Professor of Church History and Liturgical Theology at St. Vladimir's Seminary. His "Byzantium, Iconoclasm and the Monks", (St. Vladimir's Seminary Quarterly, III, 3 (1959), 18-34), is a fine article about the significance of iconoclasm, the Empire and the monks who preserved the Christian tradition through iconography. G. Ladner, "Origen and the Significance of the Iconoclastic Controversy" (Medieval Studies, II (1940), 11-20), reaches conclusions similar to those of Father Florovsky on the same subject (see above).

The Doctrine of Grace (London, 1932) was published by the Continuation Committee of the World Conference on Faith and Order held at Lausanne in 1927. From it we took two articles: "Grace in the Greek Fathers" (pp. 61-105) carries us from the first century to Saint John of Damascus; it was written by Nicholas Gloubokowsky, and the second article, "Grace in the Latin Fathers to Saint Augustine" (pp. 106-113) by E. W. Watson. He shows the difference between the idea of grace before Augustine and his teachings on the subject which subsequently became normative in the Latin Middle Ages. "The Ecclesiology of the Three Heirarchs" (The Greek Orthodox Theological Review, VI, 2 (1960-1961) 135-185) was translated from the modern Greek by Constantine Cavarnos. This was the University of Athens Oration on the Feat of the Three Hierarchs for 1961, originally published as Ē Ekklesiología tōn Triōn Ierarchōn: A'. Archè kaì Apokálypsis tēs Ekklesías (Athens, 1961). This article shows the unity of the ecclesiology of Saints Gregory Nazianzus, Basil and John Chrysostom. All believed that the origin of the Church was eternity and Its manifestation in the Incarnation. H. Musurillo of Fordham has written two articles of value: "Saint Methodius of Olympus", an introduction to the translation of the Convivium in (Ancient Christian Writers, XXVII, Westminister, Md., 1958, pp. 2-102). This is an effort to give the teachings of Saint Methodius some order; and the second article, "History and Symbol: A Study of Form in

Early Christian Literature" (Theological Studies, XVIII (1957), 357-368) deals with the Christian use of allegory which Musurillo traces to rabbinical and midrasaic methods rather than Hellenism. His method follows that proposed by E. Cassirer's Die Philosophie der Symbolischen Formen, that is, that literary form does not determine literary content, i.e., language is the symbol by which reality is expressed. J. B. Reeves' "Saint Augustine and Humanism" (Saint Augustine: His Age, Life and Thought. New York, 1957, pp. 43-77) shows Augustine's use and evaluation of pagan classicism. Father John Romanides' two articles are valuable: "The Ecclesiology of Saint Ignatius of Antioch" (The Greek Orthodox Theological Review, VII, 1 and 2 (1961-1962), 53-77) and "Original Sin According to Saint Paul" (St. Vladimir's Seminary Quarterly, IV, 1 and 2 (1955-1956), 5-28) both deal with the same subject: the centrality of soteriology to Christian doctrine. Contrary to what Augustine thought, says Father Romanides, man does not inherit the guilt of Adam. Rather Adam's progeny have become subject to death through sin and yolked to the power of Satan. Salvation is, therefore, freedom from death and Satan through the redemption of Christ. Not unlike this article is the one by Father Jean Meyendorff, "'Eph' ὅ (Rom. 5-12) chez Cyrille d'Alexandrie et Theodoret" (Studia Patristica, II (pt. 4), Berlin (1961), 157-161). Using the commentaries on the epistle to the Romans by Saint Cyril and the ecclesiastical writer, Theodoret, Father

Jean examines Romans v, 12. His conclusion is the same as that reached by Father Romanides. P. Sherwood has written the introductory essay, "Saint Maximus the Confessor", for his translation of the Saint's work, Capita de Charitatae (in Ancient Christian Writers, XXI, Westminster, 1958, 3-37). Sherwood offers a systematic exposition of Maximus' thought and identifies its dual sources as neo-Platonism and Origen. H. B. Swete's "The Fathers of the Church" (Encyclopedia Britannica, X, New York, 1911, 201-204) is a brief but interesting story of the title "father" according to ancient and modern sources. G. H. Williams of Harvard has written an excellent two part article, "Christology and Church-State Relations in the Fourth Century" (Church History, XX (Sept. 1951), 3-33; (Dec, 1951), 3-26). He shows that the relationship between the imperium and the sacerdotium in the Roman Empire was viewed in christological terms, that is, according to the two natures of Christ: the two impulses within the Empire were equal, but the sacerdotium was superior by virtue of its spiritual authority. This was among the orthodox, but the Arians, rejecting the divinity of Christ, placed the Emperor over the episcopacy. B. Otis' "The Throne and the Mountain: An Essay on Saint Gregory Nazianzus" (Classical Journal, LVI (1960), 146-165) is the tale of a man torn between his love for monastic seclusion and his duty toward the Church in the world. His poetry, says the author, expresses this tension and the deeply subjective

nature of Saint Gregory. Otis dwells a great deal on Gregory's humanism. This article is not written from a theological point of view. Otis sees Gregory as a Christian man of the classical world. R. E. Carter's "Saint John Chrysostom's Rhetorical Use of the Socratic Distinction Between Kingship and Tyranny" (Traditio, XIV (1958), 367-371) seeks to show how John used the old Socratic distinction between "king" and "tyrant" against the Arian teaching that the Emperor was the "image of God". John declared that the "ruler" is a tyrant if he disobeys God and seeks his own pleasure rather than the good of the people subject to him. A. Bogolepov, "The Church in Byzantium and Democratic Countries" (St. Vladimir's Seminary Quarterly, vol. I, 2 (1957), 8-17) defines the relationship between Church and state in Byzantium in christological terms. The relationship here is "chalcedonian", but in modern democratic countries where Church and state are separated the situation must be designated "nestorian". Bogolepov denies any caesaropapism in Byzantium on the basis of its political theology. F. E. Cranz's "Kingdom and Polity in Eusebius of Caesarea" (Harvard Theological Review, XLIV (1952), 47-66) describes Eusebius as the father of Christian political theory. This article outlines his teachings on the Christian Emperor, his headship over all things, including the Church. It is the Hellenistic monarchy in Christian dress. Glanville Downey's "From Pagan City to the Christian City" (The Greek Orthodox

Theological Review, X, 1 (1964), 121-139) explains the difference between the pagan homocentric polis and the christocentric polis of the Christian Roman Empire and the way that their respective forms of education shaped their citizens. Adolph von Harnack's "Neoplatonism" (Encyclopedia Britannica, XIX (New York, 1911), 272-278) carries the history of that philosophy into the Christian Roman Empire. According to Harnack, Neoplatonism is the philosophy which most influenced the Greek Fathers. R. S. Minear's "Time and the Kingdom" (Journal of Religion, XXIV (April, 1944), 81-88) traces the meaning of the different qualities of time through the Bible and the Sub-Apostolic Fathers, that is, the meaning of kaíros and chrónos. J. A. MaCulloch's "Eschatology" (Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, V, edited by James Hastings (New York, 1922), 272-291) is a history of the idea of "the last things" in ancient, medieval and modern religions.

4. Literature on the Modern Historical Method

Alfred North Whitehead's Science and the Modern World (New York, 1952) is an important contribution to the history of ideas. He traces the fundamental concepts of modern physical science to the medieval world-view. The modern secular world, he says, is not as free from religious ideas as it thinks. The Western Intellectual Tradition: from Leonardo to Hegel (New York, 1960) by J. Bronowski and B. Mazlish is a study of the development of Western ideas

from the Renaissance to the middle of the nineteenth century. This book is the story of the men, events and inventions which have led to the secularization of Western culture. Carl L. Becker's The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Century Philosophers (New Haven, 1932) is based upon the Storrs Lectures delivered by the author at Yale University. He demonstrates that the so-called "Age of Reason" was, in fact, a medieval world and that Voltaire, Hume, Diderot and Locke demolished Augustine's civitas dei only to build it again in modern secular terms. Two fine books by the late Ernst Cassirer were helpful: The Philosophy of the Enlightenment (New York, 1960) was translated from the German (Die Philosophie der Aufklaerung) by F. C. A. Koelln and J. P. Pettegrove; and An Essay on Man: An Introduction to a Philosophy of Human Culture (Garden City, 1953). In the first, the author attempts to offer the philosophy of that period in a systematic manner; and, in the second, Cassirer seeks to resolve the crisis in human knowledge by relating the various sciences and disciplines to a unifying concept, humanism. The Age of Ideology (New York, 1956) is part of the Mentor's Philosopher Series. It contains, aside from selections from the great philosophers of the nineteenth century, an excellent introduction by the editor, H. D. Aiken, and a commentary on each philosopher included in this book (Kant, Mach, Hegel, etc.). Since Kant, Aiken says, there has been an increasing awareness that the fundamental task of philosophical

criticism belongs not to science, but to something for which there is no other word but "ideology". Another contribution to the Mentor Series is The Age of Analysis (New York, 1955) edited with an introduction and commentary by Morton White. The major thought to the twentieth century, he says, has been reactions to the "synthetic" thought of Georg Hegel. W. K. Wright's A History of Modern Philosophy (New York, 1941) is a well written manual of modern philosophy for students. It begins with Descart and brings us contemporary times.

Individual philosophers of especial import to the development of modern historical attitudes are taken into consideration in our study. R. W. Meyer has written Leibnitz and The Seventeenth Century Revolution (Cambridge, Eng., 1952). It was translated from the German (Leibniz und die europaeische Ordungskreise. Hamburg, 1948) by J. P. Stern. In his provocative work, Meyer shows that the "revolution" in the seventeenth century was begun by Descartes. Leibnitz was central to the effort of his contemporaries to covert the "Holy Roman Empire" into a secular ideal. Norman Kemp Smith's A Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (New York, 1950) is a major work in Kantian philosophy. Along with his commentary on the philosopher, there is a large section of the book devoted to those thinkers who greatly influenced Kant. The Philosophy of Hegel (New York, 1955) by W. T. Stace is not unlike the book by Smith, but on Hegel. In his Idea of History (New

York, 1956) R. G. Collingwood describes the growth of the idea of history from the time of Herodotus. His interest centers on the modern historicists, himself being one, and devotes the last few chapters to his own idea of history.

Sir Isaiah Berlin's Historical Inevitability (London, 1955) is the transcription of his Auguste Comte Memorial Trust lectures delivered to the London School of Economics and Political Science. Berlin discusses those historical problems always present although not always deliberately treated by the historian while he writes his narrative, such as determinism, freedom, certainty, etc. A. J. Ayer's major work is Language, Truth and Logic (London, 1926). It is a contribution to the positivist examination of language, the "meaning" of truth and the application of logic to experience. The approach here is syntactical, i.e., determining the relation of words to each other and the data they represent. Michael Oakeshott's Experience and Its Modes (Cambridge, Eng., 1933) is an exposition of the Idealist "theory of coherence". All experience, he says, is conscious, therefore, all knowledge is a "coherence", a unity of consciousness. History, then, is the history of mind. Bertrand Russell's Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits (New York, 1948) recognizes the inevitability of scepticism, but insists that it is psychologically impossible for men to live by doubt. A. Sinclair's The Conditions of Knowing: An Essay Towards A Theory of Knowledge (London, 1951) teaches that all

certainty in knowledge must begin with "common sense", that all theories of knowledge must begin with this as their major premise. A. Child's "History as Imitation" (The Philosophical Quarterly II, 6 (July, 1952), 193-207) is an essay concerning the art of the historian: the dislodging of "form from the original matter and his installation of it in the new matter of art".

A. O. Lovejoy's contribution to the anthology edited by Hans Meyerhof (The Philosophy of History in Our Time. New York, 1959, 173-187) is "Present Standpoints and Past History". The author agrees with John Dewey's idea that "intertemporal cognition is inevitably dualistic, that the historian's act of knowing and its referent are existentially external to one another". This raises some of the numerous questions we have asked in our first chapter. Henri Pirenne's essay ("What are the Historians Trying to Do?, 87-99) in the same anthology deals with the problems of the historian, especially "the imponderable which is the human personality". Nothing contributed more to our understanding of the positions and methods of modern historians than two symposiums: Philosophy and History: Essays Presented to Ernst Cassirer (New York, 1963)edited by R. Kilbansky with the collaboration of H. J. Paton; and Der Sinn der Geschichte (Munich, 1961) edited by L. Reinisch. The first contains essays by Johann Huisinga, Samuel Alexander, L. Brunschvicz, G. Calogero, Giovanni Gentile, Fritz Mendicus, Emile Bréhier,

Jose Ortega y Gasset and Kilbansky; the Reinisch symposium contains essays by Golo Mann, Karl Loewith, R. Bultmann, Theodor Litt, Arnold J. Toynbee, K. R. Popper and Hans Urs von Balthasar. These scholars discuss metaphysics, epistemology, theology, methodology, history of the historical science and criticism. They represent the various philosophical, theological and historical schools. They all ask the question: what is history and where is it going? Some authors refuse to give the question any validity, insisting that history is what we make it and will go where we direct it; and others say that history is under the control of another force--whether we call it fate, nature or God--and that history is what He (or it) wishes it to be and where He (it) guides it. Curiously none of the authors denies the existence of human freedom. The late Albert Camus wrote an excellent book on the plight of modern man. His The Rebel (New York, 1956) was translated from the French (L'Homme Revolté) by Anthony Bower. The "revolt" of modern man, says Camus, is against the "human predicament", a revolt against absurdity and for meaning, order and clarity in life. There is a brilliant chapter on the existentialist conception of the nature and meaning of history.

Philosophical Understanding and Religious Truth (New York, 1956) by Erich Frank is the publication of his Mary Flexner Lectures. The thesis of this book is that unlike medieval man who sought to make his faith rational,

modern man has a reason in quest of faith. The end of each chapter has copious notes and bibliography. The book, Process and Religion (Garden City, 1960) by the famous Roman Catholic historian, Christopher Dawson, rejects the idea of inevitable material progress. He maintains that the vital, creative power behind every culture is spiritual. Thus, the key to history is religion, something every civilization has possessed. K. Loewith's Meaning in History (Chicago, 1937) is sub-titled "The Theological Implications of the Philosophy of History". He examines various attitudes towards history (e.g., Augustine, Kant, Nietzsche) and concludes that history has no inherent meaning. Human reason cannot find it; meaning must be revealed by God. E. L. Mascall is the leading Thomist of the Anglican Church. His Words and Images (New York, 1947) is an apologetical against Logical Positivism. Mascall contends, contrary to Positivism, that theology is a legitimate form of intellectual discourse. Gustave Thil's Théologie de L'histoire is the second volume of Théologie des Réalites Terrestres (Bruges, 1949). This volume is an interpretation of temporal and human history in terms of the Biblical distinction between "flesh" and "spirit". Thils believes that Augustine's idea of history as a conflict between belief and unbelief is an oversimplification. Reinhold Niebhur, professor of ethics and theology at Union Theological Seminary, is one of America's most outspoken Protestant opponents of religious liberalism

and humanism. His Faith and History (New York, 1948) is a compelling attack against the "liberal" vision of history. Faith in reason, which has played a dominant role in the development of modern culture, has not realized the historical bliss which liberals had anticipated. Catastrophe has been the result of their faith. Alan Richardson's Christian Apologetics (New York, 1957) is an Augustinian-Thomist defense of the Christian religion. History is, therefore, viewed in that tradition. Christianity alone gives history meaning, because this religion alone can boast of the Incarnation. Richardson argues also from miracles, moral power and purity of Christianity, its cultural importance, etc. E. Lampert's The Apocalypse of History is written from the Eastern Orthodox point of view: the end of history has already broken into the stream of history. The testimony of theology and philosophy, he says, indicates that the concepts of time and history are interrelated; hence, Christianity offers a unique conception of them through its eschatology. Nicholas Arseniev is professor of Comparative Religion and Christian Apologetics at Saint Vladimir Russian Orthodox Seminary. His "The Meaning and Goal of History" (St. Vladimir's Seminary Quarterly, I, 1 (1957), 5-11) describes the meaning and goal of history as divine glory. He borrows elements from all religions to show that such an idea is common to them even if the concept of God may differ.

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